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Islamic Identity, Elite Interest and Foreign Policy in Indonesia
Identitas Islam, Kepentingan Elit dan Kebijakan Luar Negeri di Indonesia

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ABSTRACT

This article aims to examine the role of Islam as the marker of identity in Indonesia's participation in international affairs. It argues that Islam's role has faced constraints derived from the secular nature of the state's identity, the politics involving elite's interest and external environments. The argument is developed into three interrelated sections. The first section discusses the politics of identity construction in Indonesia. The second section looks at how elite politics and interests halt the intrusion of Islam in governance affairs. The third section brings the focus of discussion on the evolving Jakarta's foreign relations and policy that have been devoid of substantive Islamic values – such mainly as Muslim solidarity. This article focuses on examining the role of Islam in the evolution of Indonesia's foreign policy. It demonstrates that Islam's role has faced constraints shaped by the nature of the state's identity, elite interest and policy on Islam, and external situations. The formation of Indonesian national identity was characterized by the disputation between religious and secular expressions. The religious voice was represented by Islamic political groups who aspired for the establishment of an Indonesian state based on Islam. Against Islamic identity, the secular movements favoured a state free from religious identifications, including that of Islam.

Key Words: foreign policy, Islamic identity, elite interest

Abstrak

Artikel ini bertujuan untuk mengamati peran Islam sebagai penanda identitas dalam partisipasi bangsa Indonesia dalam masalah internasional. Artikel ini berargumen bahwa peran Islam telah menghadapi kendala yang berasal dari sifat sekuler identitas negara, politik yang melibatkan kepentingan para elite dan dari lingkungan luar. Argumen ini berkembang ke arah tiga bagian yang saling berkaitan. Bagian pertama membahas mengenai politik pembentukan identitas di Indonesia. Bagian kedua melihat bagaimana para elite politik dan berbagai kepentingan menghentikan penyusupan Islam (masuknya nilai-nilai Islam?) dalam urusan pemerintahan. Bagian ketiga membawa fokus diskusi mengenai mengembangkan hubungan luar negeri Jakarta dan kebijakan yang tidak memiliki nilai-nilai Islam – seperti solidaritas Muslim. Artikel ini memfokuskan untuk mengamati peran Islam dalam evolusi kebijakan luar negeri Indonesia. Artikel ini menggambarkan bahwa peran Islam telah menghadapi hambatan yang dibentuk oleh sifat identitas negara, kepentingan elit dan kebijakan atas Islam, serta situasi-situasi eksternal. Pembentukan identitas nasional Indonesia dicirikan oleh perselisihan antara ekspresi religius dan sekuler. Suara-suara religius diwakili oleh kelompok-kelompok politik Islam yang bercita-cita mendirikan sebuah negara Indonesia berdasarkan Islam. Menentang identitas Islam, pergerakan sekuler menginginkan sebuah negara yang bebas dari identifikasi religius, termasuk Islam.

Kata kunci: kebijakan luar negeri, identitas Islam, kepentingan elite

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In post-independence Indonesian domestic politics, which has been dominated by the perceptible political interest of the secular ruling elite, Islamic voices and agendas are marginalized. This, for most of the time, occurred under the governance of Sukarno (1945-1965) and Suharto (1966-1998). After Suharto, the democratic moment rendered an opportunity for Islamic political forces to become involved in the political process, but their capacity to govern has been quite limited. The lack of space for, and power of, Islamic political movements to play roles and influence governance, has resulted in the minimal use of Islamic language in, and the focus on, secular agendas in the government's policy.

External settings also determine the way in which Indonesian decision makers formulate and implement foreign policy. In this context, Islam has restricted scope to appear in the state's participation in international affairs. Under the world order formed by the Cold War, Indonesian foreign policy was steered by the principle of *bebas aktif* (independent activism) that had been essentially devoid of any mention of Islam. In post-Cold War world politics, the feature of independent activism foreign policy has been maintained. There are some occasions where Islam has noticeably been spoken of and used in foreign policy issues, in particular with the Muslim world. However, Islam does not present as the main substance of interests, such as the commitment to pursue Islamic solidarity.

Islam and the Making of Indonesia's National Identity

Initially, the presence of Islam as a social and political movement in Indonesia needs to be clarified. Islam in this country is not monolithic. There are various streams of identities visible in distinct social and political associations. For analytical purposes, Islam/Islamic movements in Indonesia can be compartmentalized into two inclinations; traditionalists and modernists or reformists. Also one can envisage this as the divide between *santri* (devout Muslim) and *abangan* (nominal Muslim). The difference amongst such propensities is centred on profound interpretations of the way Islam should be applied in a Muslims' social and political life. This analytical labelling does not necessarily mean they are completely distinct or separated. In fact, Muslim individuals and groups in Indonesia frequently adjust to developments in their social, economic, and political environments, making the border between such dichotomies increasingly blurred.

Islam came to Indonesia from the Indian subcontinent through trade exchanges in the 15th century. Islamization of indigenous societies flourished due to marriages between the traders and local women. Islam expanded peacefully throughout the Malay lands. After Western powers, such as Portuguese and the Dutch, who invaded peoples in the Indonesian Archipelago, Islam turned into a force of struggle against colonialism, for example in the rebellion of Pangeran Diponegoro in Central Java and Perang Padri in West Sumatra during the 19th century (Taba 1996:115-123).

Prior to the 20th century, Islam in Indonesia specifically in Java had shared a common peculiarity with the older Hindu-Buddhist-Javanese traditions in terms of the dominant aspect of its tolerance and inclusiveness. At this stage, the friendly characteristic of Islam was another catalyst for the process of Islamization in Indonesia; at least it served as a nice introduction to Islamic teachings. Indonesian Islam refers to the followers of customary Islam, illustrated by a combination of local practices and those that are shared throughout the Islamic world. This mixed tendency is named traditional Islam of Indonesia (Abdullah 1989:58).

Nonetheless, by the late 19th century and the early 20th century, a serious challenge to such a blended trait of Indonesian Islam began to rise as the ideology of Islamic reformism from Egypt reached Indonesia (Laffan 2003). The emergence of the Islamic reform movement in Indonesia contributed to the background of the divergence in the modern Indonesian Muslim community, and the difference between the traditionalists and the modernists or reformists. This split was, and still is, apparent in the form of the two largest Islamic mass organizations; Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah. The direct impact of Islamic reformism on Indonesian Islamic society was that more Indonesian Muslims, particularly those living in urban areas, confronted the adequacy of the traditional versions of Islamic life in the face of modernity. Those who wished to reform and modernize Islam in Indonesia were influenced by the economic changes taking place at the end of the 19th century, especially those beginning in West Sumatra (Dobbin 1983:141).

Reformist Islam opposed traditional Indonesian Muslims on two terms. Firstly, for what modernists saw as syncretistic practices amongst traditional Muslims. Modernists regarded them as

the cause of decay in the faith (Ali 1971:13). Secondly, Reformists contested the traditional Muslims' like of uncritical following of the dictates of religious leaders without learning Islam creatively (Barton 1997:324). The reformist Muslims dreamed of creating a new image of the world and their position in it, that is, essentially to be modern while remaining Muslim (Rahman 1987:240-242).

This reform spirit spread quickly, first starting in Minangkabau in West Sumatra it soon arrived in Java, the centre of traditionalist Muslims, from where it spread to become more popular in the cities such as Yogyakarta, Surakarta, Bandung, and Kudus. The carriers of the reformism were Indonesian Muslims with Arab descent, and to a smaller extent those who came from the Indian subcontinent. Around 1900, about 18,000 Arab Indonesian Muslims lived in the Indonesian Archipelago. They mostly originated from the Hadramut region. This group continued to make contact with, and follow developments in the Middle East. Many of them had graduated from *madrassahs* (Islamic school) in the Middle East, especially those in Saudi Arabia and Egypt. For the purpose of Islamic teachings, the Djamiat Chair was established in 1905, and eight years later al-Irsyad *madrassah* was founded in Indonesia (Noer 1973:68-80). The flourishing modernism and reformism in Indonesian Islam gave birth to two Islamic mass organizations; Muhammadiyah and Sarekat Islam.

Muhammadiyah was a modernist Islamic organization established on 18 November 1912 by K.H. Ahmad Dahlan in Yogyakarta. Since its inception, this organization had been aimed at propagating the idea of Islamic reformism in Indonesia. Ahmad Dahlan went to Mecca to study Islam with the Grand Imam of Masjid al-Haram Sheikh Ahmad Khatib who was originally from Minangkabau. Ahmad Dahlan was in Mecca between 1903 and 1904 when he was introduced to the thoughts of Islamic reform by some Middle East scholars, namely Ibn Taimiyah, Imam al-Ghazaly, Muhammad Abduh, and Rasyid Rhida (Ma'arif 1985:85). Upon returning home, Ahmad Dahlan had in mind that the condition of his society needed to be changed, and to this end he was encouraged and supported by other Arab Indonesian Muslims in Yogyakarta to build an organization instrumental for reform, Muhammadiyah (Salam 1968:9).

