

The Role of Religion, Idea and Identity in Taliban Alliance with Al Qaeda in Afghanistan

Mohammad Ayub Mirdad

ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study is to analyze the alliance between Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan by exploring the factors of religion, idea and identity. The theory approach that use to analyze their alliance is neorealist approach and constructivism theory. To collect data and information of evidence in alliance between Taliban and Al Qaeda, history and literature review was explored one by one according to the time frame and theoretical framework. Afterwards, refers to the analyze of this three mentioned factors by applying the theories within the data and evidences between Taliban and Al Qaeda found that, alliance connectivity between these two groups is exist in Afghanistan. Furthermore, this study's results are relevant to be able predicting their alliance in the future relates to their terrorism action in Afghanistan.

Keywords: Religion, Idea, Identity, Taliban, Al Qaeda, Afghanistan.

Tujuan dari penelitian ini adalah untuk menganalisis aliansi antara Taliban dan Al Qaeda di Afganistan dengan mengkaji melalui faktor agama, ide, dan identitas. Pendekatan teori yang digunakan untuk menganalisis aliansi tersebut adalah dengan pendekatan neorealis dan teori konstruktivisme. Untuk mengumpulkan bukti data dan informasi yang berkaitan dengan aliansi antara Taliban dan Al Qaeda, sejarah dan tinjauan pustaka telah dieksplorasi satu persatu sesuai dengan kerangka waktu dan kerangka teoritis. Mengacu pada analisis terhadap tiga faktor tersebut dengan menerapkan teori di dalam data dan bukti antara Taliban dan Al Qaeda, telah ditemukan bahwa terdapat keterkaitan antara dua kelompok ini di Afganistan. Selanjutnya, hasil penelitian ini relevan untuk dapat memprediksi aliansi tersebut di kemudian hari berkaitan dengan aksi terorisme di Afganistan.

Kata Kunci: Agama, Ide, Identitas, Taliban, Al Qaeda, Afganistan.

Terrorism is one of the most complex and also the most complicated phenomena of the contemporary world. Terrorism takes on many forms and has an impact on all our lives in one way or another. In this concern, international terrorism became the main topic on the top agenda for many nations and institutions. Today, global terrorism is a giant problem for all humanity. This problem has been recognized not only by one nation, but also the entire nations in this era of globalization, makes it easy for the states to reach to the weapons of mass destruction and other technologies. When the nations became much more connected and interdependent, it became a threat to international security, and terrorism became more challenging at the age of globalization. Terrorism comes in two varieties; local (traditional) and transnational terrorism (non-traditional). Local terrorism is homegrown and home directed, with consequences for just the venue country, its institutions, citizens, property, and policies such as Taliban in Afghanistan. For local terrorism, the perpetrators, victims, and audience are all from the host country. Most terrorist incidents are local. And the transnational terrorism, as Al Qaeda, is a non-traditional global network.

After the 2001 terror attacks in New York and Washington, the Taliban and Al Qaeda were increasingly seen as two sides of the same coin, as manifest in the reasoning behind the armed intervention that was launched in Afghanistan to change the regime and constrain the ability of the Taliban to operate. Analysts of transnational mobilization often see joint identity as the key factor, mostly with an emphasis on ethnicity, sometimes also on religious or other identity foundations (Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006). The alliances of Taliban with Al Qaeda was transformed since the Taliban governed Afghanistan. Yet, it is striking that the ability of the Al Qaeda network to bring the Taliban aboard their globalist Islamic struggle has been so limited. There have been very few instances where persons of Afghan origin have participated in terrorist attacks outside Afghanistan. The Taliban continues to focus mainly on national to against the Afghan government and rebuilding the Islamic Emirate of Taliban in Afghanistan, despite their occasional use of globalist rhetoric. The networks operate with two set of criteria in view, the local and the global. One should not allow the resemblances between the language in which the two is set forth, with their appeal to *jihad* and the *umma*, to hide the essentially

ethnic motivations that arise within the local context (Zahab and Roy 2004). The Al Qaeda network has to a large extent itself on alliances with Taliban, based on three factors religion, idea, and identity, contributing to their local battles while at the same time seeking to influence them ideologically, supporting and recruiting activists for its own global war (Hoffman 2004). This study profoundly analyzes these three factors. The entrance of the Taliban into a coalition with Al Qaeda and associated militant movements its greatest challenge. This alliance has, as pointed out above, already been the main factor that brought about its fall from power in Afghanistan. There are general explanations about each terrorists group.

