**BENCANA, SOLIDARITAS DAN INTEGRASI NASIONAL**

Pathway to Integration or Disintegration? Reflection on Tsunami and Transformation in Indonesia’s Relations with Aceh
Sulikah Asmoro Wati

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Suatu Tinjauan Teoritik
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PENGANTAR REDAKSI

Kalau kita tengok ke belakang pada penghujung tahun 2004, beberapa negara Asia termasuk Indonesia mengalami bencana alam dahsyat yang terkenal dengan nama Tsunami. Ribuan bahkan ratusan ribu korban terpaksa kehilangan tempat tinggal, harta benda bahkan sanak saudara. Beberapa pendapat menyatakan bahwa kejadian tersebut adalah suatu peringatan, bahkan malah ada yang berpendapat azab dari Tuhan. Akan tetapi dari semua itu, sebagai manusia sudah sepatasnya untuk bangkit dan mampu mengambil hikmah atau pelajaran yang didapat dari peristiwa yang memilukan tersebut, agar tidak berlarut-larut dalam gelombang kesedihan yang berkepanjangan.

Semenjak peristiwa bencana alam atau ada yang menyebut “Rencana Alam” ini banyak sekali simpati berdatangan baik dari dalam negeri maupun luar negeri. Ada yang berupa bantuan tenaga sukarelawan, bahan-bahan pokok, pakaian, bahan-bahan rumah tinggal, dan sebagainya. Sekarang yang menjadi pertanyaan adalah sanggupkah pemerintah Indonesia mengelola segala bentuk bantuan tersebut agar tersalurkan kepada penerima yang betul-betul berhak? Mengingat track record Indonesia yang sarat dengan kasus penyelewengan di mata internasional.


Sebagai pengelola jurnal, pihak redaksi tetap berkeyakinan bahwa kehadiran jurnal ilmiah Masyarakat, Kebudayaan dan Politik ini semoga dapat memberikan yang terbaik serta mampu menyajikan media interaksi yang dapat menjembatani para ahli, ilmuwan sosial, pemerhati masalah sosial-politik dan berbagai pihak terkait dalam mengkomunikasikan gagasan serta ide untuk pengayaan bidang ilmu guna menjawab permasalahan pembangunan serta perkembangan masyarakat yang senantiasa berubah.

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PATHWAY TO INTEGRATION OR DISINTEGRATION? REFLECTION ON TSUNAMI AND TRANSFORMATION IN INDONESIA’S RELATIONS WITH ACEH

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Abstrak


Kata-kata Kunci: Tsunami, Bencana, Integrasi, Disintegrasi, GAM, Aceh

On Sunday morning, 26 December 2004, there was no sign or warning about what were going to happen at all. The Acehnese and some people in North Sumatra, especially those lived at the adjacent of Samudera Hindia, and more specifically at the northern beach of Nagngroe Aceh Darussalam (hereafter Aceh or NAD) were doing their morning activities. They were cooking, having breakfast and many other housekeeping works, and most importantly enjoying and continuing their lives; despite so many fears they have encountered so far, either caused by the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM) or from the Indonesian National Army (Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI); resulting from the continuous conflict on the movement for independence in the province.

In that day, a massive earthquake and tsunami that represents the biggest natural disaster in the globe hit the province of NAD and part of North Sumatera. This disaster is the climax of many disasters that have happened in Indonesia lately. The disaster that also hit other nine Asian countries (including such as Sri Lanka,
Thailand, and India) has claimed thousands of lives. According to the Indonesian Ministry of Health, until 20 January 2005, there were 166,520 dead human victims in Aceh, while other 240 people in North Sumatera. A more comprehensive data from Informasi Media Lembaga Informasi Nasional recorded that until 25 January 2005, there were 93,482 dead victims been buried, while the missing victims and the survivors/evacuees account for about 132,172 and 394,285 people respectively (Kompas 22 January 2005).

