Domestic Political Structure and Public Influence on Foreign Policy, A Basic Model

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ABSTRACT

This article revisits the importance of state’s domestic political structure and the role of the public on foreign policy. It begins by describing the three main aspects of foreign policy and then re-highlights the views of IR traditional perspectives on foreign policy. Taking into considering the increasing number of democracies and the influence of globalization in the last twenty years, this article stresses the significance stance of domestic political structure and the public on foreign policy by suggesting it in the form of a basic model.

Keywords: domestic political structure, foreign policy, public influence

As number of states around the world adopting democracy as a political system increasing rapidly in the last twenty years, many students of International Relations (IR) has begun to pay more attention on the domestic aspects of foreign policy decision-making. Equally, the increasing influence of the media to the general public has also helped diminishing the understanding gap between the government and the general public on issues of foreign policy. There is a need, therefore, to revisit the importance of domestic political aspects and the role of the public on foreign policy and the government’s foreign policy preferences accordingly. This article revisits the theoretical stance of domestic politics and the public on foreign policy within the tradition of IR, and it is aimed especially for early IR students who are concerns with the role of domestic political aspects and the public on foreign policy formulation.
The Three Main Aspects

Students of International Relations (IR) generally define foreign policy as authoritative measures undertaken by governments with certain purposes in regard to interactions with governments of other states. It refers to the actions and purposes of personalised national governments with respects to areas and objects lying beyond states territorial limits (Modelska 1962; Rosenau 1974; Winkelfeld et al. 1980; Holsti 1983). However, it has also been accepted that non-state actors could have had considerable impact on the overall dynamics of the international system (Nossal 1998; Mansbach 2000; Kegley and Wittkopf 2004; Russet, Starr and Kinsella 2006). Therefore, authoritative measures undertaken by governments with certain purposes in regard to interactions with other external actors would also include the ones with non-state actors (Wurfel and Burton 1990, 5).

In the process of analysis, IR scholars often further elaborate the essence of foreign policy. Modelska (1962) perceives it as a system of activity that involves the process of inputs flowing into it and outputs arising out of the process. It is in this system of activity that policy makers become one important element in the process of foreign policy formulation. Rosenau (1976) distinguishes three integral parts of foreign policy known as three concepts of foreign policy; a cluster of orientations, a set of commitments and plans for action, and a form of behaviour. A cluster of orientations refer to attitudes, perceptions, and values deriving from state’s historical experience and strategic circumstances which mark its place in the world politics. A set of commitments and plans for action points to revealing strategies, real decisions, and observable policies, which are taken when states get linked to external environments.

Meanwhile, a form of behaviour refers to the empirical phase of foreign policy. These are concrete steps or activities that follow the translation of generalised orientations of foreign policy. Holsti (1983) takes a slightly different approach by expanding and dividing the concept of foreign policy into four components ranging from general to specific; orientations, national roles, objectives, and actions. Orientations refer to general attitudes and commitments toward the external environment, incorporating basic strategy for accomplishing domestic and external objectives, especially in coping with persisting threats. National roles concerns with the policy makers’ definitions about the general kinds of decisions, commitments, rules, and actions that are suitable to their state, and of the functions their state should perform in a variety of geographic and issue settings. Objective is meant for an image of a future state of affairs and set of conditions that governments through individual policy makers aspire to bring about by wielding influence abroad and by changing or sustaining the behaviour of other states. Actions are the things that “governments do to others in order to effect
certain orientations, fulfill roles, or achieve and defend objectives”, and “an act is basically a form of communication intended to change or sustain the behavior of those upon whom the acting government is dependent for achieving its own goals” (Holsti 1983, 144).

Accepting that Modelski, Rosenau, and Holsti are representing the vast of IR scholars, there has been similarity in terms of what IR scholars have generally considered as the main aspects of foreign policy. There are at least three main aspects of foreign policy, namely sources of foreign policy, the process of producing sources becoming policy, and actions that carried out in implementing policy. Within the vast literature of IR, there are at least three different labels which are utilised in distinguishing these three main aspects of foreign policy. First, the three main aspects are identified as the sources of external behaviour, the process through which these sources are jointly taken into action, and the action itself. Second, the three main aspects are respectively named as the independent, intervening, and dependent variables of foreign policy. Third, the three main aspects are called as the input, the decision-making, and the output of foreign policy.

