

Japan in the Global "War on Terrorism"

M Muttaqien

Pengajar pada Jurusan Ilmu Hubungan Internasional FISIP Universitas AirLungyu, Surabaya.

Pemerintah Jepang memberikan respon yang cepat dan peran yang aktif dalam "perang melawan terorisme" yang dipimpin oleh AS pada Serangan 11 September 2001. Ini berbeda dengan reaksi Jepang yang lambat dan kontribusi yang sedikit ketika AS dan sekutunya berusaha mengusir Irak dari Kuwait pada Perang Teluk 1990. Tulisan ini membahas hal-hal yang melatarbelakangi keterlibatan Jepang dalam "perang melawan terorisme" terutama pada masa pemerintahan Koizumi dan bentuk-bentuk keterlibatan Jepang dalam perang tersebut. Temuan yang diperoleh dari tulisan ini adalah bahwa keterlibatan aktif Jepang dalam "perang melawan terorisme" dipengaruhi oleh semakin meningkatnya posisi perdana menteri dalam proses pengambilan kebijakan set-Tlisa Pemerintah Koizumi, adanya kepentingan-kepentingan ekonomi Jepang, dan adanya keterikatan Jepang dalam keamanan dengan AS. Bentuk keterlibatan Jepang dalam "perang melawan terorisme" berupa misi non militer, bantuan asing, dan kerjasama ekonomi dalam kerangka "perang melawan terorisme" khususnya di kawasan Asia Tenggara.

Kata-kata kunci: *perang melawan terorisme, kepentingan ekonomi, aliansi, misi non militer, bantuan ekonomi, dan kerjasama ekonomi.*

Introduction

Before September 11 Attacks, the critiques from opposition to the United States (US)-Japan alliance had increased in Japan. The critiques were triggered by a 1995 rape of a 12-year old girl by three

American soldiers in Okinawa (Leheny, 2002:40) and an American submarine's accidental sinking of a Japanese fishery training vessel carrying high school students off the coast of Hawaii in February 2001 (Lincoln, 2002:77). After September 11 Attacks of 2001, although the critiques to the military relationship between the US and Japan still exists domestically in Japan, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi committed to support the international "war on terrorism" led by the US. When terrorists attacked the US on September 11, 2001, Washington saw that the attacks as an act of war that had to be responded by military operations to any countries which support terrorists. The first response of the "war on terrorism" was the US's attack against Afghanistan to hunt Osama Bin Laden. To realize the attack, Washington asked its allies, including Japan, to support the war in Afghanistan.

This paper explores on how the Government of Japan, especially the Koizumi administration responded to the "war on terrorism" and what the economic and political interests of Japan in the "war on terror" led by the *US* are. Then, this article will also give suggestions to the role of Japan in the global "war on terrorism". This will be classified into three categories: the role of Japan in non-combat mission; in economic front; and in the second front (Southeast Asia) of the "war on terrorism."

The Involvement of Japan in the Global "War on Terrorism"

Japan as one of the US allies in the East Asia responded quickly to the war led by the US. Within 45 minutes of the September 11 Attacks, Prime Minister Koizumi supported the US by giving assistance to defend US military base in Okinawa from any unexpected terrorist attacks and assisting to victim's family of the attacks (Midford, 2003:330-1). Moreover, Units of the Japanese Navy that consisted of three destroyers and other ships accompanied the aircraft carrier *USS Kitty Hawk* left Japanese coastal waters for positions in the Indian Ocean on 21 September 2001 (Katzenstein, 2002:431). This response was different to the response of Japan to the Gulf War in 1990. The Government of Japan responded too late and too little to support the US in the war against Iraq that invaded Kuwait (Midford, 2003:330). The limit participation of Japan in liberating Kuwait probably was the bitterest memory for many Japanese especially when Kuwait excluded Japan in a list of allied countries thanked by Emir. albeit Tokyo

contributed \$13 billion to the war efforts (*Gaiko Forum* in Minford, 2003:338).

A. The Strong Leadership of Prime Minister Koizumi

Historically, the lack of a strong leadership in Japan after the US Occupation had been going on until the middle of 1990s. The decision making process within LDP (Liberal Democratic Party) as a ruling party was dominated by factions. Since LDP candidates relied on their faction for financial and other campaign resources during the general elections, a prime minister had to consider factional powers within LDP when he formed cabinet. Consequently, a prime minister's control to the members of cabinet was ineffective because the members of cabinet were more loyal to their factions than to the Prime Minister (Shinoda, 2003:20-2). As a result, the government could not respond effectively to several crises that had to take quick decisions.