Meanwhile, those who are alive have lost not only their houses and their jobs, but also their families and friends. Mothers, fathers or parents have lost their children and vice versa, children have lost their fathers, mothers and even parents. Husbands have lost their wives or again vice versa. Similarly, students have lost their teachers and vice versa. They also have lost their schools, their books and thus their education. Farmers have lost their rice field while fishermen have lost their source of life. The tsunami hit all people in the adjacent areas, regardless of their status, gender, jobs, religions and many other differences, regardless whether the people are poor or rich, men or women, doctors, army generals or peasants. It was the day of mourning, the day of death and lost!!!

Turning to the infrastructure condition, around 110 bridges were severely damaged or even disappear, swept up by the ‘angry’ wave; around 150 kilometers roads were cut off; transportation, electricity, clean water installation and communication network broke down, many other public infrastructure were harshly damage (such as nine ports and seven airports). Moreover, at least two million houses, buildings, including government offices and other public facilities were brushed away. These all were soon followed by inescapable lack of food, clothes, shelter, and clean water and many other basic necessities. Meanwhile those area hit tremendously by the disaster (such as Banda Aceh, Meulaboh, Kecamatan Jaya Baru, Meuraxa, Kutara, Kuta alam, Syiah Kuala and Baiturrahman) turned out to be areas of wastes, wastes of destroyed buildings and infrastructure, waste of stink human dead bodies.

More terribly, those who safe from the disaster (the survivors) have also threatened by the follow-on problems such as undernourishment and diseases (such as cholera) caused by poor living condition and the buried dead bodies which were unable to be evacuated soon due to heavy damages.

This disaster, indeed, has marked the end of the year of 2004 with a tragedy, a tragedy of humanitarian. The disaster has also tested Indonesia’s integrity as a nation. The question remains as to how this disaster transforms Indonesia’s relations with Aceh. As has been known, Indonesia has faced an internal conflict driven by the separatist movement (GAM) in Aceh not too long since its dependence. This paper aims to discuss how the disaster may lead to Indonesia’s integration but at the same time can be a pathway for Indonesia’s disintegration, with special case on Aceh. Discussions will also focus on what the Indonesian government, together with its citizens do in response to such huge disaster. Specifically, it concerns with what government have responded and should respond to the disaster to maintain Indonesia’s integrity. Some discussion will also be related to foreign assistance.
and interventions in Aceh. As the background, a discussion on the conflict driven by GAM will also be presented.

The Government’s Responses to the Disaster

Before discussing this section, it is important to note that to relieve sufferers of the Acehnese, actions for Aceh (i.e. by delivering more assistance and rebuilding it etc) are far more important than merely assessment of what the government do or cannot do. This is especially in regard to the complexity of the problems caused by the heavy damage.¹

Considering the massive damage of the area hit by the disaster, a question to normalise or rebuild Aceh, indeed, is ‘where to start’. Unsurprisingly, solutions to normalise Aceh seem so slow, since there are so many connecting problems as previously discussed. Coupled with unprepared institutional arrangements and bureaucracy, solutions for Aceh tend to be trapped in a vicious circle that needs to be addressed more seriously.

In fact, the tragedy of tsunami suffered by the Acehnese (and North Sumatera people) has attracted full attention to not only their Indonesian counterparts but also governments, other non-government institutions (such as the United Nation (the UN) and The World Bank) and people worldwide in general. (Discussion about foreign assistance and interventions for the victims of tsunami in Aceh will be explored in the next section).

As widely published, most elements within Indonesia’s society have participated in easing burdens, suffered by their counterparts. This includes ordinary citizens regardless the have or the have not, army members/government officials or farmers, actors or singers, small to hyper companies or any other entertainment establishments. Meanwhile, a number of leading newspapers as well as the television networks in this country have also opened bank accounts for people to donate while also set up a temporal office as the center for collecting donations. These all demonstrate that ‘the togetherness as one nation is still there within the Indonesian society. Thousands of Indonesians from most part of the country have also become volunteers who directly involve in evacuating and helping the victims. These all happen, despite many conflicts that has happened between Indonesia with the Acehnese (read GAM) and despite Jakarta’s invasion to the rebel province under Megawati administration in 2003.