Muhammadiyah sought to purify Islam against the heretical doctrine and myths often trained by Indonesian traditional Muslims, especially those in Java. It wanted to banish superstition adhered to by elements of traditional Muslims (Rabasa 2003:14-15). The reform movement of Muhammadiyah embarked upon the idea of innovation, restoration, renewal and modernization. Impressively, it succeeded in expanding branches and activities in spiritual, social and educational fields through an extensive network of youth and women's associations, clinics, orphanages, and a large and modern school system. By the early 1930s, Muhammadiyah had developed 557 branches all over Java and elsewhere. This impressive organizational advancement was perhaps helped by the nature of the organization, which is not based on a certain ethnic tradition in particular with the Javanese, but is an inclusive Islamic movement (Alfian 1989).

Unlike Muhammadiyah that was focused on social and religious movement for reform, Sarekat Islam was founded as the first Islamic political party in Indonesia with the purpose to liberate Indonesians from the Dutch colonial rule. Stemming from a committee of local Muslim merchants who were facing competition from stronger Chinese textile importers, Sarekat Islam transformed itself into a political group in a congress in Solo 11 November 1912 (Ghani 1984:12-13). This party leadership was entrusted to a young Muslim intellectual H.O.S. Tjokroaminoto. In 1915, Sarekat Islam developed its branches in Sumatra directed by Agus Salim and Abdul Muis. As a political organization, Sarekat Islam was keen to promote an anti-colonialism consciousness amongst Indonesians. It argued that people in the archipelago had to leave their backwardness, and should not be passive against Western imperialism. In Tjokroaminoto's words, the "destiny of our people, free or colonized, is beholden to ourselves..." (Koeber 1985:271).

During the 1920s and 1930s, Sarekat Islam faced internal problems and a division of opinion on what was an appropriate Islamic movement. This began when some communists infiltrated the party branches, especially those in Central Java. The communists were aware of Sarekat Islam's ability to mobilize massive support, and accordingly they used it as political vehicle. This communist move caused friction within Sarekat Islam, between the 'green' Islamic and 'red' communists. In 1926, the red faction incited an uprising in Banten West Java and in Silungkang one year later. The Dutch took police action to terminate these insurgencies, and consequently Sarekat Islam leaders were affected. Semaun and Darsono were of those who were exiled to Tanah Merah Papua by the Dutch government (Noer 1973:255-260).

Later, the new Sarekat Islam leadership under Abikusno Tjokrosujoso campaigned for 'purification' of the party. In fact, he ousted cadres who were holding positions in other mass organizations. For example, Sukiman Wiryoanjojo was fired as Sarekat Islam executive because he was too an active chair of Muhammadiyah branch of Sumatra. The sacking of Sukiman was followed by the resignation of Sarekat Islam members mainly from Sumatra; amongst them was Mohammad Natsir, the then-chair of Masyumi Islamic Party after Indonesian independence. This gave rise to the sentiment of Sarekat Islam Java and Sumatra. In the Java circles, internal conflict occurred as well. Abikusno was accused by Kartosuwiryo, a leader of the West Java branch, of changing the orientation of the party to become more cooperative with the Dutch. Against this accusation, Abikusno dismissed Kartosuwiryo in 1936; the latter then established his own political base in West Java region known as the Committee for the Defence of Truth (Ma'arif 1985:88-90). In effect, the power of Sarekat Islam diminished.

The development of Islamic reformism, especially that invoked by Muhammadiyah, was regarded as a threat by the traditional Muslim *ulama* (religious teachers) in rural areas of Java. For the traditional *ulama*, Muhammadiyah's spirit of reconciling Islam with modernity was an implied denial to the teachings of great classical Islamic scholars. The traditional *ulama* felt that it was necessary for a united response to the reformism movement of Muhammadiyah. Nahdlatul Ulama was established in Surabaya on 31 January 1926 to protect the existing way of life – the blend between Islam and local cultural traditions – and in reaction to aspirations of the purification of Islam and modernization carried by the reformists, whom the traditional *ulama* perceived had been greatly influenced by the practices of Wahhabism fostered by King Abd'al -Aziz of Saudi Arabia (Fealy & Barton 1996). Nahdlatul Ulama, therefore, was the representation of the religious interest of chiefly traditional Javanese Muslims.

In response to the critics of the modernists, Nahdlatul Ulama, with its traditional *ulama*, suggested a better adherence to the scriptural dictates, and above all obedience to established sacred leadership (Riddell 2002:70). Nevertheless, the traditional *ulama* within Nahdlatul Ulama were not unwilling to change and reform. They quietly implemented reform of their own; for example, by gradually decreasing dependence on Malay and Javanese writings in religious schools, and inserting more recognized Middle East literature. Reform in the *madrasah*'s curricula was also conducted with some secular topics included in the teaching subjects. However, Muhammadiyah continued to be perceived as a menace to traditionalist' teachings, even though the gap between these two Muslim groups had been narrowing. Nahdlatul Ulama lingered to adapt with newer Islamic discourses developing in the modernists' milieu (van Bruinessen 1994).

The diversity in Indonesian Islamic groups was not just exemplified by the divide between traditional Nahdlatul Ulama and modernist Muhammadiyah, yet it is popular for academics to make other categorization of *santri* (devout Muslim) and *abangan* (nominal Muslim) of Muslims, especially in Java Island (Geertz 1960:172-190). *Santri* is used to identify Muslims who strictly practiced *shari'a* and paid attention to Islamic doctrines applied in social organizations or political parties. It is easy to discover that devout Muslims are linked to *madrasahs* and societies surrounding them. *Abangan*, on the other hand, tend not to obey Islamic doctrines as well, or use Islamic identity for its social and political practices. In these identities, Muhammadiyah, Sarekat Islam, and Nahdlatul Ulama represent a division within *santri*, while the nationalist Muslims like Sukarno are known as *abangan*.

The Indonesian Muslim leaders were not unaware that the ideological disagreements amongst them implicated disunity in the Indonesian peoples. An effort was made to unite Indonesian Muslims or at least to mitigate the impact of their incompatibilities. On 27 September 1937, a new Muslim organization was formed, called Majelis Islam Al'a Indonesia (MIAI). The initiators of MIAI were Mas Mansyur of Muhammadiyah, Wondoamiseno of Sarekat Islam, and Muhammad Dahlan as well as Wahhab Hasbullah of Nahdlatul Ulama. To avoid power rivalry amongst the Muslim figures, MIAI was set up as a federative organization (Noer 1973:261). Due to the strict watch from the Dutch colonial master on potential Islamic movements, MIAI did not explicitly declare its objective in political terms. However, a statement of the statute of MIAI implicitly suggested that this federative group's main goal was to fuse Muslim powers against the colonialism of the Dutch (Ma'arif 1988:20).

The establishment of MIAI was well accepted by Indonesian Muslims in general. This was evident in 1941 when seven Islamic organizations committed to join the MIAI. They were Sarekat

Islam, Muhammadiyah, Partai Oemat Islam, al-Irsyad Surabaya, Hidayatullah, Islamiyah Banyuwangi, and Khairiyah Surabaya. Nonetheless, Nahdlatul Ulama rejected attaching formally with MIAI despite two of its leaders being the originators of it. Again internal division was present in the Muslim movement. Nahdlatul Ulama particularly disliked the Sarekat Islam leadership's vested interest in dominating MIAI (Taba 1996:144-145). Internal contradiction amongst Indonesian Muslim individuals and groups was responsible for their inability to effectively struggle against the Dutch rule.

Parallel to the development of the Islamists, the seeds of secular nationalism grew in Indonesian Muslims as well. The impetus was initiated by young middle-class students who had attended Western education in Batavia (Jakarta). The secular nationalist Muslims (or in shorthand secularists) were concerned about the prolonged internal division amongst Indonesian Islamic groups. Therefore, they advocated nationalism and unity instead of religious politics as the platform of the struggle for independence. The spirit of nationalism impressively gained support from Muslims – from the Javanese and other ethnic groups. On 4 July 1927, a group of Muslim students formed Partai Nasional Indonesia (the Indonesian National Party, PNI) led by Sukarno, this attracted members from Christians, Hindus, and Buddhists, making this party the first national-wide political movement with its membership representing plural Indonesian identities. Sukarno announced that the goal of his party was “Indonesian independence, the ideology was secular nationalism, and the territorial vision encompassed boundaries of the Indonesian Archipelago under the Dutch colonial government...” (Means 1947:245).

