

Integration, Disintegration and Democratization in Indonesia

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Abstract

Democratization is a changing process from non-democratic regime to a democratic regime. The Asian financial crisis that started in Thailand and spread over other Asian countries in 1997 emerged economical crisis that was followed by political crisis. The worst impact of the crisis occurred in Indonesia when the new order that had been established by Soeharto during the three decades collapsed. The development of democracy in Indonesia at the same time is accompanied by a potential national disintegration. The threat of national disintegration in the high tension can be seen in Aceh, Maluku, and the West Papua and in the low tension happens in Riau, the East Kalimantan, and the South Sulawesi. However, Indonesia tends to be integrated because of the network of collective memories and common histories among the Indonesian people. Although democracy in Indonesia is still unconsolidated, the democratization process strengthen the national unity of Indonesia, because in the democratization process can raise a strong and legitimate leader, give more authority to the local people, make the TNI to be a professional military, and give opportunity for developing political parties. The development of civil society through democratization in Indonesian cases is the way to prevent disintegration.

Key words: democracy, disintegrate, financial crisis, integrate, prevention

Democratization is a changing process from non-democratic regime to a democratic regime. According to Samuel Huntington (1991:44), democratization consists of three levels: (1) the end of an authoritarian regime; (2) the building of a democratic regime; and (3) the consolidation of a democratic regime. Interval between an authoritarian regime and a democratic regime is called democratic transition. In other words, the transition starts from the collapse of an authoritarian regime and is followed by the institutionalization of political rule in a democratic system. A democratic transition is not always followed by a democratic regime, because the political situation in the transition process is uncertain and unpredictable. It is possible that this transition will create a new authoritarian regime.

The Asian financial crisis that started in Thailand and spread over other Asian countries in 1997 emerged economical crisis that was followed by political crisis. The worst impact of the crisis occurred in Indonesia when the new order that had been established by Soeharto during the three decades collapsed. The collapse of the new order regime under Soeharto gives hope for Indonesian people to live in a better situation. *Reformasi* order, politicians usually call it, offers a democratization process, a broaden participation for people in politic and economy, and a civil society development. This order also increases the role of local people to express their political interests and gives opportunity to manage their local natural resources. The run of the two multi parties' general elections in 1999 and 2004 democratically has made Indonesia to be the one of the largest democratic states in the world after India and the United States (U.S.).

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However, the development of democracy in Indonesia at the same time is accompanied by a potential national disintegration. The authoritarian and repressive regime under Soeharto ignored the local aspiration. The collapse of this regime was seen to be a momentum to obtain their rights. Moreover, although the East Timor has a different historical background with other parts of Indonesia, when the East Timor separated from Indonesia, several territories in Indonesia were triggered to be independent. The East Timor was under Portuguese during the West colonialism era, whereas other parts of Indonesia was under the Dutch occupation.

The threat of national disintegration in the high tension can be seen in Aceh, Maluku, and the West Papua and in the low tension happens in Riau, the East Kalimantan, and the South Sulawesi. Separatist movements, especially in Aceh, Maluku, and the West Papua, demand to establish independent states, whereas the demands of people in Riau, the East Kalimantan, and the South Sulawesi are to establish federal states rather than unity state. They also demand an equal distribution of wealth from local natural resources between local and central government. The questions of this paper are does Indonesia tend to be integrated or disintegrated? Does democracy strengthen a national unity in Indonesia?

The first part of this paper explores the problems of ethnicities and disintegration in the world. The second section argues that Indonesia tends to be integrated because of the network of collective memories and common histories among the Indonesian people. The third section suggests that although democracy in Indonesia is still unconsolidated, the democratization process strengthen the national unity of Indonesia, because in the democratization process can raise a strong and legitimate leader, give more authority to the local people, make the TNI to be a professional military, and give opportunity for developing political parties. All of these are the main factors that strengthen the integration of Indonesia.

Ethnicities and Disintegration: A Global Problem

Among more than 170 states in the world only a few states that are inhabited by a homogeny people. Most of states are multi -ethnic states with different levels of diversities. Therefore, problems of ethnicities are faced by many countries in the world.