However, there are two problems related to the terrorism action of Taliban alliance with the Al Qaeda in Afghanistan that drew the author into doing this research. Most of the research written by outsiders (non-Afghan's people), they did not focus the role three mentioned factors between the alliance of Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan. Therefore the absence of an explanation about the factors of religion, idea, and identity in the presence of an alliance between the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan is significant enough to be done.

The Taliban Regime in Afghanistan

The "Great Game" in the nineteenth century played a dominant role in shaping the current political landscape of the region (Hopkirk 1992). It also gave the Pashtuns their first encounter with a modern military power through the three Anglo-Afghan Wars in 1839, 1878, and 1919. After abortive attempts to gain headway inside Afghanistan, Russia and Britain agreed to create a buffer in the shape of Afghanistan between their zones of influence. The international boundary known as the Durand Line between British India and Afghanistan was demarcated in 1893. The new border, however, did not affect the lives of the frontier Pashtun tribes who maintained strong ethnic and family connections with their cousins across the border through the provisions of Easement Rights. The British also accorded the tribes on their side of the border with a peculiar semi-autonomous status that was maintained after the creation of Pakistan in 1947 in the form of the FATA (ul Haq et. al. 2005). With occasional disturbances, the Pashtun areas on both sides of the border were

dormant during most of the twentieth century. The relative stability of Zahir Shah's four-decade rule ended in 1973. The instability that ensued after his departure provided the catalyst for the communist People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan to overthrow the weak and splintered government in 1978. The religious elements of Afghanistan, led by the *mujahideen*, resisted the communists' radical reforms package, which included drastic changes in land ownership, new taxes, compulsory education for women, and participation of women in non-traditional roles in society (Sikorski 1990). The Soviet Union deployed troops into Afghanistan in December 1979 to aid their communist ally against the Islamic militias and counter the threat of radical Islamist power along its soft underbelly of the Muslim majority Central Asian republics. The Soviet involvement further fueled the rise of *mujahideen* resistance and calls for *jihad*. The Soviet military waged a brutal counterinsurgency campaign accompanied by thorough destruction of the already meager socioeconomic framework of backwards nation. In nearly ten years of occupation, the Soviet forces and their communist Afghan allies allegedly killed 1.3 million Afghans, completely destroyed the infrastructure in both urban and rural areas, and caused approximately 5.5 million to flee into neighboring Iran and Pakistan, most of whom found their way to Pakistan's tribal belt (The Russian general Staff 2002). Following a long and costly counterinsurgency effort, the Soviet Union completely withdrew its forces from Afghanistan in February 1989, leaving Najibullah's communist government to fend for itself. A civil war followed, resulting in Najibullah's overthrow in April 1992. In the six months before their departure, the Soviets handed over huge caches of weapons and ammunition to Najibullah's forces; they continued material support for two years after their departure. The defeat of the communist government quickly revealed the differences in the fractured alliance of *mujahideen* parties. Each faction had its leader or warlord in a geographical region of the country with aspirations for power. Fighting broke out among the warlords leading to widespread looting and rapine. This strife between the warlords and a war weary population set the stage for the radical ideas of the Taliban to easily take hold in Afghanistan (Johnson and Mason 2007).

The Taliban organization has constantly evolved to adjust to its environments and operational requirements since its inception in 1994. Its organizational characteristics vary by level in the hierarchy.

Because of the group's covert nature and intermingling with the local culture, religion, social networks, and insurgent activities, it is almost impossible to draw a dividing line between its formal and informal organization. Prior to 9/11, the Taliban operated in a very rigid and extremely centralized manner at the top and middle level of an organization micro-managed by Mullah Omar. Since the commencement of OEF (Operation Enduring Freedom), the Taliban organization has apparently become flatter, with more and more independence given to local commanders, in order to adapt to the demands of a complex insurgent movement and draw benefits from dispersed small units. The first set of resources surveyed includes the religious militant outfits such as Al Qaeda and some sectarian groups. Al-Qaeda provides the Taliban's "cause" some legitimacy amid a myriad of transcontinental terrorists with global agendas. Exemplifying this are the actions of Osama bin Laden when he pledged to follow Mullah Omar, the Leader of the Faithful, which supports Omar in the eyes of the Pashtun tribes and of Islamic groups worldwide (Johnson and Mason 2007). Aside from offering assistance to the Taliban in the form of information warfare, it provides support that is monetary, personnel (foreign fighters), technological (advanced Improvised Explosive Devices and communications) and training (tactical) support. These resources are external and generally flexible as to their reliability. Tehreek-i-Nifaz-i-Shariat-i-Muhammadi (TNSM) is also a strong Taliban sympathizer and is mainly active in the FATA and Swat regions of NWFP. Other groups which support or coordinate with the Taliban include the Central Asian insurgent outfits like Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), Hizb-i-Islami Gulbuddin (HiG), Eastern Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), and a number of small militant bands on both sides of the border.