The coming of PNI started politics that were preoccupied with debates between Islamist political groups and the secularists in relation to the ideological base for the then-Indonesian state. Debates revolved around whether independent Indonesia would be founded on the grounds of Islam as the state ideology or a secular philosophical basis. Hence, Islam as an ideology of struggle began to face challenges from non-Islamic ones. Figures within the secularists had been more inspired by Western ideologies, including socialism and fascism, whilst the others referred to the past golden age of great kingdoms in the Indonesian Archipelago, such as Sriwijaya and Majapahit. Nationalist leaders like Sukarno, Supomo, and Mohammad Hatta, although they were Muslim, were socialized by the values of nationalist awakenings in other parts of Asia, mainly Turkey, Japan, India, and China.

Sukarno was conscious of the superiority of the Dutch colonials and recognized the weakness of the divided action, and hence urged that independence could only succeed if all Indonesians were united. In response, Islamic political groups such as Sarekat Islam, secular and Javanese cultural based organizations such as Budi Utomo, regional political groups such as Jong Ambon, Jong Celebes, and Jong Andalas, as well as Christian groups gathered with the secularist camp in the establishment of an organization called Permufakatan Perhimpunan Politik Kebangsaan Indonesia (the Agreement of Indonesian National Political Associations, PPPKI) (Dahm 1969:29-34). This group pledged to promote ‘unity in diversity’ to the struggle for independence.

However, the harmony within this association proved to be short-lived and superficial, as the real differences in the ideological views of its elements came to light. Sarekat Islam withdrew from the association because nationalist leaders rejected their proposal for the recognition of Islam as the ideology of the people's movement, and because the traditional Muslims opposed their entitlement for the privilege of the urban Muslim leadership with modernist discourse. For the secularists, religion and the state had to be separated, an idea that could not be accepted by the Islamist groups. This hole occurred between the Muslims themselves; on the one hand, secularists against the devout Muslims, and the urban modernists against the traditionalist *ulama* on the other. The association was finally dissolved in 1935 (Noer 1973:340).

For the secularists led by Sukarno, Islam should not be the affair of the state, and the identity of the independent Indonesian state should not be defined in terms of any religion, including that of Islam. Sukarno argued that “reality showed the people of Indonesia that the idea of integrating Islam in governance for a country which its population not entirely Muslims would not be in line with democracy...” To Sukarno's mind, a desire for an Islamic state was the creation of some Muslim scholars, and there was no foundation for this in the Islamic teachings. Thus, it was not an obligation for Muslims to establish an Islamic state. Moreover, the formation of an Islamic state in Indonesia would engender problems with minorities (Zainuddin 2000:18).

The secularist camp, represented by Supomo, further argued for a non-Islamic identity by noting: "Islam is a personal matter, and thus it is not suitable to become the philosophy of a state with pluralistic societies...Islam can be the subordinate of the nationalism ideology..." The position of Islam in Indonesian society was well thought-out as equal to other religions even though they formed only the minority. It was also common for the secularists to criticize what they viewed as the 'backwardness' of the Islamic society, which was visible for instance in the practice of polygamy and inequality between men and women. Islam was closely related to cultural conservatism and an anti-democratic political system that impeded progress (Noer 1987:27).

The Islamist groups objected to secularist's notions. The spokesman of the Islamist camp Mohammad Natsir (1955:315) argued; "Islam is more than just a system of theology, and Islam is a complete civilization comprising of general principles which regulated the interaction amongst individuals and between individuals and the society..." Arguing further, Natsir contended that to make Islamic teachings and directives operative "religion needed to be upheld by a system of authority like a state...Hence, the accord between Islam and the state was an imperative..." The Islamic groups held the view that Islam had to be the integral part of the state, and in an Indonesian context, it meant that Islam should shape the ideological basis of the independent Indonesian state and should be explicitly stated in the constitution.

After Japan overthrew the Dutch colonists in 1942, it tried to manage the conflict between Indonesian secular and Islamic nationalist groups. Between 1942 and 1945 under the Japanese governance, all political activities based on ideology were prohibited. Instead, Japan approached both Indonesian secularists and Islamists to build up the paramilitary, or people's defence capabilities to protect their country. In fact, Japan was not interested in the content of the debate between the secularists and Islamists. Rather, it preferred to usher them for strategic purposes. Several local combatant units were supported by Japan's military. They were called Pembela Tanah Air (the Defender of Nation, PETA), and were associated with the secularist camp. At the same time, Islamic paramilitary groups were established, including Laskar Syaifullah, Sabilillah, and Hezbollah in affiliation with Nahdlatul Ulama. The Japanese ruler had no socio-religious vision to uplift such Islamic groups. It was genuinely aimed at empowering local forces to aid its armed forces during the Pacific war (Benda 1980:135-140).

When Japan began to suffer a loss in World War II, Prime Minister Kuniaki Koiso spoke at Ulimero Diet (parliament) meeting on 7 September 1944, promising independence for Indonesia. This materialized in the founding of Komite Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia (the Committee of the Preparation for Indonesian Independence, PPKI) on 9 April 1945, which was inaugurated on 28 May that year under the aegis of the Japanese government in Jakarta. PPKI held two sessions of meetings; 29 May-1 June and 10-16 July 1945. The committee's main task was to design the constitution of the independent Indonesia (Yamin 1960:239).

PPKI consisted of 68 members; 8 Japanese, 15 representatives of Islamist groups who wanted Islam to be the basis of the Indonesian state, and the rest belonged to secularists and regional representatives that were in favour of non-Islamic views. It was chaired by Radjiman Wedyoningrat, a mystic Javanese aristocrat. The Islamist voices were outspoken by figures such as Ki Bagus Hadikusumo, Ahmad Sanusi, Kahar Muzakkir, and Wahid Hasyim. Since the Japanese representative was not actively involved in PPKI's discussions, the Islamist camp was again face-to-face with the secularists (Noer 1987:30-32).

The dissenting opinions over whether Islam would be the fundamental ideology of Indonesia were repeated during PPKI's meetings (Yamin 1959:115-120). Supomo, who delivered his speech on 29 May, struck the Islamist camp by arguing that the latter's demand for a creation of Islamic state in Indonesia was not supported by solid empirical evidence. It was followed by the statement made by Mohammad Yamin on 31 May arguing for the need to build a nation-state based on unity of all ethnicities, not of pre-eminence by any one particular religion – this was certainly a reference to Islam. Sukarno, on his speech before the committee's meeting on 1 June, offered an ideological formula called Pancasila, a Sanskrit (ancient Javanese language) acronym for the five principles; belief in one supreme God, humanity, national unity, people's democracy, and social justice. Nevertheless, the spokesman of the Islamist camp refused all these positions, and pressed ahead with their will to adopt Islam as the state's identity.

The deadlock resulted in PPKI's meetings forcing the committee's chair to form a committee of nine to discuss a solution to the difference. This committee consisted of Sukarno, Mohammad Hatta, Mohammad Yamin, Ahmad Subardjo, a Christian figure Alexander Andries Maramis of the secularists, as well as Wahid Hasyim, Kahar Muzakkir, Abikusno, and Agus Salim from the Islamist camp. Following intense consultations, Pancasila was accepted as a compromise solution by both camps, with an insertion of the phrase 'with the obligation to implement *shari'a* for all Muslims...' after the first principle of belief in one supreme God, in the preamble of the constitution. This agreement is known as the Djakarta Charter, issued on 22 June 1945. It was also agreed that the president of Indonesia had to be a Muslim (Zainuddin 2000:19).

With such an agreement, Sukarno and Hatta proclaimed the independence of Indonesia on the morning of 17 August 1945. Sukarno was appointed as the first Indonesian president and Hatta as his vice president. To the surprise of the Islamist groups, on 18 August when the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia was promulgated, the clause stating the compulsion of the implementation of *shari'a* for Muslims, as well as the provision that the president of Indonesia must be a Muslim, were omitted from the preamble and the articles of the constitution (Zainuddin 2000:20). This meant that the Islamic expressions in the Djakarta Charter were not incorporated in the constitution.

This exclusion of Islamic ideas caused anger to the Islamists, as expressed by Natsir (1955:101) that "the constitution has no legitimacy in Islam..." However, the secularists had their own explanation. For example, Hatta (1979: 458-460) acknowledged that on the morning of 18 August, he talked with Ki Bagus Hadikusumo about the Protestant and Roman Catholic leaders who entertained reservations about the constitution, and hence in order to secure the unity of the newly independent republic, the Islamic articles were removed. Beside this, Hatta wanted the Islamist groups to understand two crucial situations; one was that the newly independent state had to have a constitution immediately, and two was that the political temperature in Jakarta at the time was such that prolonged contradictions would be counterproductive. Eventually, Hadikusumo accepted Hatta's arguments, and for Hatta this meant that the Islamist camp was willing to give consent.