The break up of multi-ethnic states in the Soviet Union, for instance, was caused by economical, political, and cultural problems. An economic stagnant that was going on in the Soviet Union for a decade forced President Gorbachev to release *glasnost* and *perestroika*. This policy was supposed solving the economic problems in the Soviet Union. However, the development of *glasnost* (openness) and democratization was beyond the capability of the central government to restructure the Soviet Union politically and economically (*perestroika*) (Brzezinski, 1989; Desai, 1987). As a result, the demands of the multi-ethnic society in the Soviet Union as a consequence of democratization for greater national self-determination increased (Smith, 1996:2). The difference of history, culture, and ethnicity in Georgians, Estonians, Latvians, Moldovans, Belarusians, and Armenian before unifying under the Soviet Union became the main factors of the break up of the Soviet Union. People who live in the Central Asia such as Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan; and also people who live in the Caucasus Mountains such as Chechnya, Dagestan, and Ingushetia are influenced by Islam, especially during the Ottoman Empire. Meanwhile, other parts of the former Soviet Union are close to Slav culture and are influenced by Orthodox Christianity. In 1991, Russia under Boris Yeltsin started to separate from the Soviet Union and then other traditional nationalities followed.

Another example about the failure of national integration is the break up of Yugoslavia. Historically, integration among southern Slav people was caused by the threat of Nazism of Germany and Fascism of Italia. Under Joseph Broz Tito leadership (1892-1980),

southern Slav people defended their territories from Germany and Italia invasion. After releasing Beograd from Nazi in 1944, Tito declared the republic of Yugoslavia that consisted of six states with different cultural and ethnical background: Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Montenegro. Those ethnicities before world war I and world war II were influenced by different cultural background. Serbia, for instance, was influenced by Orthodox Christianity; Croatia was influenced by the Rome Catholic; and Bosnia-Herzegovina was influenced by Islam. After Tito died in May 1980, the integration of southern Slav people broke up and ethnical conflicts among them emerged in the 1990s (Gagnon Jr., 1994:142).

In other parts of the world, ethnical minorities in many countries demand from a broaden autonomy to independence. Irish, Scottish, and Welsh, for instance, demand a broaden autonomy from England. This also occur in Canada (French people in Quebec), Belgium (Vlaam and Vallon people), and Spain (Basque people). In other countries ethnical minorities want to establish independences states such as the struggle of people in Kashmir (India), Moro (the Philippines), Chechnya (Russia), Tamil (Sri Lanka), Phattani (Thailand), Rohingya (Burma), and Kurd (Iraq, Turkey, Iran, and Syria).

The Diversities of Indonesia

Clifford Geertz (1963:103-157) maintains that generally the new states in Asia and Africa including Indonesia face the problems of national integration, because on the one hand people in those new states have primordial sentiments that should be maintained and on the other hand they want to establish dynamic and stable modern states that consist of multi-ethnicities. The Indonesian society, for instance, is diverse in terms of religious, ethno-linguistic and race, and the regional and locality bases of communalism (Brown, 1995:118 - 119). When it comes to the religious diversities, although approximately 90 per cent of Indonesians are Muslims, but they divide between the devout Muslims, the *santri*, and the more nominal Muslims that actual religious beliefs and practices owe more to Hinduism as it existed before the Hindu impact than they do to Islam, the *abangan* (Geertz, 1963:121-130). Among the *santri* can be classified into two categories: (1) muslim traditionalists that usually affiliate to *nahdlatul ulama* (NU); and (2) muslim modernists that commonly affiliate to *muhammadiyah*. It is predicted that majority of the Javanese people are *abangan*. This can be seen from the results of every general election since 1955 that Islamic parties have never win in the Java Island. In the general election in 1955 the percentage of voters from the main non-religious parties in the East Java, the Central Java, the West Java, and Jakarta was 46.6%, 59.53%, 42.3%, and 38%. Meanwhile the percentage of voters from the main religious parties was 45.75%, 30.27%, 42.1% and 44.71% respectively. In more details see Feith (1955).