The lack of leadership in Japan was criticized by public especially after the National Disaster of Kobe Earthquake of 1995 when government relief efforts were ineffective. Then, public criticized government again during the Japanese hostage crises in Peru (1996-1997), and the 1997 oil spill disaster in Sea of Japan. Because of the lack of the leadership of the Prime Minister, the Diet (Japanese Parliament) revised the Cabinet Law to strengthen the role of Prime Minister and the Cabinet Secretariat (Shinoda, 2003:21). At the same time, within LDP occurred an institutional change in which the president of LDP was elected by an independent voting not along factional lines. Koizumi competed with other candidates to be the leader of LDP in April 2001 at that situation. Being elected, Koizumi formed a cabinet by minimizing the opportunity for factional influence (Shinoda, 2003:24). He became a strong leader because factional interests reduced their role in his cabinet. As a strong leader, Koizumi could take decisions in the crisis situation easily because members of cabinet consisted of ministers that were loyal to him.

Responding September 11 Attacks, five months after being elected as the Prime Minister, Koizumi expressed full support for the US campaign on "war on terrorism". He formed a liaison office at the Situation Center of the Cabinet that later became the Emergency Anti-Terrorism Headquarters headed by the Prime Minister. Then, he arranged a cabinet level meeting in the National Security Council, and announced the Japanese government's action plan (Shinoda, 2003:28). Koizumi's administration also released an Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law (ATSML) in October 2001 to give authority for

the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) to dispatch Aegis Cruisers in the Indian Ocean, because the 1999 Surrounding Areas Emergency Measures Law (SAEML) was excluded the Indian Ocean, Arabian Sea and Southwest Asia as zones that the JSDF could provide non-combat logistical support to the US. By using this law, the JSDF supported the US military operations through non-combat operation in Afghanistan (Midford, 2003:331-2, Hughes, 2004: 427). Two years later, PM Koizumi pushed the Diet to release the Iraq Special Law (Special Measures for Humanitarian and Reconstruction Support in Iraq). Based on this law, Japan sent its troops in the non-combat zones in Iraq (Hiwatari, 2005:51).

Domestically, in terms of the participation of Japan in the global "war on terror", public in Japan tended to support the policy that was already taken by Koizumi. Although opposition parties and some members of LDP criticized Koizumi's action plan to support the US in Afghanistan, the approval rating of the Koizumi Cabinet was 79 percent. According to a poll conducted by *Nihon Keizai Shimbun* on September 21-22, 70 percent of respondent agreed with Japan's support for US military action (Sinoda, 2003:30). In terms of the war campaign in Iraq led by the US, public in Japan strongly opposed to military action against Iraq. Polling conducted by the *Asahi Shimbun* in September 2002 (Uriu, 2003:88) reported 77 percent of respondents opposed any US attacks against Iraq. However, a year later related to the participation of JSDF in Iraq war, even though at the first time majority of public did not support the involvement of Japan in the war, later on the support for sending JSDF tended to increase. The *Asahi* newspaper's polls taken monthly from December 2003 to March 2004 show support and (opposition) at 34 (55), 40 (4⁸), 44 (48), and 42 (41) percent respectively (Hiwatari, 2005:51)

B. Economic Interests of Japan

Japan is a country that lacks of natural resources and source of energy. The awareness of the Japanese that this country relies heavily on the other countries to fulfill those sources makes the fulfillment of those needs to be a national core of interests. In other words, national objectives of Japan relating to the international affairs are how to maintain the demands and needs of natural resources and international markets. Historically, this awareness forced the Tokugawa regime to expand its territory by occupying Taiwan, Korea, South Sakalin, Liaodong, Micronesia, and Manchuria. In these occupied territories, Japan exploited natural resources and opened international markets for Japan's product. The fulfillment of the

natural resources and sources of energy right now in Japan is gained through international trade.

In Japan, the primary energy supply comes from petroleum. It can be seen from Table 1 that the percentage of petroleum energy supply is almost 50 percent of total primary energy supply of Japan. This is followed by coal (19.1 percent), LNG (13.1 percent), nuclear energy (12.6 percent) and hydroelectric energy (3.5 percent). The consumption of primary energy is depended on imports. Table 2 shows that more than 80 percent of primary energy is imported. The percentage of imports of crude oil in 2001 became the highest and this reached 40.2 percent of primary energy consumption in Japan.

Table 1.
The Percentage of Japan's Primary Energy Supply in 20 01

Energy Supply	Percentage
Petroleum	49.4%
Coal	19.1%
LNG, Natural Gas	13.1%
Hydroelectric energy	3.5%
Nuclear energy	12.6%
Alternative energy, etc.	2.3%

Source: The Asahi Shimbun, Japan Almanak 2004, Tappan Printing Co. Ltd., Tokyo, 2003, p. 146.