To the Islamists, especially revealed by Hadikusumo and Hasyim Asy'ari, one important reason for their agreement with Pancasila as the ideology of Indonesia was that Sukarno had promised to undertake general elections quickly after the declaration of independence, and this would be followed by complete reformulation of the constitution for the better. Islamist leaders were very sure that independence would by all means bring about stability and tranquillity, so that general elections could be held within six months. They were convinced as well that in the elections the majority of Indonesians who professed to Islam (at that time about 48 million of the 60 million) would vote for them. By winning the elections, the agenda of establishing a state based on *shari'a* would be ensured (Noer 1987:41-2).

The deletion of the Islamic expressions of the Djakarta Charter from the Indonesian constitution formalized the identity of the independent state as being empty of Islamic mentions. Indonesia was, according to the secularist leaders, neither theocratic nor secular but a state based on Pancasila. The transcendental value in the ideological basis was inherent in the first principle of belief in one supreme God. The history of the construction of Indonesian identity demonstrates that the secular component was leading. It, in many respects, will contribute to the way the post-independence government creates the state's international posture.

Islam, Elite Interest and Indonesian Politics after Independence

In the period after independence, the Islamist camp was given minority proportion of government. Within the appointed legislative council, which comprised of 137 members, the Islamist camp obtained only 20 seats, and under Sukarno-Hatta presidential cabinet, inaugurated in September 1945, which consisted of 26 ministries, only Abikusno and Wahid Hasyim were assigned positions, as minister of physical reconstruction and minister of religious affairs respectively (Boland 1985:40). However, the domination of the secularists raised new awareness amongst the Islamists for the need to consolidate power through the creation of a more solid Islamic-oriented party.

The newly shaped Indonesian government gave out an administrative instruction no. 10 on 3 November 1945 signed by Vice President Hatta, suggesting the formation of formal political parties. It was welcomed by a variety of groups through the establishment of their own political parties. Essentially, there were three main streams of political orientations in the parties established: 1)

Islamists represented by the Masyumi Islamic Party which was supported by Muhammadiyah, Sarekat Islam, and Nahdlatul Ulama, 2) secular nationalists still under PNI, and 3) Marxist/Leninists adhered to by, for instance, Partai Komunis Indonesia (the Indonesian Communist Party, PKI) (Kahin 1980:192-204).

Masyumi was created at an Islamic congress held in the office block of Mu'allimin *madrasah* in Yogyakarta from 5 to 7 November 1945. It was decided at the meeting that Masyumi would become the only Islamic political party in Indonesia that would struggle on behalf of the aspirations of all Muslims in the country over the formation of an Islamic state (Ma'arif 1988:31). The structure of Masyumi leadership resembled collaboration of the three aforementioned Islamist groups. In the Majelis Syura (council of advisors) sat Nahdlatul Ulama figures, such as Hasyim Asy'ari and Wahid Hasyim, whilst the executive board consisted of career politicians such as Abikusno, Kartosuwiryo, Sukiman, Mohammad Roem, Agus Salim and Natsir of Sarekat Islam and Muhammadiyah (Boland 1985:41). With the composition of such a big Islamic mass organizations, Masyumi was likely to become the strongest political force at the time.

Nevertheless, Islamists continued to differ amongst themselves and engage in political alignments that were not determined by their Islamic identity but by the need for power. This started in 1947 when Sarekat Islam decided to withdraw from Masyumi and ally with the socialist party under Amir Syarifuddin who needed an Islamic constituent to back up his coalition government. Masyumi leaders were opposed to Marxist/Leninist movements, and regarded Sarekat Islam's move as an ideological betrayal. However, the motive of Sarekat Islam was to achieve executive positions in the government, and not an ideological shift as alleged by Masyumi leadership (Feith 1964:138-139).

This friction worsened when traditional differences again arose between Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama sections in Masyumi, which in turn led to the withdrawal of the traditionalist *ulama* from the Islamist party. Originating from a proposal, launched by Muhammadiyah members who dominated the executive board in 1949, to relegate the authority of Majelis Syura, the Nahdlatul Ulama supporters of Masyumi protested to the modernists' plan. As their request was not met, in 1952 Nahdlatul Ulama announced the formation of a new Islamic party separated from Masyumi, the Nahdlatul Ulama Party (Marijan 1992:62). The impact of such internal fragmentation between the Islamists was seen later in their inability to place solid and significant influence on the governance.

After the transfer of power from the Dutch colonial master to the Indonesian government on 27 December 1949, Sukarno inaugurated the application of parliamentary democracy in the country's political system. It was constituted in the temporary constitution ratified on 17 August 1950. The prime minister's cabinet, which was balanced by parliament, carried out governance, the president was merely a uniting symbol of the nation. This system was coloured by the rise and fall of political parties forming the government and local parties and people's council, which were mushrooming, fighting for greater autonomy from the central government.

The first cabinet was operated by Prime Minister Hatta in early 1950. The cabinet under Natsir of Masyumi then replaced Hatta's administration in 1951. Natsir's cabinet dissolved in 1952, and Sukiman of Sarekat Islam came to power. Between 1951 and 1952, Masyumi was a strong political power that formed a coalition government with the secularist PNI. However, in the aftermath of the withdrawal of Nahdlatul Ulama from this Islamic party, its capacity to govern was overwhelmed by PNI, and Masyumi played an opposition role. The secularists took over government in 1952 under Wilopo, followed by the cabinet of Ali Sastro Amidjojo, which began in 1953. The Amidjojo government stepped down in 1955. The year of 1955-1956 was a short-term tenure, of a cabinet led by Burhanuddin Harahap, its main undertaking was to hold general elections (Lev 1966:46-49).

The significant impact of disunity amongst Islamic political parties is observable in their vote achievements in the 1955 general elections. Islamist parties, mainly Masyumi, continued to campaign for the implementation of *shari'a* in Indonesia, whilst Nahdlatul Ulama focused more on developments in the rural areas. In the elections PNI and its secularist allies obtained 45 percent of the vote; Masyumi and Nahdlatul Ulama got respectively 20 percent and 18 percent votes; and PKI gained the rest, 16 percent. With these achievements, Masyumi and Nahdlatul Ulama were invited to form a coalition government with the secularists. Masyumi came back to executive together with the cabinet led again by Prime Minister Amidjojo (Noer 1987:353-354). However, it should be noted that the attainment of only 20 percent votes by Masyumi reflected the lack popularity of its maintained political agenda for Islam.

The direct implication of the practice of parliamentary democracy for Indonesia was nothing but political instability. Sukarno was unhappy with this scheme and with the patronage of the military on 9 April 1957 the president appointed a new cabinet led by Prime Minister Djuanda. Sukarno assigned himself to engage in governance, causing protests, especially from Masyumi. In addition Sukarno created a representative council known as the constituent assembly, to formulate a new constitution. This institution was composed of 230 representatives of the Islamic groups (of which 112 were from Masyumi) and 286 secular nationalists (Ma'arif 1988:123). The old debates over the nature of Indonesian state's identity reappeared in the constituent assembly.

During the constituent assembly meetings, three drafts of state ideology were proposed and debated, Islam, Pancasila, and economic socialism. By virtue the last draft, economic socialism, was articulated only by a minority of 9 members of the constituent assembly, it did not get significant attention during the discussions. As a result, the debates were preoccupied by the pro-Islam and pro-Pancasila poles (Ma'arif 1988:124).

The pro-Pancasila figures such as Suwiryo of PNI retained their long held argument that if Islam were enforced as the state ideology, regions with non-Muslim populations, including Flores, Bali, Kai, Maluku, Timor, and West Irian would no longer want to be part of the republic, and therefore Indonesia needed to keep the place of Pancasila as its basis. Fundamental to this position was the secularists' draft of state ideology which stated "the Republic of Indonesia is desirous to build its society that believes in one supreme God and protects the will of all religions; including Islam, Christianity, Hindu, and Buddhism..." On the fundamental principles of the state, it pointed to "the notion of the supremacy of God, respect for humanity, maintenance of national integration, implementation of people's democracy, as well as the creation of social justice, which were incorporated in Pancasila..." (Anshari 1986:96-97).