**Traditional Views**

History is one of the earlier social science disciplines from where alternative approaches (theories, perspectives) for foreign policy analysis have developed (Walker 1990, 482-505; Knutsen 1992; Sked 1989; Smith 1999). An historical approach tends to describe broad trends in states’ foreign policies and relates those policies to the social, economic, ideological, and geographic conditions within a certain period of time. It focuses on the analysis of reactions to other nations or the behaviour of interests groups within a broader historical background. Together with the growing complexity of international politics, this early approach has contributed to the rise of liberalism/idealism and realism approaches, which between the First and the Second World War, particularly after the Second World War, had marked the birth of international relations as a ‘separate’ discipline in social science (Smith 1989, 3-27). Indeed, the liberalism/idealism and realism approaches have been considered as foundations of international relations (foreign policy) theories; both are often referred too as ‘traditional theories’ of IR (Kegley 1995, 25-34; Holsti 1995, 35-65; Hobson 2000, 15-106).

In essence, liberalism and realism offer different basic postulates in understanding the nature of international politics. Griffiths and O’Callaghan (2002) summarise that “a central characteristic of idealism is the belief that what unites human beings is more important than what divides them”. The idealism proponents reject
“communitarian and realist arguments that the state is itself a source of moral value for human beings”. Moreover, the advocates of idealism “defended a cosmopolitan ethics and sought to educate individuals about the need to reform the international system” (Griffiths and O’Callaghan 2002, 149). In contrast to liberalism, realism offers “both descriptive and prescriptive insights about international relations’ (Griffiths and O’Callaghan 2002, 262).

Most of its proponents share at least the following basic premises. First, it regards “the structure of the international system as a necessary if not always sufficient explanation for many aspects of international relations”. Second, it notes that “the absence of a central authority to settle disputes is the essential feature of the contemporary system”. Third, it considers states as the central actors in the international system. Fourth, it perceives the states’ behaviour as being rational because “it is guided by the logic of ‘national interest’, usually defined in terms of survival, security, power, and relative capabilities”. Fifth, state is considered as a unitary actor. Therefore, states’ actions are primarily a response to external rather than domestic political forces (Holsti 1995, 36-37; Griffiths and O’Callaghan 2002, 262-263).

Drawing on from the premises of realism, it is clear for its proponents that the most significant focus in analysing foreign policy is on the external aspects. This is a consequence of the way in which the proponents of realism portray the importance of state as the main actors in the international system, which they consider act rationally as unitary actors. It downplays, although not necessarily discounts, the significance of domestic politics. In contrast, liberalism approach has the tendency to consider the state more as a coalition of interests that could represent individuals and groups, and emphasises on low politics. Nevertheless, according to Holsti (1995, 39), at least until the end of the Cold War, realism has emerged as the dominant approach and this has been partly due to its usefulness in providing framework for understanding the Second World War and the Cold War.

Criticisms to both liberalism and realism approaches have at least derived from two other approaches, namely psychological approach and decision-making approach. From the psychological approach, as de Rivera (1968) argues, liberalism and realism do not provide more detailed picture of forces shaping foreign policy due to the lack of attention of both on the role of a psychological factor that “emphasises on the individual perceptions, values, and interpersonal relations”. According to Rivera “the individual is always present; a correct perception, or a particularly creative one, is just as psychological and reflects individual values just as much as does a distorted view of reality”. The problem, he further argues, “there is a tendency to take for granted psychological factor simply because we assume human nature as a constant factor”, and reminds that “one danger of taking
psychology for granted is the danger of failing to see that things could have happened differently if man had behaved differently”. Therefore, “any analysis [of foreign policy] that divorces history, political science, psychology, and the other social sciences is apt to be incomplete and somewhat misleading” (de Rivera 1968, 2-3).

Another criticism comes from scholars who concentrate on the way foreign policies are made; decision making approach (Snyder, Bruck and Sapin 1962; Frankel 1963; Powel, Purkit and Dyson 1987, 203-220; Anderson 1987, 285-308; Hermann, Hermann and Hagan 1987, 309-336). Basically, the proponents of decision-making stand upon several shared premises. First, they believe that individuals holding decision-making positions within the government bureaucracy play a major role in what and how foreign policies are planned and formulated. Second, they equally believe that bureaucracies (government organisations) have imperative role in the process of formulating foreign policies because the actual or end policies are often adopted as the product of bargaining between the concerned government’s organisations or departments. Third, as those important individuals work within a bureaucratic procedure, they tend to rationally operate according to certain rules that link them. Thus, state decisions are essentially designed and formulated by individuals and groups of individuals acting on behalf of state.