Feith (1970:8-9) argues that the *abangan* usually prefers affiliate to communist (in the old order era under Soekarno) or nationalist parties rather than Islamic parties. This pattern still exists today in which the total voters of nationalist parties such as PDIP (Indonesian democratic party of struggle), Golkar party, PD (democratic party), Hanura party and Gerindra party are higher than the total voters of Islamic parties such as PPP (United development party), PKB (national awakening party), PAN (national mandate party), and PKS (prosperous and justice party). Besides the diversities in the Islamic communities, in the certain parts of Indonesia, several regions are majority inhabited by non-muslim communities such as Christianity in the East Nusa Tenggara, Papua, and the North Sulawesi, and Hinduism in Bali island.

Regarding the ethno-linguistic and racial distinctions, Indonesia has 25 different language groups and over 250 different dialect groups. Perhaps 60 per cent of total population in Indonesia lives in the Java Island that divide into two main ethno-linguistic backgrounds: the

Javanese (of central and eastern Java) constitute approximately 45 per cent of the population, the Sundanese, of West Java, comprise 15 per cent. Outside Java Island, there are much smaller ethnic groups such as Minangkabau (4 per cent), the Batak s (2 per cent), the Acehnese (1.4 per cent). Besides, another important ethnical background that spread in Indonesia, especially in the urban areas, is the ethnic Chinese (3 per cent) (Brown, 1995:118-119).

With regard to the regional and locality bases of communalism, Indonesia has a population of about 230 million spread throughout 6,000 inhabited islands. To manage an area over three and a half miles east to west, Indonesia reinforces the unitary constitution divide its territory into thirty two provinces, and thereafter into districts, sub-districts, municipalities and villages. Indonesia's administrative structure is developed by considering the resource allocation and ethno-linguistic groupings with the exception of the Chinese community (Brown, 1995:119).

Although Indonesia has different cultures, ethnicities, and languages, I argue that Indonesia tend to be integrated rather than separated. The reason in favor of this argument is by using a historical approach. The historical background of a nation determines the quality of national integration. What happened in the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia are examples that relationship between ethnicities in the past such as ethnical conflicts, wars, religious sentiments, and language differences becomes the main factor that a multi-national state is disintegrated.

The Network of Collective Memories: A Historical Approach

The Indonesian people have a network of collective memories and common histories that support the unity of Indonesia (Abdullah, 2000:16). This can be seen from the facts as follows:

Firstly, historically inter-connection among territories in Indonesia had been going on for a long time ago. Although the Indonesian people separated each other by sea people who lived in the South Sulawesi, the Java Island, the South Sumatra, Aceh and Malacca interacted with each other especially through trading. Because of this geographical character, the Indonesian historian and nationalists usually called Indonesia as *nusantara*. It means in between the islands. The small kingdoms stretching in Indonesia before and during the Dutch occupation generally centralized their power in the port cities.

There were two main powers that controlled and unified small kingdoms in Indonesia before the Dutch occupation: (1) Sriwijaya kingdom (7th-12th centuries) with the central power in the South Sumatra (Palembang); dan (2) Majapahit kingdom (14th century) with the central power in the East Java (Mojokerto). Those kingdoms unified small kingdoms socially, economically, and politically. Both kingdoms were major maritime powers and controlled their territory beyond the Indonesian territory today. Sriwijaya kingdom, for instance, controlled all of Sumatra Island except Aceh, part of West Java (Banten), West Kalimantan and Malacca Peninsula. This kingdom could not control all of Java Island because in this territory especially in the Central Java established Hinduism Mataram kingdom under Syailendra Dynasty. Mataram kingdom had sphere of influence in the Sumatra Island especially after Pamalayu expedition.

Another imperial power in Indonesia is Majapahit kingdom. The sphere of influence of Majapahit kingdom stretched from all of the Java Island, the Bali Island, the West and East Nusa Tenggara, part of Sumatra, southern part of Kalimantan and Sulawesi, Maluku, Malacca Peninsula including Singapore, and Cambodia. The control of Sriwijaya and Majapahit kingdoms beyond the Indonesian territory today raises the Indonesian expansionist image among other countries especially Malaysia and Singapore, because the concept of *Indonesia raya* was based on the history of Sriwijaya and Majapahit (Sutopo, 1994:157 -161). Moreover, during the Soekarno era, Indonesia invaded Malaysia (1963).