For those who were pro-Islam, such an argument was greatly unacceptable. For instance, as conveyed by its faithful spokesman Natsir that "Pancasila is an empty ideology, it can be easily misinterpreted as separating religion from social and political system albeit acknowledging the existence of God...Indonesia, thus, requires a filled philosophical basis which is clear, powerful, firm and alive in the soul of its people majority adhering to Islam..." Emphasizing the value of Islam, Natsir argued "the principles conceived by Pancasila are by all means there in Islam, Pancasila is not pure but it is originally part of Islam..." Accordingly, Natsir advised the secularists to agree to take Islam as the state ideology and national identity of Indonesia, and that there would be no disadvantages of approving of Islam (Anshari 1986:90-93).

Until the last session of the constituent assembly's debate on 5 June 1959 there was no agreement reached. President Sukarno, who was upset by this inconclusive argument, froze the constituent assembly through a decree on 5 July 1959. With the decree, Sukarno also reinforced the 1945 Constitution and reaffirmed the unchallengeable position of Pancasila as the state ideology, and terminated the practice of parliamentary democracy in Indonesia (Nasution 1992:78).

Outside the political forum, the contentions between the secularists and Islamists were reduced in regional politics, as the national Islamist movements retreated to regional areas to strengthen their position. The regionalization of the Islamists, lead to more extreme manifestations of their ideologies defying the legitimacy of the Pancasila state, including ideas of revolution to replace it with an Islamic state. Darul Islam were the most vivid Islamist rebels during Sukarno's governance. Darul Islam (the house of Islam) was a religious-political idea and movement promoted by Kartosuwiryo in 1948 (Awwas 1999). The main base of this Islamist group had initially come from West Java Province. Before starting Darul Islam, Kartosuwiryo joined the central government in Jakarta, where he was appointed as deputy minister of defence. There were two reasons why Kartosuwiryo founded Darul Islam. Firstly, Kartosuwiryo was frustrated with the diplomatic route taken by Sukarno when dealing with the colonial Dutch master. Kartosuwiryo disapproved of Sukarno's willingness to negotiate with the Dutch, which had resulted in the Linggajati Agreement of March 1947 and Renville Agreement of April 1948. According to these agreements, Indonesia was transformed into a federation, a reality that Kartosuwiryo perceived to be a betrayal of the republic's constitution. Secondly and more importantly was that Kartosuwiryo, since joining Sarekat Islam in the 1930s, had long kept in his mind the dream of creating an Islamic state in Indonesia as his principal political objective. He accused the secularists, especially Sukarno and Hatta, of committing crimes against Islam on account of their consistent refusal to accept it as the state's philosophy (Jackson 1980).

Kartosuwiryo built the military wing of Darul Islam on 7 August 1949, called Tentara Islam Indonesia (the Indonesian Islamic Army, TII). As the objective of Darul Islam was to create an Islamic state in Indonesia, this movement expanded to other regions, including Sumatra Island (in Lampung and Aceh), South Sulawesi, South Kalimantan, and Central and East Java. Some believed that the ideal of Darul Islam received support in these regions because of a combination of two factors; one was the regional dislike of the over-centralistic governance in Jakarta, and two was the Islamic solidarity of the paramilitary veterans in those regions, some of whom were members of Laskar Hezbollah, with Kartosuwiryo, having been established there since the Japanese rule. Darul Islam's affiliates sparked insurgencies in Central Java led by Amir Fatah in 1949, South Sulawesi under Kahar Muzakkar, and in South Kalimantan under Ibnu Hadjar both in 1952, and in Aceh under Daud Beureueh starting in 1953 (Dijk 1981).

The central government saw the enhancement of the regional Islamic struggle as being destabilising to the parliamentary democratic process, largely because of the presence of more than one central power. By 1958, Sukarno had commanded police action suppressing Darul Islam's rebellious activities. Darul Islam was eventually contained and neutralized in 1962 following the destruction of its central command in West Java and the arrest of its ideologue Kartosuwiryo (he was later sentenced to death). Masyumi strongly protested against Sukarno's military operation. Consequently, Sukarno banned Masyumi in 1962, because it was alleged to have connections with the unconstitutional movement of Darul Islam (Dengel 1986).

Insurgency perpetrated by Darul Islam had adversely affected the position of Islamic political movements in the country. The central government considered radical expressions of Islam, and their zeal for building an Islamic polity, as a source of political instability and potential disturbance to national integration. The disbanding of Masyumi displayed another phase of marginalization of Islamic ideas and identity in Indonesian domestic politics led by the secularists. Indonesian Muslims had to willingly accept the reality that Pancasila was their state's ideology and national identity.

In the wake of the dissolution of the parliamentary system, in 1959 Sukarno established his own model of governance named the Guided Democracy. This was nothing more than a kind of dictatorship, whereby the central political authority lay on one chief figure, Sukarno himself. The president, however, did not entirely stop the process of Islamization in politics. This was evident in the inclusion of religious representation in Sukarno's unifying formula of Nasakom (an acronym derived from nationalism, religion, and communism) that provided an acceptable place for the religious parties' content to exercise patronage on behalf of the faithful. Traditionalist Islam, like Nahdlatul Ulama, was accommodated within Nasakom. Meanwhile, the modernists, who were mostly linked with Masyumi, were kept at bay. Under the Guided Democracy, Islamic groups found themselves divided and kept off-balance, by virtue of the requirement to defer to the secular nationalist's ideology in the fight against the remaining colonialism, and to seek allies against the communists. As a result, during this time of Sukarno's governance, Islamic political movements were domesticated, and were not in a position to confront the dominance of Sukarno's Nasakom (Leifer 1983b:147-148). Hence, Sukarno's real interest was to accumulate his political power.

An abortive coup, allegedly masterminded by PKI between 30 September and 1 October 1965 paved the way for the ousting of Sukarno from power, and the rise of the New Order government under General Suharto. The communists were heavily implicated. Suharto and the army joined forces to counter the communist movement (Hering 1986). Following the successful revision of the political system, Muslim parties expected a political reward. Muslim groups could now form the majority government, they looked forward to the practice of Islam becoming the way of life throughout the country, and achieving the establishment of an Islamic state.

They were, however, disappointed. For instance, in 1966 the military leaders supposedly identified Masyumi and the communist movement as deviants from Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution, and rejected to rehabilitate it (Feith & Castles 1970). Moreover, the Islamists persisted on the reinstatement of the Islamic ideas of the Djakarta Charter in the constitution. Nevertheless, at the session of the People's Consultative Assembly in March 1968, at which Suharto was confirmed as president in place of Sukarno, the demand was again rejected. The military leadership under Suharto generalized, based on the case of Darul Islam, that Islam still posed a danger to the unity of the nation (Sukma 2006:44-46).

Islam had no place in Suharto consolidated regime, which had the full backing of the military. The New Order government designed policies on the containment and further marginalization of Islam in Indonesia's political system. All political parties were disallowed to pursue ideological agendas. Rather, the theme of political articulation was directed at creating national stability for the success of economic development. Islamic groups were allowed to advance their religious and cultural activities, but not to influence the process of governance. Suharto assigned the Ministry of Home Affairs, which was always led by an active army General, to administer all political movements, conduct the function of political socialization, articulation, and communication to the people. The space for political parties, including that of the Islamists, was limited (Taba 1996:200-206). As a result, in the first general elections held by the New Order regime in 1971, Islamic parties obtained only 27 percent of the total recorded votes, only half of the achievement in the 1955 elections. Whilst the New Order-backed political party, Golkar, won the majority of 55 percent votes (Liddle & Emmerson 1973).

Further suppressing Islamic influences on the political system, the New Order government instructed the fusion of all existing Islamic parties into one party called Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (the United Development Party, PPP), in which the symbol of Islam was not displayed. The PPP was inaugurated on 5 January 1973 in Jakarta, comprising of sections from Sarekat Islam, Nahdlatul Ulama, and Masyumi who had been prevented by Suharto from reviving their banned party. Because the formation of PPP was engineered by the New Order and not a grass-roots wish by these Islamist groups to merge their political power, internal incompatibilities reappeared and undermined it. Nahdlatul Ulama decided to leave the party in 1984 because of its opposition to the leadership of Sarekat Islam in PPP. This resulted in the decrease in popular Islamic support for the party since Nahdlatul Ulama's masses were no longer encouraged to vote for PPP (Haris 1991:100).