Table 2.
The Percentage of Japan's Domestic Production and Imports of Primary Energy in 20 01

Domestic Production	19.3%
Imports:	
-LNG	12.7%
-Petroleum Products	9.1%
-Crude Oil	40.2%
-Coal	18.8%
Total imports	

Source: The Asahi Shimbun. p. 147

Because of the dependency of Japan on the raw materials, source of energy outside Japan, and international trade, where trade contributes highly for a proportion of the Gross National Product, several international crises were vulnerable for Japan economic development.

Two decades after Pacific War, Japan increased as an industrialized country. Its extent of industrialization during the 1960s pushed this country to expand the international order for markets. To support industrialization, Japan had to increase the imports of raw materials and sources of energy. The oil shock in 1970s and 1980s reduced 25 percent of total energy inputs of Japan, meanwhile industrial output in this country doubled. The Gulf War of 1991 again reminded many Japanese that this country was risky, especially dealing with the dependency on the sources of energy (Jones, 1993:107 -8).

The involvement of the Japanese army in Afghanistan and Iraq War as a part of "war on terror" led by the US cannot be separated from the Japanese economic interests in the Middle East. Japan tends to be more active in this region because of a strategic position of the Middle East economically (Dowty, 2000:67). The six countries of the Gulf Cooperation Countries (GCC) such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Qatar, Oman, and Bahrain, for instance, hold together a 45.5 per cent share of total proven oil reserves in the world. If the percentage is added with other Persian Gulf countries, such as Iraq and Iran, total percentage of proven oil reserve from this region is 64.7 per cent (see Table 3).

The highest percentage of Japan's crude oil imports comes from the Middle East. Table 4 shows that between 1970 and 2002 the Middle East region dominated the imports of crude oil in Japan approximately above 80 percent, except in 1980 that the percentage of Japan's crude oil imports declined just above 70 percent. This was an impact of the first oil crisis in 1973 when the growth rate of energy consumption fell below the economic growth rate (the *Asahi Shimbun*, 2003:146). The participation of Japan in the "war on terror" in the Middle East is to maintain its access to the source of energy in this region.

Table 3.
Oil Wealth of Developing Countries

Country Share of proven oil reserves (%) ⁶ Saudi Arabia ²⁴⁹	
Iraq	0.07
Kuwait	9.2
LIAR	9.3
Iran	8.5
Venezuela	7.4
Russia	4.6
Libya	2.8

Nigeria	12.3
China	12.3
Qatar	.1.4
Algeria	0.9
Brazil	
	10.
8	
Kazakhstan	10.8
Azerbaijan	10.7
	7.
Oman	10.5

Source: S. Peters, 'Coercive Western Energy Security Strategies: "Resource Wars" as a New Threat to Global Security', *Geopolitics*, Vol. 9 No. 1, 2004, p. 199.

Table 4.
The Percentage of Japan's Crude Oil Imports by Source

	1970	1980	2000	2002
Middle East	84.6%	71.4%	187.1%	185.3
Southeast and South Asia	13.4%	20.3%	6.4%	15.5%
North and Latin America	0.3%	2.6%		0.4%
Communist Bloc		3.9%	13.2%	2.2%
Other regions		1.8%	2.2%	6.6%

Source: *The Asahi Shimbun*, p. 148.

C. The US-Japan Military Alliance

From the end of the Pacific War to 1952, Japan had been under control the US led by General Douglas Mac Arthur. The US occupation of Japan drove a social institutional reform within liberal democratic framework. The American occupation also destroyed the old military and institutionalized a limit on a new military within the new constitution specifically article 9. As a consequence of the de-military of Japanese army, the US army perform some of the same roles as the Japanese army had before such as providing open markets for Japanese goods in Southeast Asia and ensuring the free flow of oil to Japan from Indonesia and the Persian Gulf (Kurth, 1989:40). The US-Japanese security treaty of 1951 maintains that Japan permits the rights to deploy the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force of the US within and in the vicinity of Japan and the US accepts this right. This Force may be used to contribute to the international peace and security in the

Far East. This treaty was renewed with the treaty of 1960 that gives a legal obligation of the US to protect Japan and justifies the deployment of the US military in Okinawa (Kawashima, 2003:26).

Japan is an effective ally of the US in Asia (Eccleston, 1986:64). Under the US security umbrella, Japan receives a security guarantee from the US. This guarantee is used by Japan to develop its economy after collapse in 1945. The economic development of Japan makes this country to be the main donor in the world. During the Cold War, as the world's largest aid donor, Japan had played a main role to support non-communist countries by giving aids through Official Development Assistance (ODA). This policy coincided with the US policy to contain communist and to widen the US's sphere of influence.