More importantly, while the world keep an eye on Indonesia’s (read: the Indonesian government) ability to reconstruct the damaged areas, there is a sense that the government has responded slowly to the problems (Kompas, 22 Januari 2005).² This is demonstrated by evidence, such as the existence of conflict of interests between

¹ Factually, this assessment has been a major topic in the discourse about the management of post-disaster in Aceh lately.
² Without ignoring the fact that the government does tries to find the best solutions for the abundant problems in Aceh (as has been discussed the problems caused by this disaster are really massive due to heavy damages).
the government elites at Jakarta, or the poor coordination in the implementation process in the field as discussed below.

One of the urgent things to do for the victims of the disaster is the relocation of the survivors from the emergency camps to better shelters. Unfortunately, the development of the relocation areas with all their basic facilities is so slow. This is because there have not been agreements between the government elites regarding where the relocation should be. In fact, there are 370,000 survivors/evacuees living in improper emergency tents, barracks or camps, waiting to be relocated to a better and safer shelter (Kompas, 15 January 2005).

Turning to the poor coordination above, there have been any systemic standard operating procedures (SOP) in the implementation process in the field. Even Bakornas PBP (Badan Koordinasi Nasional Penanggulangan Bencana dan Penanganan Pengungsian), the special coordinating body for tackling the disaster and managing the survivors, led by the vice president - Jusuf Kalla), is organised poorly without proper managerial or organisational procedures. Despite the complexities of the problems in Aceh, it works without setting any plans to choose for priorities. So far it works based on how to find the dead bodies and then buried them, as this is thought to be the urgent things to do (More clearly see Kompas, 22 January 2005).

Indeed, the condition of disorganised government’s responses to Aceh is a paradox and at the same time represents the unprepared bureaucracy caused by the legacy of the new order bureaucrats.

Most importantly, the government’s slow responses for Aceh, coupled with the poor coordination and unorganised interventions for rebuilding, rehabilitating and reconstructing Aceh were caused by the fact that there have not been any rules and laws for emergencies and disaster management in Indonesia. Thus, it is urgent for Indonesia to establish such regulations and laws.

The Foreign Assistance and Interventions

Fortunately (or is unfortunately more appropriate here for the Indonesian government???) the government’s slow responses to the disaster have soon be followed by a quick and more comprehensive efforts by the foreign assistance and interventions.

Soon after the disaster hit Aceh, foreign assistance and interventions started to flow to Aceh. With their somewhat more sophisticated equipments (such as water purification machine and the US’s Abraham Lincoln Ship), many foreign activities (for instance the establishment of temporal medical centre, schools, and shelters for the survivors) do help to relieve the Acehnese’s trauma.

Many countries have offered their contributions to rehabilitate Aceh. The government of the United States of America, for instance, appointed its two ex presidents George Bush and Bill Clinton to specially manage any assistance and interventions for Aceh. Until very recently there have been as many as 13,000 American military forces in Aceh, came specially to help the post-disaster management. The Australian government sent around 1,016 military forces, doctors and nurses, while the city of Paris contributed to five helicopters, landing craft that really useful in
the damaged areas (Jawa Pos 15 January 2005).

Meanwhile a significant number of international non-government institutions also participate in the rehabilitation process in Aceh. The largest organisation being the United Nation, (The UN, Perserikatan Bangsa Bangsa (PBB)) that has initiated significant efforts to assist Aceh. The most important things is that this long list of foreign assistance has now been more dominating initiatives for the post-disaster interventions in Aceh, than those initiated by the Indonesian government.

Indeed, within the Acehnese now, there is a view how the country is more on ‘talking’ rather than ‘doing’ in response to the disaster. The main concern of the government currently to the world is selling the idea that “we are clean (and not corrupt), do not hesitate to deliver your assistance!” or as President Susilo Bambang Yudoyono stated on the day he welcomed the two ex US’s presidents, ‘any assistances and aid for Aceh will be managed transparently’ (Kompas, 22 January 2005).