Based on those arguments, the proponents of decision-making approach challenge the realism premise considering the state as a unitary rational actor whose behaviour can be explained by mainly referring to the structure of international system. In what seems to be close to the basic premises of idealism, the advocates of decision-making approach argue that individual, groups, and organizations acting in the name of the state are also sensitive to pressures and constraints other than international system (external environment). These pressures and constraints could include elite maintenance, electoral politics, public opinion, pressure group activities, ideological preferences, and bureaucratic politics. They claim that national interests cannot be solely defined by international system because national interests can also reflect elements within the sphere of domestic politics. Moreover, they strongly believe that the internal process of the state must be taken into account with the main focus of analysis directed at decision makers and how they define the whole situation, domestic and international politics.

The decision-making approach has three variants, namely bureaucratic politics, organizational process or group dynamics, and individual decision-making or some called it the presidential (leader) management model. The first –bureaucratic politics– points to the proposition that perceives foreign policy decisions as being resultant from “a game of bargaining and compromise between upper-level decision makers”. Sometimes the compromise process is beyond the control of the leader of the state. Thus, decision-making is considered as the result
of bargaining process within the states' bureaucratic organizations. The second—organisational process or group dynamics—is a variant of decision-making approach whose proponents argue that the interests of organisations involved in the process of foreign policy decision-making dominate such process. Within this variant, therefore, foreign policy is being understood as the product of group interactions in the process of decision-making. Meanwhile the third—individual decision-making—is a variant of decision-making approach whose advocates argue that it is the leader who actually generates and controls the system in which foreign policies are formulated, partly as an effort to maintain leadership. Thus, foreign policy is being considered as the result of individual leader’s choice in the process of decision-making (Newmann 1998, 187). Regardless of the models, nevertheless, using decision-making approach means for the necessity to view foreign policy through the eyes of those who act in the name of their state. These are decision-makers and individual groups, including the leaders, who perform and function within the context of their state’s organisational bureaucratic procedures.

The Stance of Domestic Politics and the Public

Realism and liberalism differ at considering the importance of domestic politics in foreign policy. As noted previously, the former tends to downplay the significance of domestic politics because its proponents focus on the power politics, the accumulation and protection of power, states’ status in the international system, and consider state as a rational unitary actor. The realist approach argues that domestic structures of states play modest role in foreign policy. It does not consider state’s actions are being determined by domestic factors such as ideology, culture, and religion. Instead, realist sees state’s actions are being based on its interests in the power it perceives it needs to survive (Haque 2003, 135-155). The concept of real-politic is the basis for the realist argument because it emphasises that foreign policy is self-interested, aimed at preparing for war and calculating the relative balances of power. Moreover, national interest is the only main guideline to the state’s formation of foreign policy, and therefore the national interest is the accumulation of power (Doyle 1997, 18-19). In short, it is the international system and not domestic politics causing it to adopt certain foreign policy and act in a particular way.

Liberalism, in contrast, values the importance of domestic politics in foreign policy. Instead of seeing state as rational unitary actor, it views it as a coalition of interests representing individuals, a variety group of individuals, and the public. Therefore national interests are determined by which of such many interests between individual, groups of individuals, and the public captures government authority. In short, domestic values, variables, and institutions have international
significance on foreign policy. Although liberalism generally agrees that domestic politics plays a role in foreign policy, however, there have been differences among its proponents concerning how much and in what ways actually it may affect foreign policy. Norman Angel (as quoted in Griffiths 1999, 53 & 55) considered as being one of key pioneers for interdependence theory, for instance, is dubious about the ‘public mind’ of democracies in international relations. He emphasises that ‘wars often occurred because of jingoism, excessive or distorted nationalism, and the ability of military elites to manipulate and misrepresent their citizens’ views of other states’. In contrast, though acknowledging that domestic politics and public participation are beneficial in foreign policy, some refuse to accept the traditional dichotomy between domestic and international politics.

Hobson (as quoted in Griffiths 1999, 82), whose major contribution was on the study of international political economy, argued that ‘it makes no sense to study the international economy by treating domestic and international relations separately from one another’. Equally, Held (as quoted in Griffiths 1999, 77), views that as the result of increasing global interconnectedness, states are coming to the stage where it is difficult to control activities within and beyond states’ borders. The scope of states’ policy instruments is shrinking and unless cooperating with others, they are unable to solve a growing number of inter-states problems. Therefore he argues that ‘states are increasingly enmeshed in a multitude of collaborative arrangements to manage trans-state boundary issues, the result being a growing disjuncture that makes it difficult for state to separate the domain spheres of domestic and foreign policy’. Rosecrance (as quoted in Griffiths 1999, 91), who places the most emphasis on the correlation between domestic and international politics, contends that it is unworkable to isolate domestic politics from foreign policy especially in order to assess systemic stability. He argues that international action ‘is brought into play only in response to policy initiatives of member states’. Furthermore, he suggests that the main causes of foreign policy behaviour arise from the domestic political systems and criticises the inability of the international system to address serious international instabilities and their consequences caused by domestic disturbances.