September 11 Attacks strengthens the US-Japan alliance. After terrorist attacks on the WTC and the Pentagon in which more than 20 of Japanese in twin towers died, Tokyo immediately gave more attention to the consequences of the attacks to the Japanese security and the US-Japan alliance (Midford, 2003:330). By dispatching JSDF to the Arabian Sea to support the US military operations in Afghanistan, Japan wants to maintain the US-Japan alliance. Japan released several laws to give authorities for JSDF to participate in the international war on terrorism (Midford, 2003:330-2). In other words, September 11 Attack consolidated the US-Japan security arrangement that gradually taken shape during the 1990s (Katzenstein, 2002:432).

Besides in Afghanistan, Japan also dispatches JSDF to Iraq to support the US military operations. The policy makers of Japan knew that the legitimacy of the war campaign in Iraq led by the US is weak because of the absence of clear UN mandate to the US to take action against Iraq. Moreover, the reason of the US military attack in Iraq such as the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) ownership of Iraq's regime under Saddam Hussein and Iraq's connections with 11 September Attacks and transnational terrorism were not proven. Japan, however, still supports the US military operation in Iraq by sending its troops. Some believe that the policy of Japan to support the US in Afghanistan and Iraq is taken to counter the resurgent nuclear threat from North Korea as a part of 'axis of evil' in the Far East (Rozman and Rozman, 2003; Kamiya, 2004 in Hughes, 2004:434). Although Northeast Asia is somewhat peripheral to the core counterterrorism campaign in Central, Southeast, and Southwest Asia, both the US and Japan still needs to maintain their alliance to manage the relationship with North Korea and China (Gates, 2002:43).

Maintaining the alliance with the US is important for Japan to protect this country from its enemies. Japan is an abnormal military power. This country spends less than 1 percent of its national budget for military, whereas Japan lives in the region that potentially raises conflicts, such as conflicts between China-Taiwan and North-South. Relationship among Japan, North Korea, and China, for example, cannot be separated from the history and memory of conflict among those states. The Japanese occupation of Manchuria, Taiwan (Formosa) and Korean Peninsula during the 1940s has left behind the problems of the Japanese crime war during the occupation. North Korea and China, based on historical experience, become more potential threat for Japan than the Middle East countries or terrorist groups in the Middle East. Although some of the Japanese died in the WTC in the September 11 Attacks, Japanese territory was not directly threatened (Watt, 2002:735). That is why issues dealing with the tension between Japan and its neighbors make public in Japan give more attention than conflict in the Middle East, such as North Korean test missile flying over northern Honshu in August 1999 and discovery and unsuccessful interception of two North Korean spy ships in Japanese waters by Japan's Coast Guard and Marine Self Defense Forces (MSDF) in March 1999. Those cases increased domestic support for the SDF to participate in the overseas combat operation (Midford, 2003:340).

The enhancement of the US-Japan alliance can be seen from an interim report on the realignment of US troops in Japan. The threat of terrorism and the WMD, and the unpredictability of the situation in the Korean peninsula pushed Japan-US Security Consultative Committee, known as "two plus two" in late October 2005 to arrange the realignment of US troops in Japan. The report maintains that the US Forces and the JSDF enhance their roles, missions, and capabilities by establishing joint operations coordination center at Yokota Air Base, close to Tokyo. The US Air Force and the Japanese Air Self Defense Force coordinate each other for smooth operation of the missile defense system. Then, the interim report also mentioned that the headquarters of the Third Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF) will move from Okinawa to Guam involving the transfer of half the US Marine Corps (7000 troops). This will be replaced by returning the US military land south of Kadena Air Base. The realignment of US troops in Japan indicates the readiness of the US and the Japanese army to counter terrorism and the other threats. Besides, the aim of the realignment of US troops in Japan is to bring peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region (*FEER*, November 2005:58-9).

/s'

Japan's Role in the Global War on Terrorism

A. Non-Combat Mission

The changing of the international situation post cold war forces Japan to participate in maintaining international peace and security. Debate between the pacifists and realists in redefining the role and mission of JSDF in international affairs indicates the dilemma between the worry of the emergence of Japanese military as in the World War II and the demand of an active role of Japan in international security in the new era. The Persian Gulf War of 1991 was the first challenge for Japan, because many countries participate under the UN mandate to liberate Kuwait from Iraq occupation, meanwhile Japan did not send any personnel. The Japanese system was not well prepared to address this type of challenge (Kawashima, ²⁰03:34).