Moreover, PPP faced two other problems (Haris 1991:148). Firstly, this party faced an identity crisis due to the government prohibition of the formal use of ideological symbol for the party. The symbol of *Ka'bah*, which reflected its Islamic identity was not accepted by the Ministry of Home Affairs, instead it had to identify itself with a star which referred to the first principle of Pancasila; belief in one supreme God. Therefore, the Islamic party could not express its religious identity. Secondly, PPP as a political party had never got the chance to perform its political functions, especially in relation to communication to the grass-root masses. This was because the role was dominated by the government's bureaucracy under the ministry of home affairs. The PPP cadres could communicate with their constituents only during the general elections campaign. As a result, the distance between PPP's elite and the masses led to the lack of grass-roots attraction to this Islamist party, and as a result in a way Islam became more marginalized from Muslim public's political narratives.

On the grounds of retaining political stability, President Suharto signed the Law no. 5/1985 insisting the government's policy of Pancasila be the sole ideological foundation for all social (including religious) and political organizations in Indonesia. This policy had been announced in 1982, yet protests from Islamic groups caused its implementation to be delayed. It was actually aimed at decreasing and, if not, removing the influence of ideology and religion in politics (Prawiranegara 1984:74-75). Furthermore, the New Order regime wanted to homogenize political aspirations for the stability of its power base. For the Muslim community and political parties, this policy was conspicuously seen as an attempt by the New Order to prevent Islam from ever again becoming an independent and potential political force (Taba 1996: 273-275). During the 1970s and 1980s, the New Order ruler effectively paralysed Islam's political power.

By the late 1980s and through the 1990s, a sign of change was visible in Suharto's policies toward relations with the Muslim people. Suharto tried to reengage with the Muslim community. Suharto approved the establishment of an Islamic organization called Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Se-Indonesia (the Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals, ICMI) in December 1990, then led by B.J. Habibie who was serving as minister of research and technology in the New Order cabinet. Despite endorsing the creation of the ICMI, Suharto favoured the founding of Islamic Bank Muamalat, the Abdi Asih Foundation, and the Centre for Information and Development Studies in 1991 functioning as a Muslim think-tank. An Islamic-oriented newspaper *Republika* linked to the ICMI was allowed to publish. Additionally, Suharto approved the initiative by Muslim leaders for the banning of lottery games, as it was regarded as gambling. Islamic propagation activities were upheld

by Suharto's foundation of Pancasila Muslim (Azra 2006:93-94). The ICMI attained the endorsement of Indonesian Muslim community, especially the modernist Muslim figures, such as Amien Rais who was chairing Muhammadiyah.

The establishment of the ICMI and Suharto's favour for the various kind of Islamic activism at that time did not reflect his growing Islamic credentials, but rather was related to his need to retain legitimacy for his regime. Islam began to be viewed as potential, and actual, additional source of power beside the regime's large bureaucracy and Golkar Party. The ICMI was founded by Muslim intellectuals whose political vision did not suggest adherence to Islamic doctrine. It did not talk of the struggle for the formation of an Islamic state, and its focus was on economic issues pertinent to Muslims rather than politics. Thus, the New Order leader could safely connect the ICMI to the discourse of national development, and at the same time appear to be more cordial with Islam. In parallel, Suharto felt that he was in a power contest with his traditional ally, the military, which was perceived to have shown a decline in its political backing to the New Order leadership (Suryadinata 1996). As a consequence, Suharto considered that being seen as more Islamic in his appearance would be effective for gaining Muslim support.

In May 1998, the New Order regime collapsed in the aftermath of social disorder prompted by the government's ineffective management of the economic and financial crises that began in mid 1997. Subsequently, democracy was institutionalized to supplant the three-decade long Suharto authoritarianism. Under the democratic system, access to political participation was opened for Indonesian Muslims. During the governance of Habibie, dozens of new political parties were established with various ideological spectrums, including a number of Islamic-oriented and/or Muslim parties. Muslims were allowed to form social organizations with Islam present in their formal identity. Under President Abdurrahman Wahid, freedom of speech was guaranteed and fortified by the law. Islam remerged as a legal political force in democratic Indonesia. The successive governments of Megawati Sukarnoputri and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono strengthened the multiparty system in Indonesian democracy.

Since 1999 there have been about 20 Islamic-oriented and/or Muslim parties registered with the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights. Based on their ideological reference and membership characters, they can be classified as exclusive Islamist, and inclusive or pluralist Muslim parties (Azra 2004:140-141). The exclusive Islamist party used Islamic symbols, including *Ka'bah* and *Qur'an*, as its official identity. Membership was restricted to Muslims whose political views were identical, for instance the ideal of implementing *shari'a* in Indonesia, anti-Suharto's legacies, and democracy in Islamic perspective. Several parties can be included in this category; Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (the Justice and Prosperous Party, PKS), Partai Bulan Bintang (the Star and Crescent Party, PBB), Partai Masyumi Baru (the New Masyumi Party, PMB), and PPP.

The inclusive or pluralist Muslim party kept Pancasila as its political ideology, although identification with Islam was clear in terms of its major grass-root supporters originating from mass Islamic organizations. Generally, the membership of this party was not confined to Muslims. It was open to encompass members from other religions, and had a tolerant attitude toward affairs concerned with Muslim and non-Muslim relations. This party has showed a tendency to endorse non-religious agendas, for instance, good governance and democratization. Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (the National Awakening Party, PKB) supported mostly by Nahdlatul Ulama and Partai Amanat Nasional (the National Mandate Party, PAN), which is affiliated with Muhammadiyah, can all be considered to be pluralist Islamic parties.

Besides political parties, socio-religious Islamic groups have been mushrooming and operate freely. The most dramatic phenomenon has been the emergence of radical Islamic organizations, such as Laskar Jihad, Front Pembela Islam (the Islamic Defender Front, FPI), and Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (the Indonesian Council of Mujahidin, MMI). They are labelled as radicals by virtue of their unchallengeable belief in Islam, which must be applied in its full and literal form without compromise, as set out in *Qur'an* and *Sunnah* (ways of life exemplified by Prophet Muhammad) and their penchant for reactive ideas, languages, and violent physical actions toward what is envisaged as atheists, materialists and corrosive deviationist movements (Fealy 2004:104). It is commonly known that the radicals have circumstantial connections with exclusive Islamic parties.

Muslim political groups have benefited from the democratic moment. They are free to express and promote ideas and activities in the political arena. However, Islam still receives only restricted

acknowledgement in governance. This can be discerned through the continuing pre-eminence of the secularists' features and interests. Pancasila has sustained its position providing the basic philosophy and national identity for the state, despite the fact that Islam has been used in social and political identities, and *shari'a* has still not been implemented as national law governing all aspects of Muslim life.

This trend has perhaps been influenced by internal and external factors shaping the weakness of Islamists. The internal factor has been that various Islamic parties participating in the elections have had an impact on the attitudes of mass voters (Azra 2004:141-142). Firstly, ideological contestation within the Islamic parties has bought back political fragmentation amongst them. This has manifested into inter-elite conflict, as well as clashes between fanatic masses during the election campaign. As a result, Islam has not yet become the force that unites those Muslims.

Secondly, in internal party affairs, elites competing for individual political gain have caused frictions. For instance, intense conflict between Yusril Ihza Mahendra and Hartono Mardjono in PBB, caused a general split in the party's management, which in turn was followed by the resignation of Mardjono, and the subsequent establishment of his new party called Partai Islam Indonesia (the Indonesian Islamic Party, PII). This has caused a decline in the party's solidarity, and a subsequent reduction in its political power.

Thirdly, the Islamic parties, especially radical Islamic groups and those with the exclusive vision, have not demonstrated enough communication skills to argue their agendas. To exemplify, during the 1999 election campaign PPP and Laskar Jihad leaders urged the Muslim public not to cast their vote for party that was led by a woman, the reference was to Megawati, because it was not in accordance with Islamic interpretations of female obedience. The sentiment of gender bias behind these political motives bought about political repercussions for the Islamic parties. More importantly, Islamists wanting the realization of *shari'a* did not formulate the discourse with clarity, and thus this appeared to the public as being more rhetorical than real.

The external factor is derived from the fact that secular political powers - such as the established Golkar party, Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle, PDIP), and Partai Demokrat (the Democrat Party, PD) – performed stronger and were more capable than the Islamists in controlling governance. In the parliamentary election of June 1999, the exclusive Islamic parties, such as PBB, PKS, and PPP could obtain only 16 percent of the whole recorded vote, while the secularists like Golkar and PDIP got of total 70 percent of the vote for both of them, and the rest belonged to the inclusive Islamic parties PAN and PKB (Riddell 2002:67). Islam was less popular as a political platform than secularism and nationalism. The issue of national reform and economic recovery pursued by the secularist parties as well as pluralist Muslim parties proved to be more effective in attaining the political support of the voters.