One way of knowing the role of domestic structure or politics on foreign policy is by referring to studies on comparative foreign policy with some suggest that different political systems have different bureaucratic systems through which decisions (including foreign policy) are formulated and implemented (Waltz 1967; Wallace and Paterson, eds. 1978; Adomeit and Boardman, eds., 1979). While in most developed states public policies tend to be prepared and operated through the existing bureaucratic procedures, top policy makers in the developing states mostly dominate these. Studies by Clapham (1977) and Calvert (1986) suggest that very often the most significant actors on the foreign policy decision-making in the developing states are their top policy makers.
Consequently, explaining foreign policy and identifying actors involved in its formation process (decision-making) should consider the domestic structure of the state. Based on these studies, it can be assumed therefore that changes of political system experienced by a state at a particular moment of time may also lead the state to alter its foreign policy. In some cases, it could even lead to foreign policy restructuring, whereby the pattern of states’ external relations is experiencing a dramatic wholesale alteration (Holsti, et al. 1982, xi). In a broader sense, foreign policy change can be divided into (1) change that is resulted from regime change or state transformation, and (2) change that happens when the existing government decides to push in different foreign policy directions. By definition, therefore, foreign policy change that relates to the changing political system falls into the former, which is also called as foreign policy redirection. Meanwhile the latter occurs when the existing actors change their course in foreign policy. Therefore, the nature of the change tends to be more self-driven (Hermann 1990, 5).

Up to this point it still remains unclear about ways through which domestic politics may affect foreign policy. However, Goldmann’s work (1988) may provide some light on the issue. He argues for three dimensions that matter between states’ domestic politics and its foreign policy. The first is on the matter of the state’s degree of institutionalisation. That means for the extent to which the government of a state is committed to foreign policy. The second is on the matter of the state’s the degree of support. This refers to the extent to which various actors in domestic politics support or oppose the government’s foreign policy. The third is on the matter of the degree of salience that points to the significance of the issue in the domestic power struggle.

Based on these matters, Goldmann suggests several different dynamics through which domestic politics may affect foreign policy. The first is through the struggle for domestic political power where foreign policy issues become a centrepiece. Competing political leaders and groups use foreign policy issues as means to differentiate themselves from other leaders or groups. Within this situation, new incoming leader with new supporting groups could lead to the foreign policy changes. Other alternative is that leader stays but decides to pursue ‘new’ foreign policy. The second dynamic occurs when the beliefs and attitudes of the dominant constituent drastically change. This could be used as sources for explanation why foreign policy has to be changed. The third dynamic happens when transformation of the political system takes place, which could lead to various political changes including in the areas of foreign policy (Goldman 1988).

Hagan’s work (1995, 117-143) offers an even clearer answer on the question of ways through which domestic politics may affect foreign policy. The premise he starts from is that states’ decision makers must simultaneously contend with the
pressures of international affairs and domestic politics and therefore domestic explanations of foreign policy rest on such premise. While Hagan’s findings, based upon his observation of various literatures, indicate that the amount of available explanations linking domestic politics and foreign policy varies in as many as the array of available literatures on the issue, he finds that there are at least two extreme points.

On the one hand, ‘domestic politics is pictured as the clash of particularistic interests within the well-structured institutional environment of national governments’. On the other hand are ‘accounts of severe domestic crises in which national leaders aggressively manipulate foreign policy in order to save themselves from being overthrown by domestic opponents’. According to Hagan, the rest of the explanations fall between the two extreme points and emphasises that there is no single explanation of how domestic politics influence foreign policy. In essence, therefore, Hagan is of the view that the interactions and linkages between domestic and external environments may serve two types of domestic political objectives. On the one hand (1) it serves the building of political coalitions, while on the other (2) it serves the retaining of political power.