After the Persian Gulf War of 1991, Japan formulated the extension of the JSDF. The first formulation is the International Peace Cooperation Law of 1992 (Hughes, 2004:428). This law permits the JSDF participate under the UN peacekeeping operation (PKO) under five conditions: all parties in the conflict must have agreed to a cease-fire; they also must have accepted Japan's participation in the PKO; the PKO forces must maintain strict impartiality in performing their duties; the JSDF must withdraw immediately upon any breakdown of the conditions set forth above; and the use of weapon is permitted only in the extremely limited case of self-defense (Kawashima, 2003:36). To regulate the relationship between Japan and the US because of this law, Diet released the 1999 SAEML that enables for the SDF to provide logistical support to US forces in order to defend Japan in the military operation around the Japanese territory (Hughes, 2004:428). Then, after September 11 Attack, Diet issued the ATSMML of 2001 to expand the role of JSDF in non-combat mission in supporting not only the US, but also its ally (foreign forces) and at the geographical scope of action far beyond that of SAEMML of 1999 such as the Indian Ocean, Arabian Sea and Southwest Asia.

However, in terms of the role of the JSDF in the war or conflict, the ATSMML gives limitations for the JSDF during the missions. In Article 3 of the ATSMML maintains that the contents of cooperation and support activities that the JSDF can provide are supply, transportation, repair and maintenance, medical services, communications, airport and

seaport services, and base support. Nonetheless, the JSDF shall not undertake the supply of weapons and ammunitions and shall not supply fuel or conduct maintenance on aircraft preparing to take off on military sorties or undertake the land transportation of weapons and ammunitions in foreign territories. Then, the JSDF also conducts the search and rescue activities and assistance to affected people. Regarding the use of weapon (article 12), the ATSMML reveals that:

Members of SDF in charge of Cooperation and Support Activities, Search and Rescue Activities or Assistance to Affected people, may proportionately use weapons when an unavoidable and reasonable cause exists for use of weapons to protect lives and bodies of themselves, other members of the self Defense Forces who are with them on the scene, or those who are with them on the scene and gave come under their control while conducting their duties.

The implementations of the non-combat mission of the JSDF were by sending the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) flotillas in Indian Ocean that consisted of fuel supply and transport ships and two destroyers. This unit combined with the Air Self Defense Force (ASDF) provided fuel to ships from the navies of the US, UK, Germany, New Zealand, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Canada and Grace; transported Thai army equipment for reconstruction activities to Afghanistan; and provided, maintenance support to US and others in Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea (Hughes, 2004: 428).

In terms of the Japan's role in Iraq, the JSDF strictly engages in reconstruction, humanitarian duties, and non-combat mission. A Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance (LCSMHRA) was passed by Japan's Diet on 26 July 2003. This Law authorizes Ground Self-Defense Forces (GSDF) and Air Force Self Defense Forces (ASDF) to provide logistical support for US and coalition forces in Iraq and in the surrounding Persian Gulf states. The Goo troops of GSDF has conducted reconstruction and humanitarian duties such as the provision of electricity, water, medical assistance, and education in Samawah, southwest of Basra, while the ASDF assists GSDF from Kuwait and transported US troops from Kuwait to Iraq (Hughes, 2004:428). Although the Law gives authority for JSDF to carry more significant weapons than the case of the participation of the JSDF in the peacekeeping operations before, the Japanese troops could not use their weapons unless attacked. To protect the JSDF, Koizumi asked the US military to provide protection (Uriu, 2004:179), then when the JSDF withdrew from Samawah, the Australian army provided protection to the JSDF. In Iraq War, Japan faces dilemmas

over "showing the flag" when this country involves in the US side especially because of the absence of the UN Security Council Resolution (Yasuaki, 2005:843).

B. Economic Front

Differ to the role of the JSDF in the military operation, on the non-military, especially on economic front Japan contributes significantly in the "war on terror". Economic front is important in the "war on terror", because in this front the economic aids can stabilize countries that become alliances in the "war on terror". This front clearly complements with the military operations led by the US. The Government of Japan, for instance, assisted Pakistan as a front line state with Afghanistan a total of US\$300 million on 22 September and 16 November 2001 for education, health, and poverty reduction. Japan also assisted other front line states of Afghanistan, such as Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, with a total of US\$18 million. In terms of emergency humanitarian assistance because of the military operations in Afghanistan, Japan has provided a total of US\$102 million via the UN and other agencies to Afghan refugees and a pool of Y550 million to Japanese non-governmental organization (NGO) for refugee assistance. To support President I-L.111nd Karzai as a post Taliban regime in Afghanistan, Japan conducted Tokyo of the International Conference on Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan on 21-22 January 2002. At the conference Japan provided up to US\$500 million for rebuilding the government and physical infrastructure of the country and the conference it self raised a total of US\$4.5 billion (Hughes, 2004:437-8). When it comes to the Iraq War, Japan at the International Donors' Conference on Reconstruction of Iraq in October 2003 pledged US\$5 billion for year 2004 (US\$1.5 billion in grants and US\$3.5 billion in ODA loans). This amounted approximately to percent of the estimation of reconstruction costs of the World Bank. Koizumi also committed to provide Iraq's \$4.2 billion debt to Japan (Uriu, 2004:179; Hughes, 2004:438).