Secondly, in terms of the spreading of Islam in Indonesia there were inter-connections between one area and the others. For example, Islam in Makassar, Bugis, and Palu in Sulawesi, was spread by *datuk dibandang*, *datuk patimang*, and *datuk keramat* from Minangkabau, the West Sumatra. Then, Islam in Banjarmasin, the South Kalimantan, was spread from Demak in the Central Java. Meanwhile, Islam in Java was influenced by the Samudra Pasai kingdom in Aceh. The ancient manuscript about Aceh with the title *hikayat raja-raja Pasai* (the story of Pasai kings) was not found in Aceh but in Demak. Another example is the spreading of Islam in Maluku was held by Hito and Zainal Abidin that studied Islam before in Giri, the East Java (Abdullah, 2000:15-16).

Thirdly, all of Indonesian territories with different levels of occupation were colonized by the Dutch for one and a half centuries to three and a half centuries. When the Dutch controlled Indonesia, this country implemented a centralistic model. The centralistic model reduced the independency of local kingdoms, because the local kingdoms depended on the central government (the Dutch administration) in terms of the salaries that they received and the decision that they took to control their territories (Malarangeng & Rasyid, 1999:19). The weakness of local kingdom caused them need assist from the central government when they faced rebellions and riots.

The Java war (1825-1830) and the Paderi war (1821-1837), for example, were triggered by conflict in the local level between the local kings (*sultan*) and their rivals. The Java War (Diponegoro war) emerged because of conflict between *pangeran Diponegoro* and the royal family in Yogyakarta kingdom. The support from people and *ulama* (Islamic clerics) in the Central Java to Diponegoro forced the royal family to ask the Dutch assistance. The involvement of the Dutch administration in the local conflict raised the spirit of *jihad* among the Javanese people. The Java war was the big war that influenced the Dutch occupation policy in Indonesia. During the Java war for five years, approximately 80,000 soldiers from the Dutch died and the Dutch administration spent two million gulden (Abdullah, 1991:143-154). Another example is the Paderi war. The war emerged in the South Sumatra (Minangkabau) and was triggered by the conflict between *ulama* that wanted to implement the Islamic Shari'a and local traditional leaders. The weakness of local traditional leaders in fighting against the Islamic clerics and their followers (Paderi movement) pushed the traditional leaders to invite the Dutch administration soldiers (Abdullah, 1991:154-169).

The centralistic model also created common solidarities among Indonesian people as one nation under *pax neerlandica*. During the national movement (1905-1945), the common sense of Indonesian people as one nation can be seen from the births of organizations that had branches and activities not only in the Java Island but also outside Java. Sarekat Islam (SI), the Indonesian communist party (PKI), and *muhammadiyah*, for instance, had branches in Sumatra, Kalimantan, and Sulawesi. Although several youth organizations were established on the basis of ethnicities and territories, those organizations precisely pushed to unify Indonesia. How strong the inter-connected between the islands and tribes in Indonesia forced the youth organizations in Indonesia such as Jong Java, Jong Minahasa, Jong Sumatranen Bond, Jong Ambon, and Jong Celebes to declare *sumpah pemuda* (the oath of youth) on 28 October 1928 in Menteng Batavia (Jakarta): one nation Indonesia! one language Indonesia! one motherland Indonesia!