In the first objective, foreign policy decision makers are to build domestic political support in order for any of its proposed foreign policy initiative to be implemented. Thus foreign policy decisions become political resultants reflecting necessary political strategies to build agreement with the domestic structure in order to support the implementation of foreign policy. Meanwhile, in the second objective, foreign policy decisions are adjusted in order to impose fewer domestic risks. This is carried out for the purpose of retaining government’s political power. In other words, in order to stay in the office, leader(s) facing significant domestic opposition from the wider domestic structure or who needs to increase domestic and international political legitimacy, needs to raise public perception of foreign policy issues.

Moreover, Hagan argues that the two objectives work similar to ‘pull’ and ‘push’ factors that may force governments responding in different ways toward domestic opposition, and in turn could have different impacts on foreign policy. This is what Hagan terms as the dynamics by which domestic politics affect foreign policy, and suggests three alternatives strategies indicating the linkage between domestic politics and foreign policy, namely (1) accommodation; ‘bargaining and controversy avoidance’, (2) mobilization; ‘legitimisation of the regime and its policies’, and (3) insulation; ‘insulating foreign policy from domestic political pressures’. In the accommodation strategy, states’ decision makers respond to domestic politics pressure with more restraint in foreign policy. By and large this strategy is mostly exercised in order to achieve the first objective, and that is of building policy coalitions. In the mobilization strategy, states’ decision makers
confront the domestic opposition by asserting their own legitimacy. In general, the mobilization strategy is most associated with the purpose of achieving the second objective, and that is of retaining political power whereby ‘a leadership manipulates foreign policy issues’. Meanwhile the essence in the insulation strategy is that states decision makers ‘deflect or reduce domestic constraints on their foreign policy choices’. This can be done by way of ‘ignoring opposition challenges, suppressing opponents entirely, or co-opting them with political favours or concessions on other policy issues’ (Hagan 1995, 127-132).

Domestic society or the public is one source of government’s foreign policy. Indeed in conducting foreign policy, government leaders often confront domestic pressures be it through public representatives (member of parliaments) or openly and directly from the general public. In facing the pressure, therefore, government leaders often have to create a situation whereby it would get some sort of ‘domestic political public coalitions’ in order for the successful implementation of states foreign policy. In essence, governments of states play a ‘two-level game’ in implementing foreign policy; government leaders have to make adjustments to its foreign policies’ preferences and strategies as a response to developments occurring concurrently at the international and domestic levels (Putnam 1988, 427-460).

Government leaders and other people involved in the government’s policies decision-making (in this case including particularly decision-making in foreign policy) have their own interests, which can include keeping or increasing their political positions or political power, wealth and economic situation, position or status within public, as well as promoting their ideological values, beliefs, and ideals. It is these interests and possibly others that lead government leaders sought public political support in order to generally gain control of government, to be remaining in office, and be able to implement states policies including foreign policy. Thus in order to do all these, the government must respond to the demands from the public. In other words, just as public’s resources give states’ decision-makers the chance to act, public support enhances government’s willingness to act. In reality, however, governments do not always respond passively to public demands but often try to shape and control the demands.

Within the context mentioned above, two main questions have captured considerable debates within scholars of IR. The first is the question of whether the public is a relevant variable in explaining states’ foreign policy formation. The second is dealing with the question of how exactly the attitudes and opinions of the public influence foreign policy decision-making.

Just as the realist has considered public as part of domestic aspect of foreign policy, its proponents have been strongly sceptical about the contribution of public
to effective foreign policy. They have been of the view that public might be adequately concerned with states’ domestic issues that impinge on their daily lives but foreign issues are too distant from domestic public’s familiarity. They regard the public as having little inclination to become more aware about foreign issues. Moreover, the realists marginalise the role of domestic public opinion in foreign policy because they argue for the need for secrecy and flexibility in conducting effective diplomacy and foreign policy. One of the leading realists, Morgenthau (1978), once expressed that “[t]he rational requirements of good foreign policy cannot from the outset count upon the support of a public opinion whose preferences are emotional rather than rational” (Morgenthau 1978, 558). For the realist, accordingly, the involvement of public in foreign policy could jeopardise the conduct of foreign policy, because significant public involvement means for allowing ‘the emotional to govern the rational’ (Holsti 1999, 361).