In the second general election conducted in July 2004, the exclusive Islamist parties did indeed increase their strength from 16 to about 21 percent of the total vote. This success, however, was ascribed primarily to the moderation of their Islamic rhetoric before the election. Aware of Indonesian society's reservations about *shari'a* implementation, they downplayed their Islamic profile during the campaign. Their candidates chose to fight on issues that Indonesians cared about, such as the eradication of corruption, social injustice, job creation, and food prices, rather than discuss the possibility of making Indonesia an Islamic state and implementation of *shari'a* (Eliraz 2007: 5). In the April 2009 elections, the achievement of the exclusive Islamist parties decreased to 15 percent of the total recorded vote, whilst the secularists were able to maintain an outcome of no less than 70 percent; the rest went to pluralist Muslims (www.pemiluindonesia.com). This suggests the popularity of Islam in political ideas and movement has gradually decreased amidst the persistent dominance of secularist powers.

With this result, in order to get a ticket to participate in government the Islamists have had to join a coalition with the secularists. Because the Islamists are weaker, their ability to direct the government's policies has been limited. In parliament their performance has also been curbed by the voices of the majority comprised of secularists and pluralist Muslims. All of these factors contribute to the enduring insignificance of Islam in Indonesia's domestic politics, and foreign policy. In contrast, the secularists have remained able to dictate policies based on their favoured material interests.

Islam in Indonesia's Foreign Policy

Guided by Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution, as well as perceptions about the nature of external milieu, the secularist leadership of the newly independent Indonesia defined the basic principle of the state's foreign policy. Islam has been formally absent since the very beginning of the Indonesian foreign policy formulation. This is visible in the country's 1945 Constitution, which was promulgated one day after independence on 17 August 1945. The constitution mandates that Indonesian foreign policy uphold universal values, mainly anti-colonialism. As stipulated firmly in the first paragraph of the preamble of the constitution: "independence is the fundamental right of every nation, and accordingly colonialism must be opposed because it is not suitable with the values of humanity and justice..." The constitution also commands the nation to contribute to the creation of international order based on independence, permanent peace, and social justice (Alami 2007:27, Singadilaga 1970:4-5, Subandrio 1964:5).

This assertion means that the values referred to are strongly inspired by the historical background of being colonised nation. Therefore, nationalism and anti-colonialism, not Islam, developed into the principal discourse of Indonesian foreign policy makers' worldview (Weinstein 1976:161). The spirit of anti-colonialism strengthened when the Dutch colonial master wanted to reimpose colonialism upon Indonesia by launching military aggressions in the country in 1947 and again in 1948.

In addition, the newly independent state encountered international politics that was evolving into the Cold War. The world was polarized by the ideological and military rivalry between the Western capitalist bloc of the United States (US) and the Eastern socialist bloc of the Soviet Union. In response, Jakarta decided not to join either of the blocs. In a speech on foreign policy direction entitled *Mendayung Antara Dua Karang (Rowing between Two Reefs)*, Indonesian Vice President and at the time acting Prime Minister Mohammad Hatta, articulated this independent activism foreign policy (*politik luar negeri bebas aktif*), which up until today continues to be the indisputable doctrine of the state's international relations. Before the meeting of Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat (the Indonesian Central National Committee, KNIP) at Yogyakarta on 2 September 1948, Hatta (1953:446) revealed that the country would seek to find a different way in the world that was divided by the two power blocs. Indonesia would not act in consonance with neutral or allied policies with either American or the Soviet Union blocs. Indonesia would not draw back from world affairs. It would seek to participate in international affairs to contribute to the creation of a better world, yet would do so without the commitment to alliances.

Hatta emphasized that every issue would be analysed on the ground of Indonesian qualities, and in accordance with the state's pivotal national interests. In this light, the independent activism foreign policy reflected pragmatism in the obvious reference to the importance of protecting national interests as its main course of action. About this Hatta (1958:484) affirmed "the policy should be executed in line with Indonesian interests, and must be resolved in line with the fact it has to face..." Therefore, there are three underlying values expressed in Indonesian foreign policy doctrine, anti-colonialism, independence, and pragmatism (Sukma 1995:306).

Although not formally mentioned as a reference for state foreign policy, in reality Islam had a significant role in supporting the conduct of Indonesia's international diplomacy. This was especially the case when the Dutch attempted to use military action to reoccupy Indonesia. The Indonesian government stipulated that the focus of the state's foreign conduct was to meet the twin needs of securing international recognition for, and defence of, its independence. Islamist figures – such as Agus Salim and Mohammad Roem – used their Islamic identity to approach the Muslim world to gain recognition for Indonesia's independence. As a result of this diplomacy, Muslim countries of the Middle East were the first to recognize Indonesian independence. On ground level, foreign Muslim soldiers, especially those from the British Indian army stationed in Indonesia, fought with Indonesian nationalists against the Dutch aggression. Islamic solidarity was echoed during the physical revolution. In this capacity Islam was factually instrumental in obtaining the state's material interests.

During the time of parliamentary democracy, when governments alternated between the Islamist-led and the secularist-led coalitions, Islam was absent in both the interest and instrument of foreign policy. For instance, under the governance of Mohammad Natsir's Masyumi Islamic party, Indonesia promoted relations with the US and not the Muslim world. Domestic needs dictated such a policy. The Natsir government was facing problems of insurgencies in some regions. Hence, it needed to modernize and empower Indonesian military, with assistance from the US. Prime Minister Natsir

emphasized that the Indonesian-American military cooperation being fostered was intended to maintain integrity and sovereignty of the republic (*Bintang Timur*, 11 March 1952). However, this move was unpopular as both the public and elite regarded it as pro-American, and afterward pro-Western imperialism. Accordingly Natsir was toppled from the prime ministership, and was replaced by successive secularist governments under Prime Minister Wilopo and Ali Sastro Amidjojo. In 1955 their narrative of anti-colonialism culminated in the holding of an Asian African conference. Indeed, the most important issue in Indonesia's foreign policy during the 1950s was the recovery of the western half of the Island of New Guinea (West Irian/Papua) (Sukma 2006:31-32).

Under Sukarno's Guided Democracy, foreign policy served both collaboration between Jakarta and Beijing, with their shared anti-imperialism, as well as the domestic function of sustaining volatile political equilibrium amongst the nationalists, religious, and communists. In August 1962, a stormy episode occurred when Sukarno rejected to grant entry permits to Israeli and Taiwanese athletes at the Asian Games held in Jakarta. At the time this double exclusions easily fitted into Sukarno's anti-colonial rhetoric and an appeasement of China. The barring of Israeli athletes did not show any indication of a specifically Islamic cause. It could have been related to an attempt by the president to sweeten ties with the Indonesian Muslim community, who together with the communists, had expected to keep out Israeli participation (Leifer 1983b:151-152). Nonetheless, Sukarno demonstrated a slight leaning towards Islamic identity, especially when supporting Pakistan against India in the 1965 Kashmir war. Essentially, this attitude was not genuinely motivated by Islamic solidarity. The backing for Islamabad was given as a part of Sukarno's geostrategic calculation to counter India.

During the years of Sukarno, Islam had occasionally been used in support of particular foreign policy goals. However, during the 1970s and 1980s, Islam's roles conspicuously waned in Indonesian international relations. For one thing, this was in line with Suharto's policies marginalising domestic Islamic voices. Suharto inherited from Sukarno a collapsed economy, partly caused by intense political conflict both inside and outside the country. The new regime placed economic development and cooperation as the highest priority of foreign policy. The need to reap international economic benefits brought Indonesia closer to the Western-industrialized powers. Economic development and cooperation required regional stability. Therefore, Suharto's foreign policy was focused on the management of a stable Southeast Asian regional order (Mehdi 1973:20-44). The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was founded in 1967 to accommodate regional political, economic, and security cooperation amongst Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and the Philippines. One strategic aim of ASEAN was to resolve regional conflict through peaceful means (Anwar 1994).

The behaviour of communist superpowers in Southeast Asia was the major concern of Suharto and his foreign policy circles. It was foremost related to the danger that the expansion of communism in North Vietnam posed to Indonesian domestic security. Suharto and the military establishment held a common interest in countering the communists, following the 1965 coup, allegedly engineered by the Indonesian communists. Beijing was accused of assisting PKI; this resulted in the freezing of Indonesia's relations with China. Furthermore, the New Order held suspicious views on the Soviet Union's behaviour in the region. With this assessment, Suharto focused foreign policy more on Indonesia's immediate regional affairs rather than other international issues, including those pertinent to the Muslim world (Leifer 1983a). Indonesian foreign policy came to be dominated by issues associated with the creation of stability and cooperation development amongst non-communist states in Southeast Asian region.