Fourthly, the unitary of Indonesia and the spirit of nationalism was developed in the independence war (1945-1949). The defeat of Japan in the Pacific war caused the AFNEI (allied forces Netherlands east Indies) including the Dutch try to return the power in Indonesia from the Japanese administration to the Dutch administration. The rejection of the Indonesian people to the occupation of the Dutch and the conflict between Indonesian youth and the AFNEI raised the war between the allied forces under Britain and the Indonesian people in

Surabaya (the East Java province) on 10 November 1945. After the withdrawal of the allied forces from Indonesia (1946) and was replaced by the Dutch army (NICA) the rejection of Indonesian people to the new authority emerged in many regions such as in Yogyakarta, Semarang, Medan, Deli, Madura, Banjarmasin, Makassar, Padang, Aceh, and Surabaya. The independence war spreading in many regions in Indonesia generally indicated the acknowledgement of the Indonesian people who have different ethno-linguistic backgrounds, that Indonesia was an entity as a nation-state.

Finally, when the Dutch gave the sovereignty to Indonesia in 1949 and established the United States of Indonesia, Indonesia consisted of 18 independent political entities. However, in April 1950 there were only three states under the United States of Indonesia: the republic of Indonesia, the East Indonesian state, and the East Sumatra state. Fourteen states merged with the republic of Indonesia in Yogyakarta. The acceptance of the Indonesian politicians to the federalism model was only a strategy to receive an acknowledgement from the Dutch as an independent state. Finally, the East Indonesian State and the East Sumatra state merged with the republic of Indonesia in Yogyakarta.

Democracy and National Integration

The changing process from the colonialism era to the independence era in Indonesia is not only the changing control from the foreigners to the indigenous people (*bumiputera*), but also how the new authority under *bumiputera* builds a nation in the multi-ethnic societies (Sunaryo, 1999:137). The national integration in the multi-ethnic society is not taken for granted. This depends on the efforts of political regime in responding people aspirations. Local political turbulences during the Soekarno era such as the republic of the South Maluku (RMS) Rebellion; the Andi Aziz Rebellion in Bugis; the Darul Islam Rebellion in the West Java, the South Sulawesi, the South Kalimantan and Aceh; and PRRI/Permesta in the West Sumatra and the North Sulawesi indicated serious problems in relationship between state and society and relationship between central and periphery. Soekarno tried to integrate the Indonesian people by creating common enemy. He classified countries in the world into two categories: (1) *nefos* (new established forces) that were represented by the third world and socialist countries; and (2) *oldefos* (old established forces) that were represented by capitalist and liberal countries. The common enemy that was released by Soekarno was the threat of neo-colonialism (*nekolim*) that was led by *oldefos*. However, this was not effective to prevent rebellions.

During the Soeharto era, national integration developed through combination between centralistic policy and security approach that repressed and negated local aspirations. The new order under Soeharto also implemented double strategies: a state corporatism on the one side and a mass de-politicization on the other side. As Soekarno, Soeharto also created common enemies to integrate the Indonesian people. The common enemies were the threat of communism, left extremist and right extremist. However, the creation of common enemy was just to justify the state repression to the people. At the same time, regarding the economical resources, the exploitation of local natural resources was intensified without proportional share to the local people (Haris, 1999:12-13). The turbulences in Aceh, the West Papua, Riau, and the East Timor after collapsing Soeharto indicated that there was something wrong in the state formation and the nation building during the Soeharto.

After resigning Soeharto, the democratization process in Indonesia has been going dramatically. Compared to the other countries in the Southeast Asia, Indonesia has the prospect of further democratization. This can be seen from the improvement of several indicators of democratic system such as a revived multi-party system; the direct presidential elections in July 2004; two fair national parliamentary elections, provincial and district elections; the run of the direct elections of governors, regents and mayors; restored freedom of speech and association together with the emergence of a vibrant press; an amended constitution; the creation of

independence statutory bodies to oversee the activities of state machinery; separation of powers between the executive, legislature, and judiciary; and finally a reduced political role of the national Indonesian military (TNI) (Ghonal, 2004:507).

Although democracy in Indonesia is still in process to be consolidated, I argue that the process can strengthen the national integrity of Indonesia with several arguments as follows:

Firstly, democratization in Indonesia can emerge a strong and legitimate national leader, especially recently that president and vice-president of Indonesia are chosen directly by people; because historically rebellions and separatisms in Indonesia emerged because of the weakness of the state (Anderson, 1983:482). A strong national leader in the democratic transition is needed to control and maintain national integration, because the situation in the transition is unpredictable and uncertainty.