Since mid-1994, the status of women shifted dramatically in areas under Taliban control, Taliban formulated their policies under their own self-styled interpretation of Sharia' a great number of decrees were issued. Soon after the Taliban took control of Kabul in September 1996, the Supreme Council issued edicts forbidding women to work outside the home, attend school, or to leave their homes unless accompanied by a *mahram* (husband, father, brother, or son). In public, women must be covered from head to toe in a "*burqa*," with only a mesh opening to see and breathe through. They are not permitted to wear white (the color of the Taliban flag) socks or white

shoes, or shoes that make noise as they walk (Dupree 1994). Houses and buildings in public view must have their windows painted over if females are present. They are not permitted to be examined by a male health worker in the absence of a male chaperone. And they are largely prohibited from working, resulting in the brutal impoverishment of their families, especially the enormous number of families who have lost a male breadwinner as a casualty of war. Also, the Taliban severely limited women's access to health care and closed public bath houses for women. Initially, these edicts were enforced in a haphazard manner, and varied from region to region, with more severe restrictions enforced in non-Pashtun areas. The Taliban's abuses are by no means limited to women. Thousands of men have been taken prisoner, arbitrarily detained, tortured, and many killed and disappeared. Men are beaten and jailed for not wearing beards of sufficient length (that of a clenched fist beneath the chin), are subjected to cruel and degrading conditions in jail, and suffer such punishments as amputation and stoning. Men are also vulnerable to extortion, arrest, gang rape, and abuse in detention because of their ethnicity or presumed political views (Dupree 1994).

The Taliban is, however, the first faction laying claim to power in Afghanistan which has targeted women for extreme repression and punished them brutally for infractions. According to the author's knowledge, no other regime in the world has methodically and violently forced half of its population into virtual house arrest, prohibiting them on pain or physical punishment from showing their faces, seeking medical care without a male escort, or attending school. It is also difficult to find another government or would-be government in the world that has deliberately created such poverty by arbitrarily depriving half the population under its control of jobs, schooling, mobility, and health care. Such restrictions are literally life threatening to women and to their children.

Analysis of Taliban Alliance with Al Qaeda

The role of religion in political conflicts is merely instrumental. It contests the popular view that in the case of Taliban alliance and Al Qaeda religion serves as a mechanism for obtaining political legitimisation and is being abused for purely political ends. In contrast, fundamentalists throughout the world act and perceive themselves

to be the true believers. The factor of religion between the Taliban alliance and Al Qaeda had main role to make their cooperation even more stronger, they represented nobody but themselves and they recognized no Islam except their own, the example of their alliances base on the religion is what they called it Muslims brotherhood which is means defend their Muslims land as Al Qaeda did with the Taliban during the invasion of America in Afghanistan. As slain Al Qaeda leader Abu Mustafa al Yazid said: *We participate with our brothers in the Islamic Emirate in all fields; this had a big positive effect on the Taliban self esteem in Afghanistan* (NBC 2010). Al Qaeda set up the dialectic of the struggle, which initially redefined the Islamic faith to meet the needs of contemporary world politics. Al Qaeda and Taliban emphasized monotheism as the basis of the Muslim faith, which stipulates, "There is no god but Allah and Muhammad is His final messenger". For both of them this monotheistic concept defines Islamic traditions at both the individual and collective levels, this is the another example the role of religion between Al Qaeda and Taliban alliance back to their beliefs to make an Islamic caliphate base on sharia law. The concept of "No God but Allah" does not only have ritualistic connotations. Al Qaeda also drew on the perspective that the concept of God is synonymous with authority, and monotheism demands that Islam should therefore be the sole authority. Any political system or other authority that refuses to be subservient to God's will effectively ereares a form of polytheism (Shahzad 2011). The word NO (No God but Allah) symbolizes a rebellion against any human made system. Muslims who take this stance automatically reject governance systems based on democracy, socialism, or any ideology that is dependent on human imade laws as polytheistic, and argue that Muslims are required to struggle against any such system, this is the example of Taliban regime during 1996-2001 they governed Afghanistan by their own Islamic rules at that time first Al Qaeda was a guest for Taliban then their alliances start between regarding to their similarities thoughts first the religion role. Taliban government recognized only by three states around the world Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and United Emirates Arab (Shahzad 2011).