Nevertheless, regarding the position of Islam, since the early 1990s Suharto had started to show greater interest in fortifying Indonesia's relations with the Muslim world. This was in line with the New Order leader's friendlier attitude toward domestic Muslim expressions. Thus, it is safe to assume that Suharto used foreign policy as a tool to support his domestic need to attract the support of the Muslim community. Islam was not the main cause of the enhanced ties with the Muslim world. To exemplify, by 1991 the ICMI's figures, with the approval of Suharto, were keen to upgrade Indonesian status within the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) from observer to full member. Within the OIC, Indonesia paid more attention to Muslim-related issues. However, the policy was not designed to pursue international Islamic solidarity. Instead, with a secular and pragmatic logic, Suharto saw Indonesia's relations with the Muslim states in an economic context

(Azra 2006:101-103, Sihbudi 1997:19-25). This case again indicates that Islam played some part in foreign policy, if only a limited one.

Material interests continued to dictate the foreign policy of successive governments after Suharto. Particularly the need to resolve economic problems left by the New Order. But, in limited contexts Islam/Islamic ideas had begun to receive consideration in the state's international projection.

The short-term administration of President Habibie (May 1998-October 1999) did not place Islam as a discourse of foreign policy. Instead, Habibie indicated an interest in prioritizing Indonesian relations with the US and international financial institutions, namely the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, with the primary objective of mobilizing economic resources for supporting national economy, which was plagued by terrible financial crisis (Kivimaki 2000). Habibie was replaced by Abdurrahman Wahid in October 1999.

Under President Wahid, the tendency to focus on non-Islamic agendas in Indonesian foreign relations was sustained. Wahid, who was known as an Islamic intellectual and former leader of Nahdlatul Ulama during the 1990s, did not see the relevance of Islam as the basis of governance in a multicultural country like Indonesia. Wahid recognized there were Muslims who had become familiar with the formalization of Islam. Therefore, they attached the entire manifestation of Islamic teachings to the creation of a state system based on Islam. However, the presence of an Islamic state system in Indonesia would automatically put people who were not Muslims or devout Muslims in a defensive or even marginalized position. Hence, the insistence on establishing an Islamic state as the framework of nation building in Indonesia was questionable (Wahid 2007).

In the foreign policy area, Wahid paid attention to the relationship between Indonesia and the Middle Eastern countries in two areas. One was on political issues pertinent to Israel-Palestine conflict and the second was on the need to reap more alternative foreign economic resources to help ease the impact of prolonged financial crisis (Smith 2001:520). Wahid's Middle Eastern policy became controversial with the Indonesian Muslim public, when he began preparing to open diplomatic ties with Israel. His argument was that to effectively building peace for Israel and Palestine, Indonesia had to recognize Israeli state existence, and advanced a formal relationship with Tel Aviv. By doing this, when trade links with Israel were unlocked, Indonesia would also benefit from the strong worldwide Jewish-businesses. For his unusual initiative, Wahid was widely criticized by Muslim leaders and the public, including those in Nahdlatul Ulama, many of whom accused him of begging for Jewish money and ignoring the sensitivities of Indonesian Islamic society. Due to mounting opposition, Wahid backed down on his plan (Panggabean 2004:33). This case demonstrates that although the ruling elite did not have an interest in incorporating Islam in foreign policy, it did not necessarily mean that the other actors could not influence the decision-making process.

President Megawati came to power in July 2001. The government under the secular Megawati did not alter Wahid's policy direction. It persisted in paying more attention to non-religious economic and political agendas. The government intensified efforts to attain economic benefits from abroad by promoting regional economic cooperation in a liberalization scheme, the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), which was applied formally on 1 January 2002. This was coupled with other Indonesian initiatives that further fostered the formation of an ASEAN Security Community, though which it hoped to regain the *primus inter pares* status in Southeast Asian region, a status that had been unclear since the country's national power weakened in the aftermath of the economic turmoil (Weatherbee 2005).

Nonetheless, amidst the preoccupation of material interests, the events of the 11 September 2001 attacks brought a consideration of Islam into Megawati's foreign policy, but it did not shape it. This was especially evident when international pressure mounted on Indonesia to take firmer action on radical Islamic groups. Megawati needed to respond cautiously, on one hand, the policy had to deal with radical Islamists who posed a threat to national and international security, and on the other hand it could not appear as anti-Islam or anti-Muslim. This caused dilemmas for the government. As a result, Megawati took an ambivalent position, condemning terrorism but not making significant efforts to counter domestic Islamic radicalism as requested by the US (Perwita 2007:160-165).

The successor of Megawati, President Yudhoyono who was inaugurated in October 2004, has tried to insert new thinking and view in Indonesia's foreign policy. According to Yudhoyono, nowadays Indonesian foreign relations are 'navigating in a turbulent ocean'. This statement was intended to be an encroachment upon Vice President Hatta's vision stated in 1948 that Indonesia

should be 'rowing between two reefs' to manage with the Cold War challenges. In the current context of changing global settings, the independent activism foreign policy has to be able to adapt with and properly respond to the challenges the state is facing, ranging from economic, social, cultural, security and political issues. The turbulent ocean is a metaphor for an environment characterized by these challenges (Tan 2007). The pragmatic nature of foreign policy has been maintained, as the president suggested, independent activism should entail an understanding of independence of judgement, and freedom of action (Anwar 2010:44).

On 19 May 2005, Yudhoyono delivered his first foreign policy speech titled "An Independent and Active Foreign Policy for the 21st Century", before the Indonesian Council on World Affairs (ICWA) meeting in Jakarta. The Indonesian leader (Yudhoyono 2005:389-390) stressed the need to produce a constructive image of the country in the eyes of the international society. It must be rooted in a strong sense of who Indonesians are: "We cannot be all things for all peoples. We must know who We are and what We believe in, and project them in our foreign policy...." The president went on to define Indonesian identity that "We are a proud nation who cherish our independence and national unity; We are the fourth most populous nation in the world; We are home to the world's largest Muslim population; We are the world's third largest democracy; We are a country where Islam, democracy and modernity go hand-in-hand...."

The country's Islamic identity has been articulated over and over again as the state's projection onto the international arena, including the main world economic forum of G-20, in which Indonesia is the only representative from Southeast Asia. The current Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa pointed out "as the G-20 has confirmed itself for the status of the major forum on world economic issues, Indonesia is challenged to carve a niche within the group that is unique to itself as the world's third largest democracy, the country with the world's largest Muslim population, and a voice of moderation..." (Anwar 2011:132). Compared to what Hatta (1953:450) had mentioned back in 1948, "Indonesian identity is not bound to either particular religiosity, yet acknowledging the omnipotent and invisible power of God that controls human actions...this is why the first principle of the state ideology of Pancasila refers to the belief in one supreme God...", the Yudhoyono government has openly spoken on Indonesian Muslim identity, and as such has taken a firmer position on Islam.

Yudhoyono showed that he intended to play an important role in the Muslim world. For example, he supported the Hamas-led Palestinian authority with humanitarian aid, and further offered to mediate peace between Israel and Palestine. To advance Indonesia-Middle East ties, the president appointed an Indonesian special envoy to the region, Alwi Shihab, whose main job was to foster cooperation and peace (*Antara* 12 December 2005). Islam is also present as the perceptual context in which Yudhoyono's objectives are likely to be established. After the 11 September 2001 tragedy, the West has held negative perceptions about Islam and Muslims. It had depicted Muslim communities as being backward, committed to violence – including terrorism, authoritarianism, and discrimination against women. Yudhoyono may attempt to show to the West a better image of Islam, that is, its peace-loving face (Anwar 2010:45). If this campaign is effective, it will promote Yudhoyono's personal, international and domestic reputation. In other words, it is an image-building project rather than truly motivated by Islamic ideas.

Beside this, Yudhoyono's initiative is apparently limited by the lack of real international capability, and therefore it appears to only be aimed at demonstrating that the Indonesian government is trying to make efforts for peace, rather than doing nothing. Indonesia has no concrete prospects to mediate peace for Israel and Palestine, by virtue Jakarta has not had any official links with Tel Aviv. Diplomacy without a real vehicle will not be viable, even if the Israeli government perceives Yudhoyono's proposal as favourable. More importantly, President Yudhoyono has no close relations with any of the Middle Eastern leaders required to make such a plan viable (Fealy 2006:29). Therefore, Islam comes about only in the rhetoric, rather than substance of Jakarta's policy.

In a nutshell, Islam's role is mostly marginalized in Indonesia's foreign policy agenda. This is influenced by a combination of factors such as the unchallengeable non-Islamic nature of the state's identity, the ruling elite's material interest, and external constraints. Besides these factors, the persisting fragmentation and conflict within Indonesian Islamic political groups have affected to the strength of Islamization in the arena of domestic politics and foreign policy.

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