The weakness of the state during the Soekarno era was caused by the conflicts among political parties with different ideological backgrounds and the crisis of Soekarno's legitimacy especially during the guided democracy era (1959-1960). During the parliamentary democracy (1945-1957) the government was quite often changed because of the conflict among political parties. There were not any dominant political parties and as a result cabinet was vulnerably to be felled. Beside that, several policies of the central government made the local people or local political leaders unsatisfied. The weakness of the state forced the local people to rebel to the central government. Ethnical sentiment was not the main reason why certain parts of Indonesia rebelled. The reasons of rebellions were the response of the local people to the central government's policy not to separate from Indonesia. Moreover, several rebellions and separatisms led by political and military figures of the revolution that fought against the Dutch before and supported the independence of Indonesia.

The Darul Islam/Indonesian Islamic military (DI/TII) movement in the West Java led by Kartosuwiryo, for instance, emerged as a response to the Renville agreement (1947) between Indonesia and the Dutch. The agreement obliged Indonesian military withdrew from the West Java., but Kartosuwiryo and his followers from *hizbullah* and *sabilillah* militias rejected this agreement. Moreover, the Indonesian delegation in the Renville agreement led by Amir Syarifuddin from the Communist party. When Yogyakarta surrendered under the Dutch in 1949, Kartosuwiryo proclaimed Indonesian Islamic state on 7 August 1949 (Abdullah, 1991:376).

The DI movement in South Sulawesi in 1952 led by Lieutenant colonel Kahar Muzakkar, a leading Republican commander in the Revolution, was caused by the reorganization and rationalization of the TNI. As a consequence of the demobilization policy, many guerrilla fighters were not recruited to be regular army (TNI) because they did not fulfill the requirements. Most of them came from Islamic militias. Joined with 20,000 troops led by Kahar Muzakkar they refused to be demobilized and rebelled to Jakarta. In January 1952 Kahar formally announced that his rebellion was a part of Indonesian Islamic State in the West Java (Ricklefs, 1993:244). The same case occurred in the South Kalimantan that the DI movement led by Ibnu Hajar emerged because of the rejection of the demobilization policy (Abdullah, 1991:278-279).

Differ with the DI movement in the West Java, the South Sulawesi and the South Kalimantan, the DI movement in Aceh led by a charismatic leader Teungku Daud Beureueh was a response to the central government policy that put Aceh as a part of the North Sumatra Province. The Acehnese people wanted to establish own province and had autonomy to implement Islamic Syari'ah. However, the central government rejected the demand of the Acehnese people. As a result, the Acehnese people rebelled to the central government and claimed as a part of the Indonesian Islamic State in the West Java in September 1953. The DI Rebellion in Aceh ended in 1956 after the central government gave a special autonomy to Aceh

as a province that can conduct the Islamic Syari'a and gave amnesty to the rebels (Sihbudi, 2001:33-35).

Secondly, democratization in Indonesia gives more authority to the local people to manage their territories and to receive a fair distribution of wealthy. During the Soekarno era, some rebellions to the central government were triggered by the economical motive. People in Manado, the North Sulawesi, on 2 March 1957 led by Lieutenant colonel H.N.V. Sumual rebelled to the central government. This was known as the Permesta Rebellion. They rebelled because of the centralistic economic policy. The North Sulawesi as a central copra production did not receive a proportional share of benefits from the copra producti on export. A year later on 15 February 1958 a rebel government was announced in Sumatra with its headquarters at Bukittinggi. This was known as revolutionary government of the Indonesian republic (PRRI). This rebellion was also triggered by the centralisti c economic policy. They demanded to Jakarta to receive a proportional share of benefits from exported products such as oil and rubber.