Al Qaeda supported the Taliban and has contributed considerably to the Taliban's military successes, first against the Northern Alliance during the Afghan civil war in the late 1990s, and then they start to against the United States after the US attack on Afghanistan in

October 2001. There is a unique relationship, in which Al Qaeda aims to bring the Taliban and all Muslim liberation movements into its fold and to use them to forward its global agenda. Al Qaeda's support of the Taliban against the Northern Alliance went a long way in influencing the Taliban. Mullah Muhammad Omar (the spiritual leader of the Taliban) was personally indebted. This was the time for Al Qaeda to capitalize on the situation. Al Qaeda took over effective charge of the entire defense policies of the Taliban, which included running their training camps and formulating strategies to fight against the Northern Alliance. As a result, Al Qaeda gained immediate access to the camps of the Chechen, Pakistani, Uzbek, and even Chinese liberation movements. In the process of doing this, Al Qaeda changed the nature of the Taliban rule in Afghanistan, and turned it into a "national security state," creating war hysteria throughout the country (Shahzad 2011). For example, these involved actions like blowing up the Bamiyan Buddhas by the Taliban with the dictation of Al Qaeda and other activity that isolated the Taliban from the world community.

However, the underlying ideology of Taliban and Al Qaeda have a long and colourful history that dates back almost eight hundred years to the Islamic jurist Sheikh Ibn Taymiyya (Allen 2007). Quoting two verses in the Quran, specifically chapters 2, verse 193 - "Fight against them until idolatry is no more and God's religion reigns supreme. But if they desists, fight none except the evil doers and chapter 8, verse 39 "Tell the unbelievers that if they mend their ways their past shall be forgiven; but if they persists in sin, let them reflect upon the fate of bygone nations", Taymiyya could declare jihad in "strictly literal terms: as unrelenting struggle against all who stood in the way of Islam's destiny" (Allen 2007). Although his teachings did not gain much traction during his own lifetime, his ideas lived on, and would eventually greatly influence what is today commonly known as Wahhabism, from the 18th century figure Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab. This historical background the fundamentalist claim for an Islamic state and a corresponding sharia-bound (Islamic legal system) Islamic government. The call for a dawla Islamiya (Islamic state) made by all contemporary Islamic fundamentalists (Al Qaeda and Taliban) is based on the belief that a nizam Islami (Islamic system) forms the centre of Islam. Yet this assumption is

held exclusively by Islamic fundamentalists such as Taliban Al Qaeda, not the religion of Islam as revealed in the Quran and the hadith (collection of the traditions of the Prophet) but their own way of life and idea to adjustment their Islamic rule in the Islamic countries as they did it in Afghanistan.

The idea behind Al Qaeda is the establishment of a 'base' which would bring together the different terrorist Islamist groups like Taliban and others to coordinate their activities. Many of those who were attracted to Al Qaeda were non-Arab. Both groups Taliban and Al Qaeda consist of Sunni Muslims and both beliefs in a very strict form of Islamic law known as sharia law and Wahhabis. Wahhabism is derived from the teachings of Muhammad ibn abd al-Wahhab, an eighteenth century religious zealot from the Arabian interior. Like most Sunni Islamic fundamentalist movements, the Wahhabis advocated the fusion of state power and religion through the reestablishment of the Caliphate, the form of government adopted by the Prophet Muhammad's successors during the age of Muslim expansion. Al Qaeda's alliance with the Taliban was due initially to connections that had been formed during Afghan jihad against the Soviet Union forces. For example they also shared many common ideals, such as enforcement of sharia as the only way to establish an Islamic society, and perception that Islam was endangered by western influences (Waldman 2012). For example the role of idea between Al Qaeda alliances with Taliban is Al Qaeda reject differences of nationality, ethnicity or sect among Muslims. As I mentioned above about the establishment of the Islamic state and enforcement of sharia law by Taliban and Al Qaeda it's a shared common ideal between them as example of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan during 1996-2001 *Sharia law* was interpreted to forbid a wide variety of previously lawful activities in Afghanistan (Roy 2004).