Another Japan's contribution to the global fight against terrorism on economic front is the approval of the Law for Criminalization of the Financing of Terrorism by Diet on 15 June 2002. This law was combined with the Law on Customer Identification and Retention of Records on Transactions with Customer by Financial Institutions that was approved by the Diet on 22 April 2002. and the Anti-Organized Crime Law and the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Law that have been amended by the Diet to protect the terrorist financing. With these legal measures, the government of Japan ratified the UN Convention

for Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism in June 2002. By using these laws, financial institutions in Japan strengthen customer identification; keep records on customer identification on domestic and international transactions. Besides, these laws establish a legal basis and procedures for sharing information, especially classified information related to terrorists among competent ministries and agencies for freezing actions. The Japanese government also initiated the establishment the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). As a founding of FATF, Japan gives assist to the financial institutions in the Asia Pacific region (Kishima, 2004:261-3).

To support the implementation of these laws, the Japan Financial Intelligence Office (JAFIO) receives and analyzes suspicious transaction reports filed by financial institutions all over Japan. The JAFIO not only focuses on the terrorist financing but also monitors money laundering from drug crimes and other serious crimes. The number of suspicious transaction reports was increased dramatically from around ten in 1998 to 1,059 in 1999, 7,242 in 2000, 12,372 in 2001, 18,768 in 2002 and more than 20,000 in 2003. Many reports are followed up by the law enforcement to be investigated (Kishima, 2004:262). In terms of fighting against terrorist financing, in line with the UN Security Council Resolutions 1267 and 1333 dealing with the freezing of Taliban assets, the JAFIO cut off the flow of financing to and from other agencies related to Taliban. On 22 September and 26 October 2001 JAFIO froze the assets and restricted the money flows of a total of one hundred and eighty-eight individuals and groups related to Taliban (Hughes, 2004:437).

The participation of Japan in the "war on terror" led by the US is predicted give economic benefits for this country, moreover, if the war continues and expands not only in Afghanistan and Iraq but also to Iran and other countries. Besides receiving access for oil in the Middle East as I mentioned in the last section, Japan could lead to be an exporter of tools of defense such as cars and information technology tools to the US and other terrorist fighting countries. Regarding to this, Japan has very advanced technologies especially electronic devices (Sakai, 2001:27). Japan had an experience during the Korean War when this country supported the US army through providing defense tools such as cars, telecommunication tools, uniforms, and many others. This support raised Japan's economic development after collapse due to the Pacific War. This country also transferred high technology from the US.

C. Japan in the Second Front

Southeast Asia becomes the second front of the global war on terrorism led by the US after the Middle East as the first front. In late January 2002, the escalation of an insurgency by Abu Sayyaf in Mindanao in the Southern Philippines pushed the Bush administration to send 660 troops to the Philippines. The deployment was followed by the arrests of dozens of alleged al-Qaeda operatives in Singapore, Malaysia, and the Philippines (Gershman, 2002; Glassman, 2005). The emergence of the Southeast Asia as the second front was strengthened by Bali Blast I on 12 October 2002, JW Marriot Bombing on 5 August 2003, Australian Embassy Bombing in Jakarta on 9 September 2004, and Bali Blast II on 1 October 2005.

When the war on terror expanded to the Southeast Asia, regarding to Japan's role in the war, this country faces dilemma. On the one hand, as a close US alliance in Pacific, the US expects an active Japanese participation, on the other hand, the active Japanese participation will endanger the lives of Japanese (Leheny, 2002:45). Besides, in the second front Japan has many assets and investments in several countries especially Indonesia and Malaysia where predominantly Muslim that are vulnerable to the terrorist attacks. Moreover, during the Pacific War, the Japanese occupied these territories and this can be exploited by the terrorists to raise anti-Japanese sentiment.

To participate in the war on terror in this region, Japan use soft approach by strengthening multilateral agreement in the framework of economic cooperation. Summit Conferences of Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), in which Japan as well as the US becomes a member, in Shanghai China (October 2001) and in Los Cabos Mexico (October 2002) included the threat of terrorism as a main agenda of the conferences. The Shanghai Declaration under title 'APEC Economic Leader on Counter Terrorism' and the Los Cabos Declaration under title 'APEC Leaders Statement on Recent Acts of Terrorism in APEC Member Economies' and 'APEC Leaders Statement on Fighting Terrorism and Promoting Growth' indicated that terrorism was seen to be the threat of international liberalism. To realize the fight against terrorism, members of APEC established the Security Trade in the APEC Region (STAR) to regulate the security of goods and people movement (Andrea, 2003). Besides using APEC forum, Japan intensifies the role to the war on terrorism through ASEAN. In March 2003 the ASEAN Regional Forums convened the first annual International Meeting on Counterterrorism and Transnational Crime (ISM CT-TC) in Malaysia. This forum involved extra-regional "dialogue

partners", included Japan, in an effort to share information and develop counterterrorist solution (Chow, 2005:318).