Despite, the inherent good will in the president’s statement above, it should be borne in mind that the problems of corruption have always been a part of Indonesian bureaucracies. This has been well known worldwide and further led to hesitations for other countries to provide assistance. As is also maintained by the coordinator of Japan’s aid for Aceh, the Japanese government will provide some assistance but it wants to be sure that the assistance will not be corrupted (Kompas, 30 January 2005).

In response to the foreign assistance, the government continuously tries to restrict the flow of the foreign assistances and interventions in Aceh, fearing that more foreign interventions may lead to the province’s independence. The government has set a due date of 26 March 2005 for the foreign volunteers and militaries to remain in Aceh. This undoubtedly represents the government erroneous policy that does not correspond with the needs of the victims (the Acehnese).

Interestingly, on the other side, GAM welcomed and even assured the security of the foreign volunteers, militaries and all their assistances for Aceh.

The above contradict perspectives on foreign assistance in Aceh mounts to analysis on whether the disaster may lead to Indonesia’s integration or vice versa, disintegration. Before analysing this issue, as the background, the next section discusses the separatist conflict in Aceh.

The Separatist Conflict in Aceh

The fierce resistance of Aceh, the resource-rich province in the northern tip of Indonesia, to the Central Government’s control since the late 1980s lies at the pervasive sense of economical injustice, combined with a strong tradition of regional self-assertion (Huxley, 2002). This conflict is currently seen as the scene of worst

3 There is a long list of foreign assistance (including from Japan, Germany, Singapore, the Philippine and many other countries), if all are discussed here, these will take a substantial portion of this paper.
internal conflict in Indonesia.

The deep-rooted conflict in Aceh can be traced back to the region significant role in the period of Indonesia’s revolution against Dutch control. It is argued, that soon after Indonesia’s independence was declared on August 17, 1945, Aceh came to the forefront in support of the new independent country. However, what remains missing in Indonesia’s history is the fact that although Aceh remains an integral part in the process of the national building in Indonesia, Acehnese expected that the new Indonesia would recognize their regions’ distinct characteristics, history and status.

Clearly, Aceh’s demand for special treatments (such as to implement syariah (Islamic) law) has been grounded from its contributions during the revolution and its self-image as a unique religious region compared to other parts of Indonesia. However, the special treatment was not the case. It can be shown, for example, by Indonesia’s failure to make Aceh a separate province, but rather incorporated it within the larger province of North Sumatra. Since then, the relationship between Jakarta (the Indonesia’s capital), with Aceh has been tense and violent. From 1953, for example, Aceh was an important base for the Moslem separatism movement, Darul Islam, which sought to form an Islamic state (Aspinall 2002; Huxley, 2002; Smith). In response to that and any other rebellions later, the use of force has always legitimated to maintain Indonesia’s unity.

To ease the tension, in 1959 the government assigned ‘special region’ status, which allow autonomy in religion, customary law and education in Aceh. Yet, the focus on centralisation of political and economic power during the New Order government era, under Suharto, continued to provoke resentment.

The frustration of the Acehnese was worsened by the government’s exploitation of the province’s huge natural gas resources, which benefited the central government at the expense of Aceh. In accordance with the orientation for economic growth, the New Order government had tried to attract foreign capital to exploit its natural resources. This is mounted with the creation of the enclave economy zone run by the United States (US) based multinational mobil (now Exxon Mobil) which destroyed the traditional livelihoods. During this era, Aceh gained a share only as little as 5% from their oil and gas revenues (Bertrand 2004; Huxley 2002).