After collapsing Soeharto, the demand to separate from Indonesia because of unfair distribution of wealthy between the local and central government emerges again. People in Riau wanted to separate from Indonesia, because they felt that Jakarta exploited their natural resources. The Riau province in the period between 1997 and 1998 gave more than 59 quintillion *rupiah* to the central government, however only 1.71 per cent gave back to this province (Zuhro, 1999:143). Separatism in Aceh and the West Papua also increase after resigning Soeharto and the movements are more radical than in Riau. One of the main reasons of these separatisms is also economy. As Riau, Aceh and the West Papua are wealthy in natural resources. Aceh has oil and natural gas explorations (PT Arun) and lodging industries. Meanwhile, in the West Papua there is PT Freeport that explores gold and cooper and man y lodging industries. Not all of the people in those areas have had a chance to benefit from the wealth of their natural resources. As a result, in the high tension they demand to separate from Indonesia or in the low tension they demand a broaden autonomy .

To respond the demands of several territories on the rights of local governments to manage their territories and the distribution of wealthy, in the democratization era or the *reformasi* order, Habibie administration started to reform relations between th e center and the regions. The government released law no. 22 of 1999 on the regional government and law no. 25 of 1999 on the fiscal decentralization. The law no. 22 emphases on wide -ranging autonomy at the district level over all functions except national defense, international relations, justice, monetary and fiscal policy, religion, national management of natural resources, national development planning, fiscal equalization, and national standards. Meanwhile, the law No. 25 eliminated the old subsidies (SDO) and development grants (*inpres*) and replaced with a general allocation fund (DAU) from at least 25 per cent of central government revenues. From these funds provinces receive approximately 10 per cent while districts receive about 90 per cent. In terms of the exploitation of natural resources, the central government retained 20 per cent of revenues from mining and forestry, while the rest was distributed to provinces (16 per cent) and districts (64 per cent). Regarding oil and natural gas revenues, the central government received 85 per cent of oil revenues and 70 per cent of gas revenue, and the 15 per cent and 30 per cent respectively were allocated to provinces and districts (Bertrand, 2004: 201 -202). These autonomy laws had the effect on reducing the demand of certain parts in Indonesia to separate from Indonesia. Specifically for Aceh and the West Papua, the central government accommodated the demand of the Acehnese and the Papuanese by releasing two laws on the broaden autonomy for two territories on the unity of Indonesia.

Thirdly, democratization can make the TNI to be more professional. Indonesia as a large country with more than 230 million people and spread over 16.677 islands needs a strong

and professional military. Historically, the TNI has the main role in maintaining national integrity. Rebellions in the West Java, the South Sulawesi, the South Kalimantan, the North Sumatra, Maluku, Aceh, and the West Papua can be eliminated because of the power of the TNI. However, the TNI operations also can threaten the national integrity. The violations of the human rights that involve the members of the TNI in Aceh as an excess of the central government decision under Soeharto that Aceh was the military operation zone/DOM (1990 - 1998), for instance, crystallized the demands of the Acehnese to separate from Indonesia. This also happened in the East Timor and the West Papua. The democratization process in Indonesia is supposed to turn the TNI back to barracks. The demand of the student movement in 1997 - 1998 and pro-democracy activists is to turn the TNI back to the state defense force and to eliminate the role of the TNI in business. During the *reformasi* order, the dual function of the TNI (*dwi fungsi*), in which the TNI has a social and political power, has been reduced by omitting the members of parliaments from the TNI, by placing the TNI under civilian control and changing the TNI's companies to be the state companies. This policy is supposed to develop the TNI to be professional, because the professionalism of the TNI is needed to maintain the national integrity.

Fourthly, democratization in Indonesia gives opportunities for developing political parties. Political parties are institutions that can tie people across border ethnicities and territories. Political parties are organizations that represent ideas about state and society that will be struggled to be implemented in reality. Ideology, platform, vision and mission of political parties will motivate their members to move. In other words, political parties are media for people to participate in the decision making process. Basically, the membership of political parties is open for all citizens. Since Indonesia is a multi-ethnic society, the membership of political parties is also multi-ethnicities. As a result, political parties become media to establish national integration (Surbakti, 2003:51-52).

During the new order era, the government under Soeharto inhibited the development of political parties. The number of political parties was limited only three parties: Golkar as a government party, the United Development Party (PPP) and the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI). Political parties were only permitted to establish the boards of parties from central boards to district boards. There were not the boards of parties in sub-districts and villages. People in sub-districts and villages became floating masses that were directed by bureaucracies to choose Golkar.