Japan has interests to involve in the war on terrorism in Southeast Asia because this region has a strategic access for the Japanese exports and imports especially through the Malacca Strait and the South China Sea. Over 90 percent of international trade occurs via sea and 45 percent through the South China Sea, in which the Strait of Malacca that is connected between Indian Ocean and the South China Sea become the second busiest international sea land after the Strait of Hormuz. The shipping transports raw materials and energy resources such as crude oil, liquefied natural gas (LNG), coal, and iron especially from the Persian Gulf to Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. Japanese tankers carry around 70 percent of Japan's oil through this sea lane (Rowan, 2005:415-431).

When terrorism goes to sea (Luft and Korin, 2004), Japan worries that its ships will become target attack of terrorism (terrorist piracy). Japanese Defense Minister Yoshinoro Ono, on a swing through Southeast Asia has urged the three countries to do more to protect oil shipping via the Strait of Malacca from piracy and terrorism (Watkins, 2005:28). Japan gives assistance especially for Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia in technology to secure the Malacca Strait. One of agendas of the meeting between President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi in the Eleventh Summit Conference of ASEAN of 2005 was that Japan will give technical assistance for Indonesia to secure the Malacca Straits (*Kompas* online, 15 December 2005).

Conclusion

The involvement of Japan in the global "war on terrorism" is influenced by domestic and international factors. Domestically, during the Koizumi era the dominant decision makers in Japan had shifted from factional powers to the prime minister. When Japan was demanded to take decision in terms of the international "war on terrorism" campaign led by the US, Prime Minister Koizumi responded quickly to support the war. Internationally, the Japanese support to the "war on terrorism" is under framework of the Japan-US security alliance. The involvement of Japan in the "war on terrorism" is to

maintain the Japan-US security alliance in the situation that this country faces a real and direct threat from its neighbor in North East Asia, such as China and North Korea.

Although Japan under Koizumi expressed full support to the global "war on terrorism", practically Japan did not use its full military power in the war. Up till now, this country is only active in the non-combat mission. This policy was taken by Koizumi, on the one hand, to accommodate the US demand in supporting "war on terrorism" and on the other hand to minimize the worry of Japan's neighbors to the Japanese military expansion as being done during the Pacific War. This participation in non-combat mission is a broad achievement of JSDF in the international mission compared to two decades before.

In the economic front, Japan as one of the largest economic powers in the world expresses full support to the international "war on terrorism" by giving aids to the countries that support the war. These aids are supposed to recover economic crisis in the countries such as Afghanistan and Iraq that become target of the US military operations as consequences of war on terrorism. In Asia Pacific and more specifically in Southeast Asia as a "second front" of the global "war on terror", Japan strengthens its participation in the war under framework of multilateral economic cooperation.

Finally, it can be concluded that the participation of Japan in the "war on terrorism" is a symbol that Japan is a part of the US ally in Asia and the legislation of anti-terrorism laws in Japan is to provide an umbrella for Japan to maintain the US-Japan alliance. The full support of Japan in the economic front is to minimize Japan to be a target of terrorist attacks.

Bibliography

Andrea, F. (2003). 'APEC dan Isu Terrorism (APEC and Terrorism Issue)', *Kompas*, 23 October.

Asahi Shimbun. (2003). *Japan Almanak 2004*, Toppan Printing Co. Ltd., Tokyo.

- Chow, J.T. (2005). 'ASEAN Counterterrorism Cooperation since 9/11', *Asian Survey*, Vol. 45, No. 2, March/April, pp. 302-321.
- Dowty, A. (2000). 'Japan and the Middle East: Signs of Change?', *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 4, No. 4, December, pp. 67-76.
- Eccleston, B. (1986). 'The State, Finance and Industry in Japan', in Cox, A., *State, Finance and Industry*, Wheatsheaf, Sussex, pp. 60-79.
- Far Eastern Economic Review*. (2005) Vol. 186, No. 10, November 2005, p. 58-59.
- Gershman, J. (2002). 'Is Southeast Asia the Second Front?', *Foreign Affairs* (online), Vol. 81, No. 4, July-August.. Available: http://web4.infotrac.galegroup.com/it-w/infomark/631/930/88567062w4/purl=rci_EAIM_o_A870226478zdyn=7!xrn_8_0_A87022647?sw_aep=flinders (30 May 2006).
- Gill, B. (2002). 'September 11 and Northeast Asia', *The Brookings Review*, Vol. 20, No. 3, Summer, pp. 43-46.
- Glassman, J. (2005). 'The "War on Terrorism" Comes to Southeast Asia', *Journal of Contemporary Asia* (online), Vol. 35, Issue 1. Available: <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=8499000818rsid=5&Fmt=3&clientId=20831&RQT=309&VNam>. (30 May 2006).
- Hiwatari, N. (2005). 'Japan in 2004: 'Courageous' Koizumi Carries On', *Asian Survey*, Vol. 45, No. i, January/February, pp. 41-53.
- Holsti, K.J. (1977). *International Politics: A Framework for Analysis*, 3rd Edition, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc.
- Hughes, C.W. (2005). 'Japan's Security Policy, the US-Japan Alliance, and the 'War on Terror': Incrementalism Confirmed or Radical Leap?', *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 38, No. 4, December, pp. 427-445.
- Jones, E. et al. (1993). *Coming Full Circle: An Economic History of the Pacific Rim*, Melbourne: Oxford UP.