The definition of terrorism in itself comes down to a few crucial points. Terrorism is founded in a struggle regarding power and politics and the tool used is violence (Hoffman 2006). The basic principles for terrorist groups is that of creating power where there is none, fighting up from below while using publicity as a tool and weapon. However, a generalized other will often refer to a group as terrorists in order to justify their own actions and demine the

actions of the original group. As the author mentioned in the first chapter that terrorism comes into two varieties local and global both according to their actions create fear and threaten in the local and global level to the civilians and governments, therefore the factor of identity between the Taliban and Al Qaeda alliances are obvious its terrorist and their target is create violence towards civilians, foreigners, coalition troops, as well as Afghan government forces. For example, using suicide bombing, IED and rocket attack, as well as raids and shootings, assassinations, sniping, guerrilla warfare and massacres, they are believed to have a high-profile assassination corps, specifically trained and utilized for assassinations and targeted killings of individuals they called Jihad (Gargan 2001).

Strategic Analysis of Taliban Alliance - Al Qaeda

At best, there is a most universally accepted definition of it, which is, the terrorism is the use of violence to create fear (i.e., terror; psychic fear) for political, religious, or ideological reasons. States will be plagued by terrorism as long as individuals are willing to use violence for political purposes. Religion, idea, and identity important factors of between the Taliban alliance and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan that already each factors explained. It's obvious that globalization has positive and negative impact in every aspect of human being life and no exclusion in every part of the world, so Afghanistan faced with the negative impact of globalization in the case terrorism such transnational terrorism organization like Al Qaeda and making alliances with the Taliban in Afghanistan, therefore based on the mentioned three factors the author will explain the strategy and ideology of alliances of Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan. Ideology or more precisely, religion-based has also been mentioned as an efficient factor favoring Al Qaeda's and Taliban cohesion. A shared ideology enables followers to carry out hard to control operations by using special tactics, for example, the suicide attacks that are only possible due to a fanatic belief in a cause. The leader of both groups is seen as a central piece of this ideology and a "symbol of resistance"(Gunaratna 2002). Al Qaeda and Taliban alliance in Afghanistan also has a mission statement. A "story about US versus Them", distinguishes the "pure from the impure", creates group identity and can be considered as "the glue that holds even the most tenuous organization together". Their

mission statement focuses on expelling U.S. and other Western forces from Afghanistan and by means of hostage-taking and bombings. Also the Taliban and Al Qaeda alliance in Afghanistan their objectives and strategy can be analyzed based on three factors religion, idea and identity: the particular goal is to replace corrupt and heretical government with the rule of "Sharia" (Islamic law) and establish a pan-Islamic state. The objective of the "Re-establishment of the Muslim State" and the removal of foreign presence primarily American (Moore 2001). According to Hoffman (2003), they believes that the only way to address these objectives and the only language that the West understands is the logic of violence, and thus "jihad is the only option".

To attain these objectives, a method of calculated and unlawful use of violence has been adopted. Taliban and Al Qaeda's alliance in Afghanistan their major strategy is violence, pursued and justified under the guise of "jihad", which is the Arabic word for "to strive". The translation "holy war" is incorrect, but widely used. There is a distinction between the greater and the lesser jihad. The greater jihad is defined as a personal struggle against temptation and sin, and the lesser one as defending Islam against aggression. Both groups and other extremists argue that jihad can be declared against Muslims who are insufficiently pious, particularly corrupted rulers. Following his declaration of jihad Bin Laden released a series of statements that expanded the vision and scope of his self-declared conflict with the United States and specified his political prescriptions for the reformation of Islamic societies. Islam has always been beset by revivalist movements aimed at counteracting an apparent backsliding by those in power in relation to the founding principals recited in accordance with divine inspiration. Movements have arisen in Islamic world in response to what has been seen as corrupt and unprincipled behavior on the part of government. The movements have generally taken a puritanical form and there has been a resort to arms to impose the new vision on society (Marsden 2002). Their target is violence to non-military individuals and their property. This blind and widely orientated violence is intended to intimidate and coerce government, and in order to achieve this, Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan uses "fatwas" (religious decrees) issues religious instructions and rulings in order to justify their actions. The Taliban and Al Qaeda alliance in Afghanistan used

various forms of guerrilla tactics: hit-and-run operations roadside ambushes improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Increasingly, new techniques of warfare have been adopted. One thing is the use of suicide attacks, a dramatic addition to the tactical repertoire, the use of targeted assassinations has also picked up (Straziuso 2006).