In 1976, Hasan di Tiro, a former

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4 On October. 15 1945, four of the most respected clerics in Aceh — Teungku Hadji Hasan Kroeng Kale, Teungku M. Daoed Beureueh, Teungku Hadji Dja’far Sidik Lamjubat and Teungku Hadji Ahmad Hashballah Indrapoeri — issued an announcement in the name of all clerics in Aceh, calling on all Acehnese to help defend the new Indonesia. In addition, the Acehnese also donated cash to help finance the Indonesian government in Yogyakarta to run its operations and open representative offices abroad. In 1949, the Acehne se donated two airplanes, one of which was the famous Seulawah plane that later became a pioneer in the establishment of national flag-carrier Garuda Indonesia (RI-001). Because of these donations in the early period of Indonesia, first president Sukarno described Aceh as a capital of Indonesia.
Darul Islam envoy and businessman descended from pre-colonial sultans, formed the Aceh Sumatra National Liberation Front (ASNLF), which later well known as Free Aceh Movement (GAM). Since then, GAM has been the main vehicle of the separatist movement in Aceh. In the late 1980s GAM gained popular support and began attacking Indonesia, security forces. The Indonesian authorities responded brutally by sending more than 6000 troops in mid 1990. Meanwhile, since 1989 until 1998 Aceh is designated as a Military Operation Areas (DOM). From this time, the Acehnese have carried on their lives with terror, killings, arbitrary detention, torture and disappearance (McCulloch, and; Huxley 2002).

According to McCulloch (no date), the Aceh struggle is not based on religion or a hope to impose syariah (Islamic) law in Aceh as many recent media reports imply. Rather, the GAM enjoys significant support in Aceh for two reasons. First is the belief that the central government, the local pro-Jakarta elite and the army stationed there, have systematically devastated the province’s riches. Second, the continuous human rights abuses imposed by the security forces have cultivated in a sense of hatred towards the government in Jakarta and the army involved.

In the post Suharto era, East Timor’s independence has made the conflict worse and its resolution even more difficult. Since early 1999, there has been a movement for an East Timor-style referendum. A student-led coalition of about one hundred NGOs emerged called the Aceh Referendum Information Centre (SIRA), with a non-violent focus on independence. Meanwhile GAM continued to carry out their radical action. On November 9, 1999, possibly one-fourth of the entire Acehnese population demanded a referendum in the capital city of Banda Aceh. However, all the governments of Indonesia (under Habibie, Abdurrahman Wahid and Megawati) have opposed to any referendum, fearing that it would raise the possibility of independence and thus lead to the break-up of Indonesia (Smith 2002).

To reach a peaceful resolution in the situation in Aceh, in June 2001 the government-style approaches have been made, namely granting the Special Autonomy for Aceh, implying significant political (the implementation of the syariah law, including the change of the provincial name as the Province of Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam (NAD), a new Islamic name) as well as economic concession (Aceh will receive 70% of the total revenues of its natural resources as from January 1, 2002). Several negotiations, sponsored by the Henry Dunant Center (HDC) and the United Nations have also been held in Geneva. However, neither side indicated a willingness to compromise on Aceh’s sovereignty (Huxley 2002).

The latest response to the conflict under Megawati’s government was the Jakarta’s invasion to Aceh in June 2003. This military operation has been the biggest operation after Indonesia’s invasion to East Timor in 1975.

In the post-disaster, GAM shows it existence by speaking in international media. As Mucksalma, the spoken person of GAM, asserted to Ian Fisher from The New York Times, GAM in the opinion that it is Indonesia (the Indonesian army (TNI) in Aceh in particular) the one that ‘foreign’ (asing) for them. For GAM, Indonesia is just the other name of Java co-
lonialism. Thus without doubts, GAM is in support of foreign assistance in Aceh.

The latest negotiation between Aceh and the Indonesian government is going to be held in Helsinki in the next February 2005. But, it seems that it will be difficult to come to agreements. The problem is that the Indonesian government remains on its idea that solution for Aceh is the special autonomy, while GAM sticks on the idea of Aceh’s independence.