- Katzenstein, P.J. (2002). 'Same War, Different Views: Germany, Japan, and the War on Terrorism', *Current History*, December, pp. 427-435.
- Kawashima, Y. (2003). *Japanese Foreign Policy at the Crossroad*, Washington: The Brooking Institution.
- Kishima, K. (2004). 'Japan's Efforts in the Global Fight against Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing', *Journal of Money Laundering Control*, Vol. 7, No. 3, Winter, pp. 261-263.
- K0771pas (online), 15 December 2005. Available: <http://www.kompas.com/utama/news/0512/15/021823.htm> (28 February 2006).
- Kurth, J.R. (1989). 'The Pacific Basin versus the Atlantic Alliance: Two Paradigms of International Relations', *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 505, September, pp. 34-45.
- Leheny, D. (2002). 'Tokyo Confronts Terror', *Policy Review*, December 2001/January, pp. 37-47.
- Lincoln, E.J. (2002). 'Japan in 2001: A Depressing Year', *Asian Survey*, Vol. 42, No. 1, January/February, pp. 67-80.
- Luft, G., Korin, A. (2004). 'Terrorism Goes to Sea', *Foreign Affairs* (online), Vol. 83, No. 6, November/December. Available: http://web4.infotrac.galegroup.com/itw/infomark/631/93o/88567062w4/purl=rci_EAIM_o_A1242754118zdyn=10!xrn_6_o_A124275411?sw_aep=flinders (30 May 2006).
- Midford, P. (2003). 'Japan's Response to Terror: Dispatching the SDF to the Arabian Sea', *Asian Survey*, Vol. 42, No. 2, March/April, pp. 329-351.
- Peters, S. (2004). 'Coercive Western Energy Security Strategies: "Resource Wars" as a New Threat to Global Security', *Geopolitics*, Vol. 9 No. 1, pp. 187-212.
- Rowan, J.P. (2005). 'The US-Japan Security Alliance, ASEAN, and the South China Sea Dispute', *Asian Survey*, Vol. 45, No. 3, May/June, pp. 414-436.

- Rozman, G., and Rozman, N. (2003). 'The United States and Asia in 2002: Needing Help against "Evil"', *Asian Survey*, Vol. 43, No. 1, January/February, pp. 1-14.
- Sakai, K. (2003) '11 September and the Clash of Civilizations: the Role of the Japanese Media and Public Discourse', *Arab Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 25, No. 1/2, Winter/Spring, pp. 159-178.
- Sakai, Y. (2001) '9-11 and Japan: How the Terrorist Threat is Affecting Tokyo's Thinking', *The International Economy*, November/December, p. 27.
- Segal, G. (1990). *Rethinking the Pacific*, Clarendon, Oxford.
- Shinoda, T. (2003). 'Koizumi's Top Down Leadership in the Anti Terrorism Legislation: The Impact of Political Institutional Changes', *SAIS Review*, Vol. 23 No. 1, Winter-Spring, pp. 19-34.
- 'The Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law', (online). Available: http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/policy/2006/anti-terrorism/029terohougaiyou_e.html Accessed 26/4/2006.
- Uriu, R. (2004). 'Japan in 2003: Muddling Ahead', *Asian Survey*, Vol. 44, No. 1, January/February, pp. 168-181.
- . (2003) 'Japan in 2002: An Up-and-Down Year, but Mostly Down', *Asian Survey*, Vol. 43, No. 1, January/February, pp. 78-90.
- Watkins, E. (2005). 'Japan Urges Malacca Strait Shipping Safety', *Oil & Gas Journal*, 24 January.
- Watts, J. (2002). 'Balancing the "Axis of evil" in the Northeast Asia', *The Lancet*, Vol. 360, 7 September.
- Yasuaki, C. (2005). 'Insights into Japan-US Relations on the Eve of Iraq War: Dilemmas over "Showing the Flag"', *Asian Survey*, Vol. XLV, No. 6, November/December, pp. 843-864.