Since the establishment and involvement of political parties in the two general elections in 1999 and 2004, political parties in Indonesia are still unconsolidated. This can be seen from conflicts among and within political parties. When Megawati Soekarnoputri failed to be president in 1999, her followers from the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP) in Bali protested, made riots, and destroyed Golkar's secretariat party. When President Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) was impeached by the People's Consultative Council (MPR), Gus Dur's followers from the National Awakening Party (PKB) burned Golkar's provincial secretariat in Surabaya and destroyed some of the national mandate party (PAN) regency secretariats.

Beside conflicts between political parties, conflicts within political parties also appear in several parties. Since March 2005, public in Indonesia has seen several congresses or *muktamar* of political parties that were ended with conflicts, such as the congress II of PDIP in Denpasar, Bali, 28-31 March 2005; the *muktamar* II of PKB in Semarang, 16-18 April 2005; and the *muktamar* I of PBR in Jakarta, 26-28 April 2005. Ironically, according to Daniel Sparingga (Kompas, 2005), these parties were born in the *reformasi* era. Political parties hopefully will bring Indonesia pass the transition of democracy, but they are betrayal to the democracy.

Although political parties in Indonesia are still unconsolidated, I argue that the existence of these institutions can strengthen national integrity, because to gain voters in the general election, every political party tries to expand their activities all over Indonesian territory. Political party activists also try to fulfill all of the boards of parties until village levels, because this is one of the main strategies to be the winner in the general elections. The PDIP, the Golkar party and the PD are three parties that has branches until villages in all of Indonesian territories, and they become the winner in the elections of 1999, 2004, and 2009 respectively. These activities can integrate people in Indonesia.

A new political party has to be registered in the ministry of justice and human rights. To be registered, the new political party must have a central board in Jakarta; provincial boards in a half of total number of provinces in Indonesia; in each province a new party must have regency boards in a half of total number of regencies; and in each regency a party must have sub-district boards in a half of total number of sub-districts. The new political party that fulfills these requirements cannot follow a general election automatically until that party fulfills several requirements from the general election commission (KPU). These requirements are that a new political party must have a central board in Jakarta, provincial boards in the two-third of total number of provinces in Indonesia, regency boards in the two-third of total number of regencies in each province, and in each regency boards a new political party must have 1000 members that are proved by member identifications. The national scope of political party makes this institution as one of the media to integrate people in all regions in Indonesia.

Conclusion

Integration and disintegration are a dynamic process. These are the problems that are commonly faced by every community and every country in the world. The historical experience of a nation strongly determines the quality of national integration. Although a country, for instance, has multi-cultures, multi-races, and multi-ethno-linguistics, if this country tied in the same historical experience and has common idealism, this country potentially will be integrated than disintegrated.

Indonesia is a multi-ethnic state that also faces a dynamic process between integration and disintegration. Based on the historical experiences, Indonesia tends to be integrated because people in this country are tied in the network of collective memories, the common historian, and the common sense of destiny. However, the common sense of the Indonesian people can be up and down. This depends on the treatment of the central government in responding the regions demands. Repressive approach in the short term can prevent disintegration, but in a long term this can threaten the integration itself.

The development of civil society through democratization in Indonesian cases is the way to prevent disintegration. In Indonesia historically a centralistic model that is applied by the state and the weakness and illegitimate national leader contributed to the national disintegration. Democracy is an instrument to create a strong and legitimate national leader and to create a balance relationship between state and people. The development of political parties in the transition to democracy also can strengthen national integrity, because political parties are cross border ethnicities and territories organization. It is right that political parties in Indonesia right now is unconsolidated because of conflicts among them, but this happened because the flourishing of democracy in Indonesia is still young and this needs time to be mature. Giving opportunity to political parties as civilian institutions to develop is better rather than giving opportunity to military (TNI) to take control. In other words, creating civilian supremacy is a main agenda to prevent disintegration.

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