**Analysis: Is the Disaster a Pathway for Indonesia’s Integration or Disintegration?**

Looking back at how the Indonesian society has responded ‘truthfully’ to the disaster, shown by a significant amount of donations either in cash or in the form of basic necessities (food and clothes including baby’s) as well as their willingness to be volunteers; it is clear that the solidarity amongst Indonesian society as a nation still exists. If this good will of the society is then translated to the field (i.e. to the Acehnese) correctly, demonstrated by clean and transparent distribution of any donations collected, this will contribute to the integrity of Indonesia as a nation. In this way, the sense of ‘trust’ and belonging as well as togetherness amongst the Acehnese to their Indonesian counterparts as one nation arises.

In contrast, the government’s slow responses to the post-disaster management, as well as its restriction to the foreign assistance in Aceh can contribute to Indonesia’s disintegration.

Yet, it is unwise to restrict foreign assistance, such as by setting a due date of 26 March 2005 for the foreigners to remain in Aceh. Especially considering that these assistance are still needed by the Acehnese and also for the rehabilitation of the post-disaster areas.

This paper will not argue that for some reasons, too much relying on foreign assistance is not wise. One of the reasons is that too much foreign assistance may lead to Aceh’s independence (as the Acehnese know by themselves how their government is somehow incapable and irresponsible especially compare to the foreigners). Briefly, at least for the next one year foreign assistance are still needed in Aceh. What the government can do to prevent the tendency of independence is by showing the world, and the Acehnese more particularly, that the government concerns more on what the Acehnese’s need and interest and not only emphasises on the politicised policies as has happened so far (read: policies that benefit Jakarta or central government). Practically, the government should mobilise a significant amount of its strengths and resources to rebuild Aceh (including the peaceful mobilisation of the TNI to develop Aceh) and not by restricting such useful foreign assistance.

More significantly, the representation of Indonesia amongst Acehnese so far is the government officials such as the governor, major, etc including the TNI members which are corrupt. This should be banished away and changed with a more clean government as spelled out in the new elected government’s goals, especially in its first 100 days in power. This will result in accountability and transparency in the post disaster management and therefore raises the Acehnese’s trust to Indonesia after so long treated unfairly in the new order era.
Factually, there are two biggest challenges in the post disaster management in Aceh, namely that the foreign assistance should be distributed equally and transparently and the development of infrastructure. For the later, it is important, therefore, that the economic potentialities of Aceh’s natural resources within government policies should be used to answer the need of the Acehnese, that is, for the rehabilitations of infrastructures in Aceh.

Meanwhile the government also should not hesitate to devote a significant fund for rebuilding Aceh considering its contributions in the previous years. As has been known, in 1990s, when Indonesia relied heavily its national income on oil and gas products; Aceh was the biggest contributor for Indonesia’s income. At that time the production of oil and gas in Aceh reached a value of US$ 2 billion (Rp. 18 triliun), currently this value has become around US$ 500 million (Rp. 5 triliun), huge money that can be spent to rebuild Aceh as a reward for its contribution to Indonesia so far (Kompas 22 January 2005).

Last and the most important, there is an urgent need for regulations and laws on the emergency relieve and disaster management which never being taken into consideration in the government policy before.

Conclusion

The disaster of earthquake and tsunami in Aceh and part of North Sumatera on 26 December 2005, which represents the biggest natural disaster in the globe, has left so many lessons, particularly for Indonesia’s relations with Aceh. The disaster that also represents the climax of the disasters happened in Indonesia raise a question on whether the disaster is a pathway to Indonesia’s integration or vice versa. Discussion in this paper finds that this disaster can be a pathway for both Indonesia’s integration and disintegration. This especially relates with the contradict responses between the Indonesian government’s (that tends to restrict) and GAM’s (that tend to welcome) upon the flows of foreign assistance and interventions in Aceh. One of the important things is that it is not wise to restrict foreign assistance in regard to the fear of Aceh’s independence. This is because the Indonesian government’s unfavorable responses to the foreign interventions more or less may contribute to the international support to GAM which welcoming such interventions and thus may lead to Indonesia’s disintegration. Eventually, it is suggested that there is urgency for Indonesia to have regulations and laws on the emergency relieve and disaster management, as well as the need to embrace on a more accountable and transparent post-disaster management.
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