In contrast to realist, however, there has been a common view within the liberalism and liberal-democratic tradition strongly suggesting about significant and constructive influence of the public in foreign policy. It has been long argued that foreign policies of democratic states are more peaceful partly due to public opinion constraints upon their leaders. The domestic public support coming in the form of public opinion is a crucial device for states’ decision-makers because public opinion signifies and provides domestic public legitimacy for the implementation of government policies (Doyle 1997, 280-282). This is particularly the case in states practicing representative government (democracies) that allows for the rotation of government through an election system. In democracies, the system would encourage the elected government to formulate responsible policies, because the public can punish the government in power with electoral loss. In other words, democracies can both defer decision makers and influence them making prudent policies (Waltz 1967, 288-297). As a result, the argument goes, government elected through a democratic system are reluctant to formulate foreign policy that contradicts popular opinion within the public, especially in the case whereby the popular opinion coming from the government’s main support base. The government in power would try to be responsive to public opinion. This means, as Jackson suggests, that “citizens [public] have some voice in foreign policy” (Jackson 2000, 133).

In relation to the second question—how exactly the attitudes and opinions of the public influence foreign policy decision-making—Risse-Kappen (1991, 479-512) identifies two general different views in explaining the interactions between public opinion and decision-makers in the process of foreign policy decision-making, especially in liberal democratic states. The first is a ‘bottom-up’ approach assuming that public has a measurable impact on the process of foreign policy decision-making; decision-makers follow the public. The second is a ‘top-down’
approach, which considers public consensus as ‘a function of elite consensus and elite cleavages trickle down to mass public’. The top-down approach assumes that ‘the public is easily manipulated by political leaders, because of (1) the low salience, or significance, of foreign and security policy issues as compared with economic policies, (2) the low degree of knowledge about the issues involved, and (3) the volatility of public opinion’ (Risse-Kappen 1991, 480-482).

However, Risse-Kappen (1991, 482-483) finds that the two approaches have one identical major shortcoming. Both do not always concur with empirical evidence. Furthermore, both approaches are inadequate because of the tendency to (1) treat public and decision makers as ‘unitary actors’, (2) ignore various ways and stages in which public opinion can influence decision-makers, and (3) assume the interactions between public and decision-makers working in the same way across different countries. These criticisms are well grounded given the increasing complexity of recent relations among states. The growth of economic interdependence, along with rising literacy and the communications revolution, has blurred distinctions between domestic and foreign policy and heightened the domestic political salience of social, cultural and economic relations among states. In addition, the variety of domestic and international issues potentially influencing relations among states make the explanation about interactions between public opinion and decision-makers in the process of foreign policy making even more complex.

Partly in recognition to the complexity of the recent relations among states and mainly responding to the propensity of systemic theories of international relations continuing to undermine the societal (public) influence on foreign policy formulation, Skidmore and Hudson (1993, 1-22) identifies three possible models of approaches explaining state-society relations in the process of foreign policy decision-making. Although each model embodies different assumptions about the structure of state-society (public) relations and how the three relate to the decision-making of foreign policy, together the three models place the importance of society (public) in foreign policy making.

The first is statist model that closely relates to realist theory. It assumes that in formulating foreign policy, decision makers are functioning largely autonomously from the influence of society. The government is much stronger than the society, thereby resulting in the neglecting of the role and influence of society in foreign policy. In other words, states have full authority in managing foreign relations and tend to neglect the role of society in the foreign policy decision-making.

The second model is the societal approach. Contrary to the first model, this approach assumes that societal groups within state are in fact playing a dominant and continuing role in foreign policy. This societal approach consists of two
models namely pluralist and social blocs. Pluralist model comes from the assumption that for the requirement of both maintaining and maximising influence and effectiveness in foreign policy decisions, political leaders will care most about maintaining a high level of domestic political support. Social blocs model involves variants of alternative to pluralism such as elite, Marxist, corporatist and sectoral blocs of society. This model emphasises the role of mass media, non-government organisations, and other forms of pressure groups in society, which controls or even directs the issues and contents of foreign policy decision-making.

The third model is a trans-national approach emphasising the global society. It is based on the assumption that similarities of interests and objectives in societal groups can form political coalition surpassing national boundaries. It is the network of cooperation coming out of this process that in turn can provide issues that foreign policy actors should take into consideration in formulating foreign policy decisions. In addition, the objectives of trans-national society varies ranging from regimes transformation, mediating and settling international conflict, bringing new issues becoming global agenda, and changing global values, standards and norms (Skidmore and Hudson 1993, 7-15).

Conclusion

Taking into consideration to what has been previously described, then the role of domestic politics and the public on foreign can be modelled in the following figure. It is extracted from Hagan’s work (1995, 137) but it is modified after taking into consideration the likely significant role of the public in foreign policy making. As it is written in the beginning, however, that the model is a basic one which would be useful for novice IR students intending to explore even further the interplay between domestic political structure of the state and the public and its possible impact on government’s likely foreign policy.
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