The Prediction of Alliance between Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan

The war in Afghanistan is a long-term and complex challenge due to numerous issues that continue to prolong progress. First is the role of Pakistan within their alliance continuation, Afghanistan and Pakistan have a long standing and complex relationship. During the cold war, Pakistan's main interest in Afghanistan concerned the border conflicts along the *Durand* line. Durand line is the poorly defined border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, where the Federally Administration Tribal Areas (FATA) are located, in for years the FATA has functioned comfort zone for terrorist and insurgent groups like Taliban and Al Qaeda. As a result, Al Qaeda and Taliban used this relationship to move over the border into Pakistan to avoid the US military in Afghanistan (Rashid 2008). Pakistan relationship with Afghanistan and the US remain consistent struggles, Pakistan consistently manipulates others to obtain strategic benefits while Afghanistan clings to corruption and turmoil. In other side, the war in Afghanistan is irreparable without fixing issues in Pakistan as well.

Second prediction is America's presence in Afghanistan, the US strategy lacked a counterinsurgency approach and until 2003 did not do anything to counter the resurgence of the Taliban and Al Qaeda. The principle objective of the US intervention was Al Qaeda and their alliance Taliban, and it bases in Afghanistan protected by Taliban regime. The US intervention in Afghanistan has made some progress but it has failed to understand the problems that the intervention itself has generated and to counter the threat with a proper strategy. In another side, the Afghan government keep struggle for the negotiation and reconciliation with the Taliban so if the Afghan government become success by doing reconciliation with Taliban it's possible the alliance would be stop with Al Qaeda and other affiliate groups in Afghanistan. Much has been written about

the wars in Afghanistan and the basic narrative of the conflict, in one form or another, has been repeated in countless books, academic articles and news reports. But the voices of ordinary Afghans are often absent from these accounts, and yet it is the Afghan people who are most affected by the violence.

Conclusion

In the era of globalization the nations became much more connecting and independent, it became a threat to international security and terrorism became more challenging. Terrorism comes in local (traditional) and transnational (non-traditional). After the 2001 terror attacks in United States, the Taliban (local) and Al Qaeda (transnational) were increasingly seen as two sides of the same coin, as manifest in the seasoning behind their alliance. The Al Qaeda network has to a large extent itself on alliances with Taliban, based on three factors religion, idea and identity. This study profoundly analyzes these three factors that brought about its fall from power in Afghanistan, and understanding the issues to predicting different assumptions about the future of their alliance in Afghanistan. Started from the Soviet Union deployed troops into Afghanistan in December 1979, the Soviet involvement further fueled the rise of *Mujahideen* resistance and calls for jihad. In nearly ten years of occupation the Soviet forces and their communist Afghan allies allegedly killed 1.3 million Afghan's, completely destroyed the infrastructure in urban and rural areas, and caused approximately 5.5 million to flee into neighboring countries (Edwards 1998).

The cadre of Taliban emerged from *Pashton* ethnic group, student of Madrasah, that a selectively interpreted version of Islam, *Wahhabism*. According to spokesman of Taliban *Mullah Wakil Ahmed*, after the *Mujahideen* parties came into power in 1992, Afghanistan people thought that peace would prevail in the country. However, there was wide spread corruption, road-blocks everywhere, women were being attacked, rape and killed. Therefore, a group of students from *Madrasah* decided to rise against *Mujahideen*. Here they gained their religious legitimacy among the rural Pashtons and their leader *Mullah Omer* were sacred cloak of Prophet Mohammad (PBUH) in a public gathering and declared himself *Amir-ul-Momineen* (leader of faithful), the event is probably the most important milestone in the

Taliban history. The Taliban were known in own region of world, the Taliban regime beginning in 1994 has brought Afghanistan to a new level of desperation and horror, they engage in violations of human rights such as executions, beheading, stoning, forbidding women to work outside, attend school, thousands of men have been taken prisoner, tortured, killed and disappeared. To my knowledge, no other regime in the world has methodically and violating forced half of its population.

Religion (Islam), is using as an instrumental for the Taliban and Al Qaeda to achieving their political goal. The factor of religion between their alliance had main role they represented nobody but themselves and they recognized no Islam except their own, to build their own Islamic Caliphate based in their own interpretation of Islam. Regarding to the Taliban and Al Qaeda interpretation of Islam, both beliefs in a very strict form of Islamic law known as Sharia law and Wahabis thoughts, the idea behind Al Qaeda is the establishment of a base which would bring together the different terrorist Islamist groups like Taliban and others to coordinate their terrorist activities.

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